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Summary 
The representation of labour markets in Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models is 
characterised by a trade-off between data representation and data availability. Models are by 
definition abstract and simplified pictures of the real world: as a map of scale 1:1 does not help to 
find an unknown destination, a model which perfectly depicts the real world would hardly help to 
analyse adjustment effects of policy changes or macroeconomic shocks. When the analysis is 
focused on distributional issues, it seems obvious that such an analysis can only be based on 
models that differentiate at least more than one household group. Household groups 
characteristically differ in factor endowment and since factor income– besides price effects – is a 
main determinant of welfare analysis, the specification of labour markets crucially determines the 
analysis. There are mainly two possibilities to specify the labour market in a CGE model: First, the 
labour market can be set up as competitive market with perfect substitutability between 
individual workers on that market. With this setup, wages must be equal among labour types and 
sectors because every difference in wages provokes adjustments, which finally equalise wages 
again. In contrast, data reports typically significant wage differences between labour types that 
can only originate from imperfect labour markets. Thus, the second option is to depict these wage 
differences by imperfect substitutability of individual workers in the production process. But data 
on substitution possibilities of labour demand between different labour types is weak and 
estimations of substitution elasticities are in most of the cases not available. 
Meanwhile, in the real world, wages differ in various dimensions and in models labour types are 
typically differentiated by age, gender, skill level or occupation. When differentiating labour types 
within these dimensions, wage differences become possible and can be explained by 
transformation limitations between characteristics: e.g., wage differences between female and 
male workers are originating from the fact that female workers cannot become male workers. 
This differentiation has the effect that in most of the models, transformation between the 
characteristics of a dimension is no longer possible and workers stay in a specific labour type. 
Typically labour types are not differentiated by sector of employment and, thus, are assumed 
homogeneous amongst sectors. Movement of workers between sectors seems possible; 
nevertheless, data reports partly huge wage differences between different sectors of an 
economy. As a solution, CGE models typically include an efficiency parameter which allows 
calibrating the model according to the data, but the model assumes still homogeneous labour 
which should be priced equal. Thus, the efficiency parameter does not economically explain the 
existence of these wage differences. 
Against this background, this thesis develops a comprehensive framework to model imperfect 
mobility in CGE models. First, the article on ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Labour: Who 
Benefits?’ introduces a single country CGE model for Israel with a detailed depiction of the labour 
market and a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production process. Based on this 
model, the second article on ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’ introduces imperfect 
mobility between sectors with a migration function. It furthermore develops the possibility to 
change between sector and factor specific productivity, which is used to estimate productivity 
effects from factor reallocation. This theoretical approach is applied in the third article on ‘Labour 
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market flexibility and costs of adjustment’ to analyse the macroeconomic costs of intersectoral 
labour reallocation found in several empirical studies. 
The thesis concludes that nested factor demand is useful to depict heterogeneity of factors. A 
main critic to this approach is the non-availability of required additional parameters, thus, 
substitution elasticities are mostly based on educated guesses instead of empirically estimates. 
However, careful sensitivity analyses show stable results for a wide range of elasticity values. The 
value of a substitution elasticity affects the results significantly only for extreme values or in 
combination with factor specific productivity, when productivity differences are huge, but this is 
more a matter of the productivity setup. Stronger than the value of the elasticity, the nesting 
structure and nesting hierarchy seem to matter for the model outcomes. 
When labour moves from less to more productive sectors, an economy experiences a de facto 
increase in labour endowments, which is an important part in the explanation of economic 
growth. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that labour migrating between sectors experiences 
wage losses and that labour types are not perfectly mobile across sectors. Neglecting factor 
reallocation costs and factor specific productivity in CGE-modelling might overestimate the size of 
potential adjustments in the labour market as a response to exogenous shocks and, thus, affect 
simulation results; this is the research question in the second article. Productivity effects from 
labour reallocation are an important driver for model outcomes, macroeconomic results change 
completely in the second article when excluding them. The productivity effects are larger the 
more reallocation takes place, and the higher the mobility of labour is assumed. They depend also 
on the size of differences in sectoral wages. The relevance of productivity effects for model 
outcomes indicate that the assumption of full mobility might overestimate positive 
macroeconomic effects accruing, e.g., from trade liberalisation. 
Several empirical studies show that workers, who change sectors, can experience large and 
persistent wage losses. Responsible for these losses are primarily two effects: lower incomes 
during unemployment, and lower wages upon reemployment. Neglecting these reallocation costs 
overestimates the possibility of adjustment for an economy as well as the welfare benefits of 
policy reforms. The third article shows, that costs of labour reallocation, which decrease labour 
mobility, matter on the macroeconomic level, affect the whole economy and especially income 
distribution. Workers who would migrate but are hindered due to the related costs, are the ones 
to lose the most. Provided the adjustment leads to inflow of workers in the more productive 
sectors of an economy, the losers are relative low waged workers in the less productive sectors 
and the income gap widens. 
This thesis presents a comprehensive and flexible framework to introduce imperfect factor 
markets in CGE models. Labour mobility between labour types is controlled by migration 
functions where the degree of mobility is controlled by elasticities that govern the responsiveness 
of migration to changes in relative wages. Finally, the model provides the user with three 
additional instruments to control the operation of labour markets. First, the user can control the 
stock flow relationship for each labour type, e.g., does a migrating worker keep her productivity 
from the initial activity, adopt that of the destination activity or something in between; second, 
the user controls the flexibility of the labour market by setting the migration elasticities between 
activity blocks; and third, the setting of adjustment parameters determines the (assumed) costs of 
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migrating. The analysis of productivity effects and costs of factor reallocation emphasises the 
relevance and influence of labour market specifications on model outcomes. Thus, this thesis sets 
the base for a careful setup and test of labour market assumptions applied in CGE models. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die realistische Wiedergabe von Daten auf der einen Seite, sowie die Verfügbarkeit von Daten auf 
der anderen, bilden einen Grundkonflikt bei der Abbildung von Arbeitsmärkten in allgemeinen 
Gleichgewichtsmodellen (CGE-Modellen). Modelle sind per Definition abstrakte und vereinfachte 
Bilder der realen Welt: Wie eine Landkarte mit dem Maßstab 1:1 nicht weiterhilft, ein 
unbekanntes Ziel zu finden, wird ein Modell, welches die Realität perfekt wiedergibt, kaum dabei 
helfen, Anpassungseffekte und Auswirkungen von politischen Entscheidungen oder 
makroökonomischen Schocks zu analysieren. Wenn die Analyse auf Verteilungswirkungen abzielt, 
scheint es naheliegend, dass eine solche Analyse nur mit Modellen durchgeführt werden kann, die 
mehrere Haushaltsgruppen unterscheiden. Haushaltsgruppen unterscheiden sich typischerweise 
in ihrer Faktorausstattung und damit in ihrem Faktoreinkommen.  Faktoreinkommen ist – neben 
Preiseffekten – eine der Haupteinflussgrößen in der Wohlfahrtsanalyse, damit beeinflusst die 
Darstellung der Arbeitsmärkte die Analyse entscheidend. Es gibt vor allem zwei Möglichkeiten 
einen Arbeitsmarkt in einem CGE-Modell darzustellen: Erstens kann der Arbeitsmarkt als 
Wettbewerbsmarkt aufgefasst werden, in welchem die Arbeitskräfte perfekt substituierbar sind. 
In einem solchen Wettbewerbsmarkt müssen die Löhne von verschiedenen Arbeitergruppen und 
Sektoren einheitlich sein, denn jeder Lohnunterschied verursacht Anpassungseffekte, welche 
letztendlich wieder zu einem einheitlichen Lohnniveau führen. Im Gegensatz dazu weisen 
Arbeitsmarktdaten typischerweise deutliche Lohnunterschiede aus, welche nur aufgrund 
unvollkommener Arbeitsmärkte entstehen können. Somit, um diesen Lohnunterschieden gerecht 
zu werden, ist die zweite Möglichkeit der Abbildung von Arbeitsmärkten eine unvollkommene 
Substituierbarkeit individueller Arbeitskräfte im Produktionsprozess. Der Nachteil dabei ist, dass 
bei diesem Ansatz deutlich mehr Parameter benötigt werden, die kaum oder nicht verfügbar sind, 
wie  zum Beispiel Informationen über die Substituierbarkeit verschiedener Gruppen von 
Arbeitern.  
Währenddessen unterscheiden sich Löhne in der Realität in verschiedensten Dimensionen, 
Arbeitskräfte werden daher in Modellen üblicherweise anhand von Alter, Geschlecht, 
Qualifikation oder Beruf kategorisiert. Wenn Arbeiter in diesen Dimensionen kategorisiert sind, 
werden Lohnunterschiede möglich und sind durch beschränkte Transformationsmöglichkeiten 
zwischen den Ausprägungen der Dimension erklärbar: z.B. kann sich eine weibliche Arbeiterin 
kaum in einen männlichen Arbeiter verwandeln und Lohnunterschiede können somit nicht durch 
Transformation in die andere Kategorie ausgeglichen werden. Die Differenzierung anhand 
verschiedener Ausprägungen hat zur Folge, dass in den meisten Modellen keine Transformation 
zwischen den Ausprägungen mehr möglich ist und Arbeiter somit in einer spezifischen Kategorie 
verbleiben. Normalerweise werden Arbeiter nicht anhand des Beschäftigungssektors 
kategorisiert, daher wird implizit angenommen, dass Arbeiter homogen über Sektoren sind. 
Bewegungen von Arbeitern zwischen Sektoren scheinen durchaus möglich, trotzdem findet man 
in den Daten teilweise große Lohnunterschiede zwischen Sektoren. Aus diesem Grund haben CGE-
Modelle typischerweise einen Effizienz-Parameter, der es erlaubt, das Modell im Sinne der Daten 
zu kalibrieren. Trotzdem basiert der Arbeitsmarkt des Modells immer noch auf der Annahme von 
homogener Arbeit, welche einen einheitlichen Lohn erhalten sollte und der Effizienz-Parameter 
erklärt damit nicht die Existenz dieser Lohnunterschiede. 
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Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelt diese Dissertation eine umfassende Struktur zur Modellierung 
von unvollständiger Mobilität in CGE-Modellen. Der erste Artikel, ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on 
Labour: Who Benefits?’, stellt ein Ländermodell für Israel vor, welches den Arbeitsmarkt 
detailliert abbildet und einen Produktionsprozess beinhaltet, der sich über mehrere Ebenen 
erstreckt und diese Ebenen mit CES-Funktionen (konstante Substitutions-Elastizitäten) verbindet. 
Aufbauend auf diesem Modell entwickelt der zweite Artikel, ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous 
Labour’, unvollkommene Mobilität zwischen Sektoren, welche mit einer Migrations-Funktion 
eingeführt wird. Zudem entwickelt der Artikel die Möglichkeit zwischen sektorspezifischer und 
faktorspezifischer Produktivität zu wechseln, was es ermöglicht, Produktivitätseffekte von 
Faktorreallokation zu schätzen. Dieser theoretische Ansatz wird im dritten Artikel, ‘Labour market 
flexibility and costs of adjustment’, angewandt, welcher die makroökonomischen Kosten der 
Reallokation von Arbeitern zwischen Sektoren analysiert, deren Existenz in empirischen Studien 
nachgewiesen ist. 
Die Dissertation kommt zum Schluss, dass eine gruppierte, hierarchische Faktornachfrage nützlich 
ist, um die Heterogenität von Faktoren abzubilden. Ein Hauptkritikpunkt mit diesem Ansatz ist die 
fehlende Verfügbarkeit der benötigten zusätzlichen Parameter. Substitutionselastizitäten basieren 
daher oft auf Erfahrungswerten, anstatt empirischen Schätzungen. Systematische 
Sensitivitätsanalysen zeigen jedoch stabile Modellergebnisse für eine große Bandbreite von 
Elastizitätswerten. Der Wert einer Substitutionselastizität beeinflusst die Ergebnisse signifikant 
nur für Extremwerte oder in Kombination mit faktorspezifischer Produktivität, wenn 
Produktivitätsunterschiede groß sind, was jedoch ein Problem der Produktivitätsspezifikation ist. 
Von größerer Bedeutung für Modellergebnisse als der gewählte Wert der Elastizitäten, ist die 
Struktur und Hierarchie der Ebenen. 
Wenn Arbeiter von weniger produktiven zu produktiveren Sektoren wechseln, erfährt eine 
Ökonomie faktisch einen Anstieg des Arbeitskräftepotentials, was einen wichtigen Anteil bei der 
Erklärung von volkswirtschaftlichem Wachstum spielt. Empirische Arbeiten legen nahe, dass 
Arbeiter, welche ihre Beschäftigungssektoren wechseln, Lohnverluste erleben und daher nicht 
vollkommen mobil zwischen Sektoren sind. Die Vernachlässigung von Reallokationskosten und 
faktorspezifischer Produktivität in CGE-Modellen kann zur Überschätzung des 
Anpassungspotentials nach einem exogenen Schock führen und somit Simulationsergebnisse 
beeinflussen; dies ist die Forschungsfrage im zweiten Artikel. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Produktivitätseffekte von Arbeitsreallokation ein wichtiger Treiber für Modellergebnisse sind. 
Makroökonomische Ergebnisse drehen sich in Artikel zwei komplett um, wenn 
Produktivitätseffekte ausgeschaltet werden. Diese Produktivitätseffekte sind größer, je mehr 
Reallokation stattfindet und je höher die Möglichkeit der Mobilität angenommen wird. Die 
Relevanz von Produktivitätseffekten für Modellergebnisse zeigt, dass die Annahme der 
vollständigen Mobilität positive makroökonomische Effekte, z.B. von Handelsliberalisierung, 
überschätzt. 
Einige empirische Studien zeigen, dass Arbeiter, welche ihren Beschäftigungssektor wechseln, 
große und andauernde Lohnverluste erfahren. Verantwortlich für diese Verluste sind vor allem 
zwei Effekte: geringeres Einkommen während Arbeitslosigkeit und geringere Löhne in der neuen 
Arbeitsstelle. Die Vernachlässigung dieser Kosten überschätzt die Anpassungsfähigkeit einer 
Ökonomie, sowie positive Wohlfahrtseffekte von Politikreformen. Der dritte Artikel zeigt, dass die 
Zusammenfassung 
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Kosten der Arbeitsreallokation, welche Arbeitsmobilität verringern, auch auf makroökonomischer 
Ebene Bedeutung haben und insbesondere Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensverteilung haben. 
Arbeiter, welche aus einem Sektor abwandern würden, durch die damit verbundenen Kosten 
jedoch daran gehindert werden, sind diejenigen, welche am meisten betroffen sind. 
Vorausgesetzt, dass die Anpassung in Richtung zu den produktiveren Sektoren der Ökonomie 
führt, sind die Verlierer die relativ geringer entlohnten Arbeiter in den weniger produktiven 
Sektoren und die Einkommensschere weitet sich. 
Die Dissertation präsentiert einen umfassenden und flexiblen Rahmen, um unvollkommene 
Faktormärkte in CGE-Modellen abzubilden. Arbeitsmobilität zwischen verschiedenen Kategorien 
von Arbeitern wird von einer Migrations-Funktion gesteuert, wobei die Stärke der Mobilität von 
Migrationselastizitäten beeinflusst wird, welche die Sensitivität der Migration hinsichtlich relativer 
Lohnveränderungen bestimmen. Das Modell bietet dem Nutzer schließlich drei zusätzliche 
Instrumente, um den Arbeitsmarkt zu kontrollieren: Erstens kann der Nutzer den 
Produktivitätsfluss für jede Arbeiter-Kategorie kontrollieren, z.B. ob ein Arbeiter seine alte 
Produktivität behält, die des neuen Sektors annimmt oder diese nur teilweise annimmt. Zweitens 
kann der Nutzer mit Hilfe der Migrationselastizitäten die Flexibilität des Arbeitsmarktes 
kontrollieren; und drittens bestimmen zusätzliche Anpassungs-Parameter die (angenommenen) 
Kosten der Migration. Die Analyse von Produktivitätseffekten und Faktor-Reallokationskosten 
machen die Relevanz und den Einfluss von Arbeitsmarktspezifikationen auf Modellergebnisse 
deutlich. Diese Arbeit bildet eine Basis für eine sorgfältige Konfiguration und Überprüfung von 
Annahmen, welche in CGE-Modellen für Arbeitsmärkte zum Einsatz kommen. 
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I. Introduction 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models exist in various levels of aggregation and the 
assumptions on and simplifications of behavioural relationships vary strongly. There are CGE models 
ranging, e.g., from the simple 1-2-3 model developed by Devarajan et al. (1997), with one country, 
two producing sectors and three goods, to the MIRAGE model, which includes a poverty module with 
more than 50 household groups per region, multiple regions and up to 57 sectors (Bouet et al., 
2011). Other models, such as GTAP (Hertel, 1997), focus on trade and depict factor markets and 
domestic agents rather aggregated, but illustrate a very detailed view on trade relationships and 
trade partners, i.e., the latest GTAP 8 database incorporates detailed trade data for 129 regions. 
Thus, the level of abstraction depends crucially on the research question to be analysed. The 
representation of factor markets in CGE models is characterised by a trade-off between 
representation of real world data, market structure and empirically validated behavioural 
parameters. Models are by definition abstract and simplified pictures of the real world: as a map of 
scale 1:1 does not help to find an unknown destination, a model, which perfectly depicts the real 
world, would hardly help to analyse adjustment effects of policy changes or macroeconomic shocks. 
When the analysis focuses on distributional issues, it seems obvious that such an analysis can only be 
based on models, which differentiate at least more than one household group. These household 
groups characteristically differ in factor endowment and since factor income is – besides commodity 
price effects – a main determinant to welfare analysis, the specification of labour markets crucially 
determines the analysis. 
There are mainly two possibilities to specify the labour market in a CGE model: First, the labour 
market can be set up as a competitive market, with perfect substitutability between the individual 
workers and groups of workers (labour types) on that market. With this setup, wages must be equal 
among labour types and sectors, because every difference in wages provokes adjustments which 
finally equalise wages again. In contrast, the data typically reports significant wage differences 
between labour types that can only originate from imperfect labour markets. Thus, the second 
option is to depict these wage differences by imperfect substitutability of individual workers in the 
production process. But data on substitution possibilities of labour demand between different labour 
types is weak and estimations of substitution elasticities are in most of the cases not available. 
Boeters and Savard (2013), which review the modelling of labour markets in CGE models, therefore 
see a plausible default in the assumption of perfect substitutability in labour demand. According to 
Boeters and Savard (2013), demand differentiation is only justified, when there is evidence that 
wages do not move in parallel. 
Meanwhile, in the real world, wages differ in various dimensions: typically labour types are 
differentiated by age, gender, skill level or occupation. When differentiating labour types within 
these dimensions, wage differences become possible and can be explained by transformation 
limitations between characteristics: e.g., wage differences between female and male workers are 
originating from the fact, that female workers cannot become male workers1. This differentiation has 
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 Wage differences between male and female workers are an empirical fact, why and if the gender matters in 
the production process is controversially discussed. 
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the effect, that, in most of the models, transformation between the characteristics of a dimension is 
no longer possible and workers stay in a specific labour type. In perfectly competitive markets, only 
heterogeneous productivities can explain the existence of wage differences (Bourguignon and 
Bussolo, 2013). To stay economically consistent, if wage differences are not based on productivities, 
the labour market cannot be perfectly competitive. Market imperfections might originate from wage 
discrimination against parts of the labour market or the existence of groups of workers, who can 
secure non-competitive advantages in some areas (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013). In both cases, if 
labour types earn different wages due to heterogeneous productivities and due to imperfect 
markets, labour types seem to be imperfect substitutes in the production process. 
In CGE models, labour types are usually not differentiated by sector of employment and thus are 
assumed homogeneous amongst sectors. Movement of workers between sectors is possible; 
nevertheless, data reports partly huge wage differences between different sectors of an economy. To 
reflect these wage differences in the model, CGE models typically include an efficiency parameter 
which allows calibrating the model according to the data, but the model assumes still homogeneous 
labour, which should be priced equal. Thus, the efficiency parameter does not economically explain 
the existence of these wage differences. 
Against this background, this thesis develops an alternative approach to include heterogeneous 
labour in a CGE framework. To this end, imperfect mobility is implemented using migration functions, 
where workers migrate between different sector blocks of production. Migration functions have 
been used to depict migration between countries or regions by McDonald and Thierfelder (2009), 
with workers migrating to a pool and from that pool. This study extends the migration function 
approach, by defining migration bilaterally between different sector blocks of the economy. Based on 
this approach, the thesis analyses the relevance of heterogeneous labour for model outcomes, i.e., it 
estimates productivity effects from factor reallocation and analyses macroeconomic costs of 
intersectoral labour reallocation. For this purpose, the model is extended to allow to specify 
productivity as sector-specific or factor-specific. The thesis is based on three articles, which form a 
cumulative dissertation. These articles are developed in the framework of the trilateral project on 
‘The Economic Integration of Agriculture in Israel and Palestine’ funded by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Article 2 (section III) focusses on the methodological contribution, 
while article 1 (section II), which introduces the base model and database, and article 3 (section IV) 
are more applied. 
The first article ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Labour: Who Benefits?’, published in Economic 
Modeling, introduces imperfections on the Israeli labour market with a system of nested Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES)-functions in a single country CGE model, adapted to a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Israel for the year 2004. Imperfect substitutability in labour demand is 
assumed for different dimensions, i.e., skill level, ethnicity, gender and occupation. The study 
evaluates the effects of reducing movement and access restrictions between Israel and the West 
Bank: Palestinian workers have been employed in low-skilled jobs in Israel for decades. The second 
Intifada, starting in 2000, severely increased border restrictions and sharply reduced employment 
possibilities for Palestinians in Israel, increased unemployment and reduced income in the West 
Bank. 
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The second article, ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’, submitted to Labour Economics, 
establishes a framework in which factors are non-homogeneous among sectors. Reflecting the data 
for the Israeli labour market, which reports huge wage differences between sectors and for 
notionally the same labour type, factors are additionally differentiated according to sectors. A 
migration function is implemented to allow for movements between sectors dependent on relative 
wages. When assuming a perfectly competitive market with no distortions, the wage differences 
between sectors result from productivity differences, which raises the question whether these 
heterogeneous productivities are related to the sector of employment or the factor itself. If labour 
productivity is modelled as sector specific and labour moves from less to more productive sectors, an 
economy experiences a de facto increase in labour endowments, which affects simulation results. 
Separating the impacts of implicit increases in labour endowments from other impacts arising from 
labour reallocation is therefore important for result interpretation. Two scenarios are run in order to 
analyse the size and relevance of the productivity effect: the first scenario causes labour to move 
from less to more labour productive industries, the second scenario induces movement of labour 
from more to less productive industries 
The third article ‘Labour Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment’ submitted to the Journal of 
Policy Modelling applies the methodology developed in the second article. Findings of the empirical 
literature on reallocation costs are considered in a CGE framework: not only is the mobility of labour 
between sectors assumed imperfect, but there are additional adjustment costs originating from 
labour movement. Neglecting these reallocation costs overestimates the size of labour movements 
and therefore the possibility of adjustment for an economy as well as the welfare benefits of policy 
reforms. In the light of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the study analyses, how the existence of labour 
reallocation costs for movement between sectors is influencing welfare effects accruing from a 
calming down of tensions resulting in increasing employment of Palestinians in Israel. 
The thesis concludes with a general discussion and synthesis of the three articles. For the description 
of technical details is rather tight in journal articles, a detailed technical appendix on database, base 
model and model adjustments complements the main part of the thesis. 
I.1. References 
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Abstract 
Palestinian workers have been employed in low-skilled jobs in Israel for decades. The second Intifada, 
from 2000, increased border restrictions severely and sharply reduced employment possibilities in 
Israel for Palestinians, increased unemployment and reduced income in the West Bank. Israeli 
employers responded by increasing the number of foreign workers, mostly from Asia. Growing 
unemployment among Israeli unskilled workers caused Israel to impose quotas on the employment 
of foreigners. This study evaluates the effects of reducing movement and access restrictions between 
Israel and the West Bank. The study uses a single country computable general equilibrium model, 
adapted to a Social Accounting Matrix of Israel for the year 2004, to simulate the effects of different 
Israeli labour policy regimes and to identify the inter sectoral, whole economy and distributional 
implications. 
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II.1. Introduction 
Palestinian workers commute to Israel on a day-to-day basis for, predominantly, employment in the 
agricultural and construction industries where wage rates exceed those in the West Bank and Gaza. 
By 1999 Israel was the largest employer of Palestinian workers, with 23% of the employed 
Palestinians working in Israel and its settlements (PCBS, 2010), but this had fallen to 8% of Palestinian 
employees by 2004 which had inevitable adverse consequences for employment and income in 
Palestine (PCBS, 2010). Fluctuations in the numbers of Palestinians working in Israel follow political 
relations between Israel and the Palestinian Territories: after the election of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1995 employment increased until the outbreak of the second Intifada, in 2000, when employment 
fell sharply. The Israeli labour market responded to these fluctuations by increasing the number of 
foreign workers2, mostly from Asia. More recently tighter quotas have been imposed on foreign 
workers following increases in the unemployment rates of Israeli low and unskilled workers. 
The Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, are de facto economically separate3, 
have different economic and social characteristics, are ruled by different parties, and experience 
different treatment from Israel. Unemployment in the West Bank decreased from 28.2% in 2002 to 
17.8% in 2009, but remained high in the Gaza Strip, 38.6% in 2009, (see Figure II.1), with, in 2010, no 
cross-border workers from Gaza but about 14.0% of West Bank workers in Israel (PCBS, 2010). This 
study focuses only on the labour markets of the West Bank and Israel, since the bar on workers from 
the Gaza Strip is unlikely to be lifted soon. 
This study estimates the potential benefits accruing to both economies from reducing labour 
movement restrictions between Israel and the West Bank. Such a policy change will impact 
differently on different industries in Israel and will have whole economy implications; hence the 
study uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (STAGE) that has been adapted for this 
analysis. The data employed are provided by a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Israel in 2004 
(Siddig et al., 2011) developed for this study. 
The next section provides an overview of the Israeli and Palestinian labour markets, while section 3 
describes the CGE model, its extension and the Israeli SAM, and additional data. Section 4 defines the 
scenarios analysed and presents and discusses the results. The conclusions and potential policy 
implications are discussed in the final section. 
II.2. Labour Markets in the West Bank and Israel 
II.2.1. The West Bank Labour Market  
The West Bank labour force is fast growing. In the 15 years to 2009 it nearly doubled, from 358 to 
643 thousand (PCBS, 2010); largely reflecting the demographic profile but the potential for increase 
is large due to the relatively low participation rate, 43.8%, that derives from the low participation 
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 Palestinians are not considered foreign workers. 
3
 Less than 1.0% of West Bank workers have been employed in Gaza since 1995 and vice versa. 
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rate of women (17.4%).4 Unemployment declined strongly in the late 1990s (Figure II.1) during a 
period of high economic growth. But unemployment increased with the outbreak of the second 
Intifada in 2000, which resulted in the closure of the Israeli-Palestinian border and the establishment 
of restrictions on movement, e.g., checkpoints and road barriers within the Palestinian Territories, 
and a sharp reduction in the employment of Palestinians in Israeli and its settlements (PCBS, 2005). 
Unemployment further increased with the contraction of the Palestinian economy, although since 
2003 unemployment has fallen primarily due to employment growth in the West Bank. 
Figure II.1. Unemployment Rates in the Palestinian Territories (%, 1995-2009) 
  
Source: Own compilation based on PCBS (2010). 
Palestinian employment in Israel has long been substantial (Figure II.2), but access to the Israeli 
labour market by Palestinians is managed. In 1999 employment in Israel and its settlements 
accounted for 26% of West Bank workers, but this had declined to 13% by 2002; since then the 
number of Palestinians employed in Israel has doubled although it only accounted for 14% by 2009 
due to the growth in the labour force (PCBS, 2010). Expansion of such employment has significantly 
increased national income and demand (Palestinian Ministry of Finance, 2009). 
Palestinians are mainly employed in unskilled or low skilled jobs in Israel, where the wages are at 
least 70% higher than the average wage in the West Bank (Bank of Israel, 2010a; PCBS, 2010). 
Compared to neighbouring countries, the wage level in the West Bank is relatively high (Aix-Group, 
2007), which may be due to the possibility of employment in Israel, which raises the reservation 
wage (Bulmer, 2003).  
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 In the Gaza Strip, the labour force participation rate was 37.6% in 2009. 
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II.2.2. Structure of the Labour Force in Israel 
During the second Intifada domestic demand stagnated in Israel and unemployment increased, 
peaking at 10.6% in 2003. After 2003 the Israeli economy grew rapidly and wages and employment 
rates increased so that by 2006 there was ‘full employment in Israel’ (Bank of Israel, 2010a) with the 
lowest unemployment rate (6.1%) in two decades and the highest level (56.5%) of labour force 
participation. Since 2009 unemployment has slightly increased; mainly due to declining employment 
in industries that intensively use low skilled labour. 
Israeli low and unskilled workers compete with foreign (non-Palestinian) and Palestinian workers in 
the labour market. Israeli workers rarely take employment below the minimum wage (OECD, 2010c), 
while weak enforcement of the minimum wage law allows foreign and Palestinian workers to be 
employed below the minimum wage (Bank of Israel, 2010b; OECD, 2010c). Moreover Israelis who 
serve in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are supported with privileges in the labour market (OECD, 
2010c). Since Arab Israeli’s rarely serve in the IDF this results in Jewish and Arab Israeli’s being 
differentiated in the labour market.5 The segmentation of the labour market implied by these 
institutional arrangements is confirmed by the wage rates implied by the data. 
Table II.1. Different Reporting on Wages for Palestinian Workers in Israel, 2005 
Minimum wage in 
Israel 
Wages according to 
OECD publicationsa 
Wages according to 
PCBS and Bank of 
Israel publications 
Average wage in the 
West Bank (PCBS) 
20 NIS/hourd 18 NIS/houra 16 NIS/hourd 9 NIS/hourd 
160 NIS/day 144 NIS/dayd 127 NIS/day 74 NIS/day 
3,335 NIS/month - 2,772 NIS/monthb 1,739 NIS/monthc 
a Association of Contractors and Builders in Israel (2009) as cited in OECD (2010c). b calculated with 22 
days. c calculated with 23.6 days in West Bank. d calculated with 8 working hours per day. 
Sources: OECD (2010c), PCBS (2011), Bank of Israel (2010a).  
The wages in Israel range from 127 NIS per day to 160 NIS per day, the minimum wage (Table II.1). 
Palestinian workers can earn between 70 and 110% more on the Israeli unskilled/low skilled labour 
market than the average wage on the West Bank labour market. The wage rates for foreigners on the 
Israeli labour market are higher than for Palestinians (OECD, 2010c); employers have to pay higher 
social contributions and fees for foreign workers, although Palestinians receive subsidised 
transportation. Consequently there are strong incentives for Palestinians to seek employment in 
Israel. 
Since 1990 Israel has increasingly turned to foreign workers with the relative and absolute 
participation of Palestinians declining with the tensions in the early 1990s and again after 2000. 
There was a recovery after the election of the Palestinian Authority in 1995 and since 2003 there has 
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 Certain Israelis are exempted from service in the IDF on religious grounds. 
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been a slow increase, but the number of Palestinian workers is still well below the levels in the 1980s 
(Figure II.2). 
Figure II.2. Palestinian and Foreign Workers in Israel (in thousands, 1985-2010) 
 
Source: Own compilation based on Bank of Israel (2011)  
Three Israeli industries are highly dependent on non-Israeli (Palestinians and foreigners) workers: 
agriculture, construction, and homecare. In 2008, 30% of all employees in construction and 37% of all 
employees in agriculture were non-Israeli (Bank of Israel, 2009). In these industries wages are low 
and employers have difficulties recruiting Israelis.  
After 1993 the flow of Palestinians to Israel became irregular due to access restrictions that were 
determined by security, not economic, concerns. Changing security procedures increased uncertainty 
of whether the workers would be able to reach their workplace, even for those holding permits. This 
situation affected both employers and employees negatively (Aix-Group, 2007). 
Since 1990 workers from abroad, mainly Asia, have been allowed to work in Israel on renewable 
three monthly work permits as employers lobbied to raise the number of foreign workers in Israel. 
For 10 years, the number of foreign workers in Israel increased rapidly (Figure II.2). Despite the 
number of permits issued remaining almost constant since 1995, with approximately 60 thousand 
permits released annually (Bank of Israel, 2008; OECD, 2010c), and quotas on foreign labour in 
agriculture and construction, the number of foreigner workers has increased, mainly due to ‘illegal’ 
workers (people who stay in Israel after their working permit ended). A period of stricter 
enforcement of work permits reduced the number of foreign workers in the early 2000s but since 
2005 the number has been rising. 
The short-run elasticity of Israeli demand for Palestinian labour in the late 1980s was estimated at 
between -1 and -2 (Angrist, 1996); this study also provided strong evidence that decreasing 
Palestinian labour supply in Israel significantly increased wages Israeli employers pay, especially for 
low-skilled workers in construction and agriculture. Since 1990 the presence of large numbers of 
foreign workers has changed the situation. The effects of foreign workers on the employment 
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situation for Palestinian cross-border workers was analysed in an empirical study by Aranki and 
Daoud (2010) with data covering a period from 1999 to 2003. Their findings indicate that it is less the 
presence of foreigners but rather movement obstacles that restrict Palestinians crossing the border 
for work, which significantly limit Palestinians’ employment opportunities.  
Several studies analyse the impact of foreign workers on wages of native workers. Chao and Yu 
(2002) use a simple two-sector general equilibrium model to examine why immigration policies 
typically favour skilled immigrants and discriminate against unskilled immigrants. They distinguish 
between a non-tradable services industry, which is skilled labour intensive, and a low-skilled labour 
intensive industry producing tradable products, where the non-traded sector is governed by 
imperfect competition. Their findings indicate that immigration of skilled workers is welfare 
enhancing, while the immigration of unskilled workers can reduce the host country’s welfare. 
Immigration of skilled workers leads to an expansion of the skilled labour intensive services industry 
and to falling prices. Thus the inflow of skilled workers increases welfare by shrinking the existing 
distortion in the services industry via an increase in the output of this industry; immigration of 
unskilled workers has the opposite effects. According to Carter (2005) the competition for jobs is 
between native and foreign workers, hence their substitutability is crucial for welfare effects from 
immigration. This theoretical study, which uses a rather aggregated migration model, analyses 
competition across segmented labour markets, and demonstrates that if there are more migrants in 
a country the number of jobs for migrants increases, migrants’ wages are lowered and income for the 
host country from capital and labour increases. But if migrants start to move into jobs previously 
occupied by native workers, host-country labour may be hurt by falling wages and increasing 
unemployment. In this regard it is not the number of migrants which may harm native workers, but 
the number of jobs, which is available for the native workers. Regarding Israel the labour market is 
rather segmented between Israelis and immigrants, for migrants are dominantly working in low-
skilled jobs in agriculture and construction, in which Israelis are hardly willing to work. 
II.3. Analytical Framework and Data 
II.3.1. Main Features of the STAGE Model 
This study uses an augmented version of the single country Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model STAGE (McDonald, 2009). STAGE is a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) based model with a mix 
of non-linear and linear relationships governing the behaviour of the model’s agents. Households 
maximise utility subject to preferences represented by Stone-Geary utility functions. They consume 
‘composite’ products that are constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregates of domestic and 
imported products. Domestic and imported products are modelled as imperfect substitutes, 
following Armington (1969), where the relative price determines the optimal ratio of domestic and 
imported product consumption. Israel is assumed to be a small country in the world market; 
therefore world market prices for imports and exports are fixed. 
Domestic production is modelled as a two stage production process with either Leontief or CES 
technologies applied. At the first stage, intermediate input and value added generate the output of 
each industry. At the second stage the use of intermediate inputs is in fixed proportions using 
Leontief technology. CES technology is used at the second stage to form value added by primary 
production factors where the optimal ratio of factors is determined by relative prices. 
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Product demand consists of domestic demand and export demand. The distribution of domestically 
produced products among domestic demand and exports is governed by relative prices on these 
markets, using constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions, which reflects imperfect product 
transformation.  
II.3.2. Modelling of the Labour Market 
The domestic production module is extended to use a five-level production process that better 
reflects the operation of the Israeli labour market. Aggregate value added is defined as a series of 
CES aggregates of (natural) primary inputs or aggregated (primary) inputs where the optimal 
combinations of these inputs are determined by relative input factor prices. At each level the model 
allows for the elasticities of substitution to be level and industry specific. Because of the lack of 
empirical evidence to calibrate the CES elasticities the base configuration of the model assumes that 
the elasticities are only level specific6; the sensitivity of the results to this assumption is tested by 
sensitivity analysis (see Section 4.2.3 below). 
Figure II.3. Value Added Nesting 
 
Source: own compilation.  
Figure II.3 illustrates the value added nesting structure adopted for all activities. Since Palestinian and 
foreign labour are not represented in the skilled labour market in Israel only Israeli, Jewish and Arab 
& Other, skilled labour are available, and therefore aggregate skilled labour can only be sourced from 
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 The value of the elasticities (i,j) are chosen as follows: derived from literature (Hertel, 1997) 22=0.8 and 
31=1.5; good substitutability is assumed between Jewish and Arab Israeli groups as well as unskilled labour 
41=42=51=4 and a very strong substitutability between Non-Israelis 52= 6. 
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different ethnically defined Israeli skilled labour (PCBS, 2005). Aggregate unskilled labour can be 
either Israeli or non-Israeli: this reflects the segmentation in the Israeli labour market that is reflected 
in the differences in wage rates (see Table II.1). As with skilled labour the Israeli unskilled labour 
aggregates are made up of Jewish and Arab & Other workers resident in Israel. The non-Israeli 
unskilled labour aggregates are made up of Palestinian and foreign unskilled labour, which reflects 
the fact that Palestinian and foreign unskilled labour are in ‘direct’ competition while, for instance, 
Jewish and Palestinian unskilled labour are in less ‘direct’ competition. 
While all labour incomes for Palestinian labour are earned within Israel they work in Israel on a day 
to day basis and wages are remitted directly to households in the Palestinian Territories; hence they 
do not contribute to final demand within Israel. 
Segmentation according to ethnicity within the categories of Israeli labour, skilled and unskilled, 
reflects the fact that wages differ substantially (see Section 3.3), such differences stem from various 
discriminating features of the Israeli labour market system. For example, there is recognition that in 
Israel ethnicity affects employment. This is partly due to service in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
(OECD, 2010a, b); Jewish Israelis (with the exemption of the religious Haredim) serve for two to three 
years in the IDF while Arabs generally do not serve. Those who serve in the IDF are supported with 
privileges in the labour market, which means that such supporting practices affect one population 
group more than the other (OECD, 2010c).  
II.3.3. The Database 
Few SAMs and CGE models have been developed for Israel. The first SAM for Israel was developed by 
Palatnik (2009) for 1995, which provides data on 18 industries and products and has a special focus 
on energy industries. The Israeli 2004 SAM used in this study (Siddig et al. 2011) has several 
distinctive features. First, the SAM differentiates between 43 industries and products, i.e., multi 
product industries can and do exist. Second, there are detailed data on trade and transportation 
margins. Third, there are 10 (representative) household groups and 36 different labour categories 
differentiated by profession and ethnicity. For Israeli workers there are eight skill categories, seven 
profession/occupation categories and one unskilled category, which are further categorized by 
ethnicity (Jewish and Arab & others) and gender. There are four non-Israeli labour categories; legal 
and illegal Palestinian cross-border and foreign workers. 
The labour data are recorded as transactions in the SAM and as a matrix of real quantities; thus 
estimates of real wage rates and wage differentials are available. Comparing labour categories within 
the same skill category, female wages are significantly lower than male wages and Jewish Israeli 
wages are up to 20% higher than wages of Arab Israelis. 
The sources of the data used to compile the SAM include the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS), the Central Bank of Israel (BOI), and the Israeli Tax Authority (ITA). In addition, non-Israeli 
sources were used to fill-in gaps in domestic reports: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. 
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The database also includes standard elasticities of substitution/transformation for imports and 
exports based on literature and plausibility considerations, the production nests and the Stone-Geary 
(LES) demand system. 
II.4. Policy Simulation and Results 
II.4.1. Policy Simulation 
The simulation reported here assesses the implications of a partial reintegration of the Israeli and 
Palestinian labour markets. Since Israel is apparently unlikely to allow free mobility of labour 
between the two labour markets, the simulations concentrated on evaluating an increase in the 
‘quota’ of Palestinian workers given access to the Israeli labour market.  
The core simulation assumes that the quota on Palestinian worker was increased to 114 thousand, 
the pre-Intifada level, from 50 thousand, and hence that the price of Palestinian labour on the Israeli 
market will decline, i.e., the minimum wage law is not rigorously enforced. The high unemployment 
rate in the West Bank and the high gap between the wages Palestinians can receive in Israel and the 
wages they receive in the West Bank support the assumption of the availability of Palestinian labour 
to fill the increased quota. The quotas of foreign workers are assumed to remain constant. Other 
simulations for other ‘realistic’ changes in the quota were run; these produced results that are 
consistent with those reported. 
The macroeconomic closures imposed are that the foreign exchange market is cleared by the 
exchange rate. Savings are investment driven, the government consumes a fixed share of absorption 
and balances its account by a variable income tax and the CPI serves as numéraire. These choices 
ensure that all adjustments take place in the solution period by avoiding passing benefits or costs to 
the future. 
For the labour market it is assumed that the Israeli labour market for skilled and unskilled labour is 
characterised by full employment and adjusts by variation of the wage rate, i.e., the minimum wage 
law is not binding. Hence the scenarios are defined by varying factor supplies for the respective non-
Israeli labour groups. 
II.4.2. Results 
The discussion of the results begins with the implications for the Israeli economy before moving on 
to the implications for the West Bank’s economy. 
II.4.2.1. Effects on the Israeli Economy 
Increased employment of Palestinians in Israel – from 50 thousand to the pre-Intifada level of 114 
thousand – results in extra workers’ remittances flowing from Israel to the West Bank. The exchange 
rate depreciates by 0.1%, to absorb this change in the current account; this, together with cost 
changes (see below) increases the competitiveness of exports, while increases in domestic activity 
increase import demand, albeit at a slower rate (Figure II.4). 
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Figure II.4. Macroeconomic Effects of the Pre-Intifada Simulation in Israel, % Changes 
 
Figure II.5. Effects of the Pre-Intifada Simulation on Household Welfare, % Changes 
 
Overall there are positive benefits to the Israeli (macro) economy. Israeli GDP grows by 0.3% (Figure 
II.4) with private consumption, government consumption and absorption increasing. Welfare 
increases for all households (Figure II.5) due to increases in household incomes for all household 
groups, except the Arab households in the second poorest quintile, and a general reduction in 
purchaser prices.7 There are distributional impacts: household groups from higher quintiles 
experience larger increases in income and welfare than household groups from the lower quintiles. 
These derive from two sources: first the changes in factor incomes, which are relatively larger for the 
richer households, and second changes in the household specific costs of living,8 which decline for 
the two poorest quintiles but increase for the three richer quintiles. Purchaser prices decrease for 
most agricultural and manufacturing products but increase for most service products (Figure II.6); 
price declines are concentrated in staple products. The changes in cost of living confirm that the 
                                                          
7
 The percentage changes in purchaser prices are the same as those in the producer prices reported in Figure 
II.6; this is because there are no changes in tax rates or margins. 
8
 As measured by the household specific consumer price indices. 
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changes in purchaser prices are consistent with increasing the welfare of poorer households and that 
the benefits to the richer households derive from increases in their incomes from factors (see below).  
Figure II.6. Effects of the Pre-Intifada Simulation on Purchaser/Producer Prices and Domestic Output, 
% Changes 
 
The increase in Palestinian labour changes the relative availability of factors and thus directly affects 
returns to factors. Wage rates for capital and land, which become relatively scarce, increase relative 
to the average wage rate for labour (Figure II.7). The effect is stronger for land because of the 
relative intensity of unskilled labour in agriculture (Table II.2). The increase in quantity of unskilled 
(Palestinian) labour causes wages for skilled labour to increase while wages of unskilled labour 
groups decrease. The wage rates for Palestinians decrease most (16.7%) followed by wages of other 
foreign workers, which are direct substitutes. The effect on Palestinian wages is strong, but needs to 
be considered against the background of Palestinian labour supply increasing by more than 100%, 
which implies the (long run) own price elasticity of demand is high (about 7), and the increase in 
factor income is over 275%.  
Factor incomes decline for nine, out of 36, labour types. All three foreign labour types experience 
declines in income of 3.8 to 8.5%, unskilled Jewish and Arab & Other labour types experience income 
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reductions of about 2.5% while female Jewish and Arab & Other skilled agricultural workers 
experience marginal reductions in income (less than 0.05%). All other domestic labour types 
experience income increases of 0.16 to 0.36%; while there is evidence that factor income increases 
with skills it is notable that the largest increases are experienced by skilled industrial workers. Land 
and capital incomes increase by 0.54% and 0.27% respectively. Thus the changes in factor incomes 
have the opposite impact on real income distribution to the cost of living and are dominant. 
Figure II.7. Effects of the Pre-Intifada Simulation on the Wage Rates of Different Factor Groups, % 
Changes 
 
Although outputs expand for all but one industry, three groups of industries can be distinguished. 
First, industries in which the share of unskilled labour in total labour use is high, experience 
reductions in input costs and prices decrease (Figure II.6). Agricultural industries such as wheat, other 
crops (except cereals), milk, and vegetables-fruit production as well as construction are main 
employers of unskilled labour (Table II.2). These industries increase production but domestic and 
export demand for these products is muted because demand for agricultural products, and 
construction, is assumed to be inelastic with respect to prices and income. The exceptions are other 
crops and, to a lesser extent, wheat where export expansion is important. For all agricultural and 
food industries and construction the costs of aggregate intermediates and value added per unit of 
output fall. 
Second, the industrial industries, for which electronic equipment and manufactures (not elsewhere 
classified, nec.) are representative. Here the share of unskilled labour is around 10% or less, although 
there are appreciable differences across industries. Typically intermediate input costs decline or 
increase marginally, while factor costs increase slightly. However these industries realise relatively 
large production increases in response to increasing consumption and, especially, export demand. 
Household income is not only composed of income from factors, but also contains transfers from 
government, enterprises, other households, and from the rest of the world. Most important for all 
household groups is factor income with a share between 50-83% in total household income. In lower, 
poorer, quintiles the second important source for income are transfers from the government, income 
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from enterprises ranks third; in higher income quintiles it is the other way around. Factor income, 
government transfers and income from enterprises account together for more than 80% of income in 
all household groups, inter-household transfers and income from abroad play a minor role. 
Table II.2. Share of Unskilled Labour in Total Labour Input (%), Selected Industries 
Industries Israeli unskilled Palestinian Foreign Total unskilled 
Wheat 10.3 3.4 24.0 37.7 
Other crops 9.9 3.8 27.1 40.7 
Milk 10.0 2.8 19.5 32.3 
Vegetables and fruits 9.9 3.8 27.1 40.7 
Construction 4.4 9.2 26.7 40.3 
Electronic equipment 7.1 2.7 0.6 10.3 
Manufactures (nec.) 6.9 1.9 0.4 9.2 
Communication 4.1 0.6 0 4.7 
Public services 4.9 0.6 3.7 9.2 
For the service industries, typified by the communication and the public services industries in Table 
II.2, there is limited employment of unskilled and Palestinian labour except for Trade. Intermediate 
input costs marginally increase, except for Dwellings (due to the reduction in construction costs), 
while factor costs increase appreciably (0.04 to 0.23%) except for Trade where they fall by 0.22%. 
Nevertheless outputs increase due to increased incomes and hence expanded domestic demand. 
There is some increase in exports but, except for Other Transport, these industries only export small 
shares of their output. 
Factor income increases for most of the household groups except for Arabs in the three poorest 
quintiles, caused by different ownership of factors. Compared to Jewish households, Arab 
households have a larger share in unskilled labour, which experiences a fall in wages. Moreover, 
compared to Arab households, Jewish households own more skilled labour. Transfers from the 
government do not change, but transfers from enterprises, households and abroad increase, partly 
absorbing the negative effects for poor Households. 
Since inter household transfers and transfers from government to households are fixed in real terms 
the changes in household incomes are overwhelmingly driven by incomes for sale of factor services, 
either directly or indirectly through (intermediary) incorporated enterprises (Figure II.5). 
Consequently the primary determinant of the income distribution effects is the patterns of factor 
ownership with the richer households having greater endowments of skilled labour and capital. 
Therefore, the income gap between poor and rich households widens. This is ameliorated by the 
patterns of falling purchaser prices, a falling income tax rate and decreasing savings rate which 
increases disposable income and expenditures for all households. 
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II.4.2.2. Effects on the West Bank Economy 
While cross-border workers in Israel experience a substantial, 16.97%, fall in wages; overall labour 
incomes rise from 1,374 NIS million in the base scenario to 2,524 NIS million (Table II.3). The near 
doubling of remittances raises the potential contribution of remittances form 13.8% to 25.5% of the 
West Bank’s (2004) GDP. Thus, the simulated policy reduces unemployment in the West Bank and 
simultaneously increases the West Bank’s income, even if no allowance is made for any multiplier 
effects through increases in domestic production and investment. 
Table II.3. Palestinian Workers Remittances from Israel and West Bank GDP (2004) 
 Base Scenario Pre-Intifada Scenario 
Workers remittances from 
Israel 1,374.0 NIS Million 2,524.4 NIS Million 
West Bank GDP Share of remittances in the West Bank GDP 
9,899.1 NIS Million 13.8% 25.5% 
Source: PCBS, 2011 
However large revenues from worker remittances can cause an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate – a paradox known as Dutch disease – that would offset the potential benefits from increased 
remittances. Nevertheless, a study by Astrup and Dessus (2005) found that increased export 
competitiveness for the Palestinian territories was insufficient to compensate for losses in income 
after closure of the Israeli labour market, indicating that cross-border employment is an important 
contributor to the living standard in the Palestinian territories. 
II.4.2.3. Testing for the Sensitivity of the Results to the Level of the Substitution Elasticities σ42 and 
σ52 
The sensitivity of the results to the substitution elasticities, particularly those for the labour market 
equations, was assessed by systematically varying the elasticities. These analyses show that two 
elasticities have especially strong influences on the results: the substitution elasticities between 
Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers, σ42, and between Palestinian and foreign workers, σ52 
(Figure II.3). 
Increasing the substitution elasticity between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers, σ42, increases 
the negative impacts on poor Israelis. Doubling the elasticity reduces the positive change in the 
quantity of products consumed, although the effects remain positive. On the other hand, when 
assuming an almost perfect substitutability between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers, by 
setting the elasticity to 100, the change in consumption quantities by poor Israeli households are 
negative. The substitution elasticity between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers may vary with 
the political situation since it will be indicative of the extent of the reluctance of employers to 
employ non-Israelis and, in particular, Palestinians. In a situation of strong political tensions, this 
reluctance is expected to be higher, i.e., lower elasticity, than in more peaceful situations.  
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When doubling the substitution elasticity between Palestinian and foreign workers, σ52, and when 
assuming perfect substitutability, the effects on the labour market are stronger. The wage rate for 
aggregate labour decreases, but the main effect is a change in the allocation of wages between 
Palestinians and foreigners. Palestinians wages fall less if σ52 is high while foreigners experience a 
greater decline in wages. Differences in the effects on Israeli households are not large, while the 
effects on the macroeconomic level are very small, but positive as the elasticity is increased. 
II.5. Conclusions and Outlook 
This study examined the potential effects of a partial liberalization of labour market policy in Israel 
with respect to cross-border workers from the West Bank by simulating an increase in the number of 
Palestinians working in Israel from 50 thousand to the pre-Intifada level of more than 100 thousand. 
The results indicate that opening the Israeli labour market to more Palestinian workers would 
increase domestic production, and potentially enhance economic growth in Israel, provided the 
labour market remains segmented. These results are robust across a wide range of substitution 
elasticities and are consistent with the results of Carter (2005). Opening the labour market would 
widen the income gap between poor and rich households in Israel by increasing the factor income of 
rich household groups more than those of some poorer household groups. However, the negative 
distributional effects of changes in factor incomes will be partially offset by greater reductions in the 
cost of living for poorer households. Overall there are welfare gains for all household groups in Israel. 
The West Bank economy would benefit from sharply increased remittances from Palestinians 
working in Israel. Such additional inflows to the West Bank from employment abroad could 
negatively impact on the West Bank’s economy. While previous studies have found a positive effect 
from the transfer of high labour income from Palestinian cross-border workers to the West Bank, the 
interaction effects are not well articulated. There is therefore a case for a multi-region CGE model for 
the West Bank and Israel that endogenises the Palestinian labour supply decisions and the 
consequent indirect effects upon the West Bank.  
The authors acknowledge the generous support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for 
this research project on ‘The Economic Integration of Agriculture in Israel and Palestine’. 
II.6. References 
Aix-Group (2007). Economic dimensions of a two-state agreement between Israel and Palestine. Aix 
Group. http://www.aixgroup.org/. Accessed 15 December 2011. 
Angrist, Y. D. (1996). Short Run Demand for Palestinian Labour. Journal of Labour Economics, 14(3), 
425-453. 
Aranki, T. N., Daoud, Y. (2010). Competition, Substitution, or Discretion: An Analysis of Palestinian 
and Foreign Guest Workers in the Israeli Labour Market. Journal of Population Economics, 23, 
1275–1300.  
Armington, P. (1969). A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of production. IMF 
Staff Papers 16, 159-178. 
II. Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Labour: Who Benefits? 
20 
Astrup, C., Dessus, S. (2005). Exporting goods or exporting labor?: Long-term implications for the 
Palestinian economy. Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 3(1), 39-61. 
Bulmer, E. (2003). The impact of Israeli border policy on the Palestinian labour market. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 51, 657-676. 
Bank of Israel (2008). Annual Report 2007. Bank of Israel. March 2008. 
Bank of Israel (2009). Annual Report 2008. Bank of Israel. April 2009. 
Bank of Israel (2010a). Annual Report 2009. Bank of Israel. May 2010. 
Bank of Israel (2010b). Press release of the office of the spokesperson and economic information, 
26.05.2010. Bank of Israel. http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/press/eng/100527/100527f.htm. 
Accessed 15 December 2011. 
Bank of Israel (2011). Data Series Database. Bank of Israel. http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/series/en/. 
Accessed 3 May 2011. 
Carter, T.J. (2005). Undocumented Immigration and Host Country Welfare: Competition Across 
Segmented Labour Markets. Journal of Regional Science, 45(4), 777-795. 
Chao, C.-C., Yu, E.S.H. (2002). Immigration and Welfare for the Host Economy with Imperfect 
Competition. Journal of Regional Science, 42(2), 327-338. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) (2007). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. Cambridge University 
Press, 1997.  
ICBS (2002). Input-Output Tables – 1995. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), Jerusalem. 
McDonald, S. (2009). STAGE Version 1: July 2007. Course documentation. 
OECD (2010a). Labour market and socio-economic outcomes of the Israeli-Palestinian population. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD Social, Employment 
and Migration Working Papers 102. 
OECD (2010b). Israel: A divided society: Results of a review of labour-market and social policy. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
OECD (2010c). OECD Reviews of Labour Market and Social Policies: Israel. Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Palatnik, R. (2009). Economics of Climate Policy Impacts: Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for 
Israel. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller GmbH & Co. KG, Saarbrücken, Germany, July 2009.  
Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Finance (2009). Palestinian economic recovery strategy in 
transition. June 2009. 
PCBS (2005). Palestinian labour force in Israel and settlements (1995-2003). The Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Ramallah, Palestine. June 2005. 
PCBS (2010). Labour Force Survey Annual Report: 2009. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS). Ramallah, Palestine. April 2010. 
PCBS (2011). Data series Database: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/labor/tab_42.aspx. 
Accessed 3 May 2011. 
Siddig, K., Flaig, D., Luckmann, J., Grethe, H. (2011). A 2004 Social Accounting Matrix for Israel, 
documentation of an economy-wide database with a focus on agriculture, the labour market 
and income distribution. Agricultural Economics Working Paper Series No. 20, Hohenheim, 
Germany. 
  
III. Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour 
21 
III. Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour 
Dorothee Flaig, Harald Grethe and Scott McDonald 
 
 
This chapter consists of the correspondent article which is submitted to Labour Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Labour productivity can vary strongly between sectors, reflecting the fact that labour of a specific 
type may not be homogeneous. When labour moves from less to more productive sectors, an 
economy experiences a de facto increase in labour endowments. This study uses a CGE model in 
which labour reallocation is imperfect with a migration function governing the movement between 
sectors to separate the impacts of implicit increases in labour endowments from other impacts 
arising from labour reallocation. The specification of labour mobility is found critical: neglecting 
heterogeneous labour may change macroeconomic as well as sectoral simulation results in 
magnitude and direction. 
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III.1. Introduction 
Empirical data on labour markets reports wide-ranging differences in applied wage rates across 
different sectors of production for factors that are notionally the same. These differences are smaller 
among subsets of sectors, e.g., among agricultural sectors, and larger between these subsets. There 
are two standard approaches to calibrate labour demand and supply in CGE models depending on 
whether data of the quantities of labour types demanded by sectors are known or not.9 If labour 
quantities are unknown the standard (Harberger) assumption is that each labour type is 
homogeneous, and hence is paid the same irrespective of the sector that employs the labour. This 
can be viewed as a strong perfect market assumption wherein there is a one-to-one relationship 
between labour quantities and values, and the marginal productivity of a labour type is independent 
of the characteristics of the sector that currently employs that labour, e.g., the capital-labour ratios 
do not determine the marginal productivities of the labour types. If labour quantities are known it is 
possible to define sector specific wage rates for each labour type: a standard approach in this 
instance is to define the activity specific wage rates as the average wage rate of the labour type 
weighted by a labour type and sector specific productivity adjustment factor. Calibration of the 
Harberger assumption is a special case of this ‘general’ form: all the average wage rates are equal to 
one and all the sector productivity adjustment factors are equal to one. A problem arises, when 
labour factors are mobile across sectors and the sector productivity adjustment factors are not all 
equal, since this implies differences in the marginal productivity of the labour type according to the 
sector employing the labour. In these cases labour reallocations can lead to large productivity effects.  
Arguably, there are three approaches to resolve this problem. In the first approach, it is (implicitly) 
asserted that all labour productivity differences are attributable to the sector employing the labour: 
hence reallocated labour adopts the sector specific productivity adjustment factor, and therefore the 
marginal productivities of each labour type are solely determined by the sector that employs the 
labour, e.g., the IFPRI standard model (Lofgren et al., 2002) and the STAGE model (McDonald, 2007). 
This approach has the distinct advantage of producing a transparent market clearing condition, since 
each labour type is homogeneous and the demand for each labour type can be aggregated across 
sectors in terms of the stocks, e.g., person hours, of each labour type, but does not mitigate the 
productivity effects. A second approach is the application of a CET function, which implies that each 
labour type is differentiated across the using sectors and the quantity units are measured in 
‘efficiency’ units that are the product of the stock of the labour type and the flow of services realised 
by use in a specific sector, e.g., the GTAP model (Hertel et al., 2007). In this approach the reallocation 
of labour involves the movement of ‘efficiency’ units where the implicit assumption is, that the flow 
of services realised changes according to the properties of the CET functions, i.e., the elasticities and 
share parameters/weights. This approach has the advantage of mitigating the productivity effects, by 
endogenously adjusting the flow of services available to a sector from a given stock of labour, but 
makes the labour market clearing condition opaque, because the labour quantities are no longer 
recorded in ‘natural’ (stock) units and hence cannot be an unweighted aggregate across sectors. 
Moreover, since each labour type is now defined to be heterogeneous in demand, a difficulty arises 
in the price definition for each labour type: specifically there is only one price definition equation for 
                                                          
9
 In levels (GAMS) based CGE models the process of calibration is explicit whereas in rates of change 
(GEMPACK) based models the process of calibration is implicit. 
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each type of labour and therefore it is, implicitly, assumed that the productivity of labour can change 
without any change in the cost of producing that labour. A third approach to account for 
heterogeneity within labour types is to increase the number of labour types, so that each is 
homogeneous. This approach seemingly solves the problems of productivity effects, makes the 
market clearing conditions transparent and ensures unique price definitions for each labour type. But 
the empirical evidence indicates that, at all realistic levels of disaggregation, each labour type 
becomes sector specific and hence, using standard functions, there is no possibility for reallocating 
labour between sectors, and therefore the model becomes worthless for practical purposes. None of 
these approaches is ideal. 
This study develops a fourth approach, that mitigates the productivity effects, recognises the 
importance of sector specific characteristics, e.g., capital-labour ratios, maintains transparent market 
clearing conditions and (partially) solves the issue of under specified price definitions. It builds on the 
third approach. Labour types are disaggregated, but the possibility of labour reallocation/mobility is 
retained by specifying (labour) migration functions that govern the reallocation of labour across 
sectors. These functions are all specified in terms of labour stocks (‘natural’ units), which requires 
that the issues raised differences in the flows of labour services from different labour types in 
different sectors are explicitly modelled. There are two polar options: the productivity of moving 
labour is determined by the destination sector, which assumes that all differences in the productivity 
of each type of labour across sectors are attributable solely to sector specific attributes, or that the 
productivity of the moving labour is labour type specific, which assumes that all differences in the 
productivity of each type of labour across sectors are attributable solely to labour type specific 
attributes. Clearly there are an infinite number of alternatives between these two polar options. 
Naturally, the discussion on productivity becomes relevant, when satellite accounts are used which 
determine physical labour units and make different wage rates between sectors visible. Given this 
information, when labour moves from less to more productive sectors and productivity is sector 
specific, an economy experiences a de facto increase in labour endowments. Separating the impacts 
of implicit increases in labour endowments from other impacts arising from labour reallocation is 
therefore important for the interpretation of results. With migration functions it is practical to track 
movements in the stock of labour types between sectors and changes in the flows of services from 
different labour types. Thus, for instance, the de facto endowment (flow of services) from different 
labour types can be held constant. In order to illustrate the potential of the migration function 
approach this study compares effects of the common sector specific productivity setup, which de 
facto increases/decreases factor endowment and homogeneous labour, and a factor specific setup, 
which implies constant factor endowment and heterogeneous labour. 
III.2. Factor Mobility in CGEs and Productivity Effects from Labour Reallocation 
Factor Mobility in CGEs 
In applied CGE modelling, labour markets are usually differentiated into different groups, where the 
differentiation should be based on whether wages move in parallel or not (Boeters and Savard, 
2011). Imperfect substitutability is thus assumed between different levels of skills, age or gender, but 
usually not between different sectors. Factors are typically either modelled as perfectly mobile 
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across sectors or sector specific, thus immobile. Perfect mobility or transformability should result in a 
homogeneous market and equalised wages. In the real world, however, there are huge variations 
between wage rates of different skill classes and among sectors, e.g., see Table III.1 for Israel. These 
differences are typically accounted for in CGE-models with sector specific productivity/efficiency 
factors. When labour moves from less to more productive sectors, it typically adopts the productivity 
of labour in the destination sector and an economy experiences a de facto increase in labour 
endowment. This is a strong assumption, but it is an open question as to the determinants of the 
productivity of workers that relocate between sectors. The empirical literature on costs of factor 
reallocation highlights the existence of severe costs of reallocation, mainly caused by non-
transferability of skills and losses in skills, which hinders mobility between sectors. For example 
Figura and Wascher (2010) find in a study on the US labour market a wage loss for displaced workers 
who switch industries of 20.8%, while those remaining in their former industries experience a wage 
loss of 5%. This is supported by Fallick (1996), who finds in a review of the empirical literature 
workers experiencing 16-20% higher earning losses upon reemployment in other sectors compared 
to reemployment in the old sector. 
Thus, there are several reasons to regard the mobility of labour between sectors as imperfect. In CGE 
modelling, imperfect factor mobility is typically included with a Constant Elasticity of Transformation 
(CET) function. In the GTAP-model family imperfect mobility of land between agricultural sectors 
modelled with a CET function is a standard feature and the code allows extending this feature to all 
factors. Several studies address the improvement of the land supply framework in the GTAP model 
and estimation of the CET parameter. For example, Golub et al., (2006) evaluate land use change in 
response to climate change with different versions of land mobility and find the most restrictive 
version returning the most realistic outcomes. Ahmed et al., (2008) empirically estimate CET 
elasticities for different land uses with data for the USA. A recent study on the imperfect land market 
of Li et al. (2012) focusses on the estimation of CET parameters in a more flexible nesting structure. 
In a study for Israel and Italy, Palatnik et al., (2011) estimate CET elasticities based on simulations 
with a regional scale PMP land-use model and apply these estimates to a CGE model in which land 
supply is modelled with nested CET functions. 
Regarding other factors of production than land, imperfect mobility is introduced in the capital 
market as standard in GTAP-AGR based on a CET function. In none of the models imperfect mobility 
is standard in the labour market. Nevertheless, there are some studies including imperfect mobility in 
the labour market. Ivanchovichina and Martin (2004) as well as Zhai and Wang (2002) study possible 
effects of China’s accession to the WTO taking into account barriers to labour mobility between rural 
and urban regions with a CET function. Both studies conclude that labour market reforms, mainly 
lifting the barrier for rural-urban migration, would significantly improve efficiency and equality. 
Intersectoral labour migration – between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors – is considered in a 
study of Valenzuela et al., (2008), which evaluates the sensitivity of results of global trade 
liberalisation to different assumptions on factor mobility, closures and trade elasticities with the 
GTAP model. The increase in agricultural value added is found twice as high in the specification with 
perfect labour mobility compared to immobile labour, which highlights the importance of the 
mobility assumption. 
The CET function approach reallocates labour in terms of the movement of ‘efficiency’ units, where 
the implicit assumption is that the flow of services realised changes according to the properties of 
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the CET functions, i.e., the elasticities and share parameters/weights. While this approach has 
advantages, it render the labour market clearing condition opaque, because the labour quantities are 
no longer recorded in ‘natural’ (stock) units and the price definitions for each labour type are under 
defined, because there is a single equation for each type of labour. Ideally, labour should be defined 
in ‘natural’/physical units, in order to be able to track the actual quantity of workers who move 
between sectors and clarify the market clearing condition, while dealing explicitly with the 
implications for differences labour productivity across sectors. This is the purpose of this study. To 
this end, we model imperfect mobility using migration functions, where workers migrate between 
different sector blocks of production. Migration functions have been used to depict migration 
between countries or regions by McDonald and Thierfelder (2009). Migration between rural and 
urban regions can also be conceived of as migration between agricultural and other sectors. This 
study extends the migration function approach by defining migration bilaterally between different 
sector blocks of the economy. In the migration function of McDonald and Thierfelder (2009), the 
migration decision is based on the relative wage of the own region relative to the average wage level 
in all regions, with workers migrating to a pool and from that pool. In contrast, the origin of a 
migrating worker is traceable in the version of the migration function developed for this study. 
Productivity Effects from Labour Reallocation 
Productivity studies differentiate economic growth between input driven growth and technical 
progress. The change in output over the joint units of labour and capital gives Hicks-neutral technical 
progress, which is notionally an index of residual factors which contribute to the generation of 
output but which are not explicitly accounted for; these residual factors include, besides others, the 
effects of R&D, managerial capabilities and intersectoral transfer of resources (Felipe, 1999). Thus, 
Hicks-neutral technical progress contains the change in factor productivity from reallocation of 
resources between industries. The growth accounting method following Solow (1957) compares the 
change in output of an economy to the change in all its inputs and defines the residual, which cannot 
be explained by input growth, as productivity growth. Thus, estimates seek to distinguish between 
those parts of economic growth that can be attributed to movement along the production function 
(accumulation of inputs) and those caused by shifts in the production function (technical progress). 
This kind of measurement contains the problem that any errors in measurement appear as 
productivity changes (Domar, 1961; Felipe, 1999). In light of this issue, Solow’s basic approach has 
been refined: First, inputs were disaggregated and thus differentiated by qualities, improving the 
measurement of inputs. Second, sectoral reallocation – from agriculture to industry, thus to capital 
intensive sectors and to higher marginal productivity – is a key factor in productivity growth and has 
been included in the standard accounting measure of total factor productivity (TFP) (e.g., Massell, 
1961; Pack, 1993; Poirson, 2001). 
Poirson (2001) estimates the impact of labour reallocation on economic growth rates and asks the 
question to what extend these reallocation effects contribute to faster or slower growth rates, using 
panel data for 65 countries between the years 1960 to 1990. Her findings confirm the importance of 
labour reallocation effects in determining economic growth rates: countries which allocate labour 
relatively more in sectors with a higher productivity over time grow faster. In addition, Poirson shows 
that missing reallocation, from agriculture to industry and services, accounts fully for the growth gap 
of African countries relative to other countries. 
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III.3. Modelling Framework 
III.3.1. Main Features of the Model and Data 
The model used in this study is an augmented version of the single country Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model STAGE, which is developed by McDonald and Thierfelder (2009)10 and 
derives from the ERS model of Robinson et al., (1990) from the early 90s. STAGE is a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) based model that has a mix of non-linear and linear relationships that 
govern the behaviour of the model’s agents. Utility maximisation of households is based on 
preferences which are represented by Stone-Geary utility functions. They consume composite 
aggregates of domestic and imported commodities that exhibit constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES), following Armington (1969), where the relative price determines the optimal mix of domestic 
and imported good consumption. Israel is a classic example of a small country in the world market; 
therefore, world market prices for imports and exports are fixed in the model.  
Domestic production is modelled as a two stage production process with either constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) or Leontief technologies applied. At the first stage, intermediate input and value 
added generate the output of each activity based on CES technology. At the second stage, the use of 
intermediate inputs is in fixed proportions using Leontief technology, while the CES technology is 
used to form value added by primary production factors where the optimal ratio of factors is 
determined by relative prices. 
Commodity demand consists of domestic demand and export demand. The distribution of 
domestically produced commodities among domestic demand and exports is governed by relative 
prices on these markets, using constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions, which reflects 
imperfect product transformation. The model is solved in General Algebraic Modelling System 
(GAMS). 
This study uses a variant of the STAGE model that has been calibrated using an Israeli SAM of the 
year 2004 (Siddig et al., 2011). This Israeli SAM has several distinctive features. First, the SAM 
differentiates between 43 activities and commodities, i.e., multi product activities can and do exist. 
Second, there are detailed data on trade and transportation margins. Third, there are 10 
(representative) household groups and 36 different labour categories, differentiated by profession 
and ethnicity. For Israeli workers there are eight skill categories, seven profession/occupation 
categories and one unskilled category, which are further categorized by ethnicity (Jewish and Arab & 
others) and gender. There are four non-Israeli labour categories: legal and illegal Palestinian cross-
border and foreign workers. For all labour types there are data on the quantities of labour inputs, 
hence differences in wage rates in the model are ‘real’. 
The sources of the data used to compile the SAM include the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS), the Central Bank of Israel (BOI), and the Israeli Tax Authority (ITA). In addition, non-Israeli 
sources were used to fill-in gaps in domestic reports: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. 
                                                          
10 Refer to McDonald and Thierfelder (2009) for a detailed description of the model. 
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Figure III.1: Value Added Nesting 
 
Table III.1. Labour groups 
Labour type 
Wages in sector blocks (NIS/month) 
Agriculture Industrial Services 
Skilled Jewish Israeli 6 188 17 246 14 473 
Skilled Arab and Other Israeli 5 766 11 871 11 978 
Unskilled Jewish Israeli 4 045 7 548 6 058 
Unskilled Arab and Other Israeli 3 948 6 612 5 915 
Palestinians 1 560 2 943 2 811 
Foreigners from ROW 3 214 5 906 4 948 
The modelling of production is changed to include a five-level production process. Each level involves 
CES or Leontief aggregations of primary or aggregated inputs to produce aggregates. In the first level 
of the production nesting, aggregate intermediate input and aggregate value added are combined to 
form domestic output as CES aggregate. Aggregate intermediate input is a Leontief aggregation of 
intermediate inputs, while aggregate value added, depicted in Figure III.1, is a combination of 
primary inputs using CES technologies. The CES technology allows for the assumption of imperfect 
substitution in factor demand between specific factor types, with the substitution elasticity σ11 
determining the substitution possibilities among them. All substitution, and transformation, 
elasticities are recorded as satellite accounts to the SAM. 
The definitions for labour types have been redefined for this study (Table III.1). Labour types, 
differentiated by skill categories and ethnicity, are allocated to three segmented sector blocks: 
                                                          
11
 σ is set as follows: derived from literature (Hertel, 1997) σ₂₂=0.8, and in the lower nests: σ=1.5. 
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agricultural, industrial and service sectors. Finally, each labour type owns a labour group for each of 
the sector blocks. 
III.3.2. Factor Productivity and Mobility 
III.3.2.1. Factor Specific Productivity 
The wage rates for workers of a specific labour type vary strongly across the different sector blocks 
(see Table III.1). When assuming that wages reflect the marginal product, the wage differences 
reflect differences in factor productivity. This productivity varies between and within labour types. 
The model explicitly distinguishes between the stock (ff,a) of a labour type (f) used by a sector (a) and 
the flow of services (    
  ) realised from a unit of that labour in a sector. This means, that wage rates 
are defined per productivity unit and are equal. This ensures that both, the stock and flow of labour 
services, are tracked. 
The output of a sector depends on the quantities of inputs used and on their productivity. The CES 
production function therefore includes the productivity unit; if one worker is twice as productive as 
another worker, the output she produces is double as much: 
  
     
  [∑           
        
   
 ]
  
         (1) 
where:   
  = quantity of Value Added;   
  = adjustment parameter;     
 𝜹f,a = share parameter; and ρa = elasticity parameter; 
and the first order condition for profit maximisation is: 
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       (2) 
where:   
 = price of Value Added;     = wage rate; and     
  = factor use tax. 
When allowing for migration between sectors, workers are assumed to gain the new sector’s 
productivity. To allow for scenarios in which workers maintain their old productivity level the 
productivity factor is made factor specific. A range of intermediate alternatives can also be specified, 
where the factor has some proportion of sector and factor specific productivity level. 
Productivity is factor (and sector block) specific, when a worker who migrates to a new sector 
maintains the productivity of his old sector. The average productivity (  ) of his new sector adjusts 
accordingly. The total amount of productivity units a sector uses is determined by its original amount 
of productivity units and the amount of productivity units migrating into it. The migrating 
productivity unit is the actual worker who migrates from f to fp (mf,fp)
12 times the average efficiency 
                                                          
12
 Where fp is the alias of f and stands here for the amount of workers migrating from one sector block specific 
labour type (f) to another (fp). 
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factor of the old labour type (  ), which is the average productivity of a labour type inside a sector 
block. Thus when there are three sector blocks the productivity in block 1 after any reallocations is: 
          ̅           ̅           ̅          .     (3) 
The sector specific efficiency factor,     
  , is determined by its base value,  ̅   
  , and the productivity 
adjustment: 
    
    ̅   
    ∑  ̅                    ̅     ⁄       (4) 
where aadjfp represents an adjustment parameter which allows for variation in the skill transfer. If 
the adjustment parameter, aadjfp, is set to a value less than 1, the worker cannot maintain her 
former level of income. When it equals 1, the worker maintains her old productivity; if it is greater 
than 1, productivity increases. 
With this setting, there are four possibilities for productivity, or skill, transfer of inter-sector labour 
reallocation:  
 Reallocated labour adopts the new sector’s productivity.  
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity. Thus, the average productivity of 
each labour type in each sector block will change. 
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity adjusted for a predetermined 
productivity change (aadjfp not equal to 1). 
 Reallocated labour adopts a productivity somewhere between that of the old and new 
sectors. Again the average productivity of each labour type in each sector block will change. 
For this purpose productivity is set partly sector and partly factor specific in model 
calibration. 
III.3.2.2. Imperfect Mobility 
This model includes imperfect inter-sectoral labour reallocation by developing the migration function 
in McDonald and Thierfelder (2009), which allows for bilateral movement between segmented blocks 
specific labour types, f, e.g., ‘Agricultural skilled Arab’. The segmented blocks are defined as groups 
of sectors, e.g., ‘Agricultural sectors’ (Table III.1), within which labour is perfectly mobile. Migration is 
possible between the sector blocks but only within a specific labour type, e.g., ‘Skilled Arab’. 
Migration depends on the change in the relative wage, the wage a worker could earn in her old 
sector compared to the wage she could earn in another sector she could migrate to. Thus, the 
amount of workers who migrate, mf,fp, from one sector block to another is determined by the change 
in the relative wage and the labour supply in the base situation,   ̅. The responsiveness of migration 
to wage changes is determined by the migration elasticity,   : If the elasticity is high, labour is mobile 
between the sector blocks, if it is zero, there is no migration. 
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The number of workers who are migrating and the workers who remain in their old sector of work 
must equal the base labour supply in this labour type, so that labour markets are cleared in stock 
terms, i.e., 
  ̅= ∑                   (6) 
where fp contains all sector blocks a specific labour type is employed in. 
The labour supplies of all labour types that cannot migrate are fixed in the closures. If migration is 
allowed, labour supply is the sum of all workers of a labour type which migrate to a sector block 
   = ∑        . 
III.4. Simulations and Results 
III.4.1. Simulations 
This model allows the user to disentangle and quantify the size of the productivity effects of labour 
reallocation from other effects arising from an economic shock. The model specification allows 
addressing the question whether and to what extent the changes in labour specific productivity 
among sectors matters for growth and welfare results. For illustrative purposes two scenarios are 
implemented:  
1. Mig2man: An isolated 20% increase in world market prices of industrial goods, which causes 
labour migration from sectors with low productivity to sectors with higher productivity; and  
2. Mig2agr: An isolated 20% increase in world market prices of agricultural goods, which causes 
labour migration from sectors with high productivity to sectors with lower productivity. 
Each of the simulations is implemented for each of the polar opposite productivity options 
controlling the productivity of reallocated labour: 
(a) ~_sec: Reallocated labour adopts the new sector’s productivity.  
(b) ~_fac: Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity. 
Thus, there are four different scenarios that differ by the overall amount of productivity units 
available in the economy and the effects on the labour productivity within sectors, as shown in Table 
III.2. The effects from changes in de facto labour endowment compared to pure labour reallocation 
are analysed by comparing simulations 1a (mig2man_sec) with 1b (mig2man_fac) and 2a 
(mig2agr_sec) with 2b (mig2agr_fac).  
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The macroeconomic closures are set as follows: investment is savings driven; the exchange rate is 
flexible to clear the balance of payments; the government consumes a fixed value and balances its 
income with a variable income tax; and the CPI is the numéraire. In the factor market, all factors are 
fully employed and mobile between sectors. Labour is assumed perfectly mobile within sector blocks 
and imperfectly mobile among sector blocks inside labour types. The migration elasticity is offset as 
1.5. 
Table III.2. Simulation Setup 
 (a) Sector specific productivity (b) Factor specific productivity 
1. Migration from low 
to high productivity 
(to manufacturing) 
(1a) Increase in factor endowment/ 
productivity units 
Average productivity in each sector 
not directly affected by migration 
(1b) Constant factor endowment/ 
productivity units 
Decreasing average productivity in 
manufacturing sectors 
2. Migration from high 
to low productivity 
(to agriculture) 
(2a) Decrease in factor endowment/ 
productivity units 
Average productivity in each sector 
not directly affected by migration 
(2b) Constant factor endowment/ 
productivity units 
Increasing average productivity in 
agricultural sectors 
III.4.2. Results and Analysis 
Results are presented as percentage deviation from the base situation before the world market price 
changes. 
III.4.2.1. Increasing Total Factor Productivity (Scenarios mig2man_sec and mig2man_fac) 
The first scenario simulates an increase of the world market prices for manufacturing goods by 20%. 
The increased export price increases manufacturing exports and thus increases domestic production 
of manufacturing goods (Appendix). At the same time imports become more expensive and 
manufacturing imports are reduced, which increases demand for domestic produced goods and 
stimulates, too, domestic industrial production. The value of exports increases strongly, the value of 
imports is reduced and the domestic currency appreciates strongly, 14.7%, to maintain the current 
account balance. This appreciation in turn decreases import and export prices, resulting in an 
effective import/export price increase of industrial goods of around only 2.3% and decrease of prices 
of agricultural and services products by -14.7%. Manufacturing is boosted in this simulation, shifting 
resources from agriculture and services into the manufacturing sector block (Table III.3). Wages are 
higher in manufacturing compared to agriculture and services and factor income increases 
accordingly in mig2man_sec (Figure III.2); household income and GDP increase. 
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Figure III.2. Scenario mig2man: Macroeconomic Effects, % Changes, and Difference between 
mig2man_sec and mig2man_fac (Variables Depicted in Value Terms). 
 
Table III.3. Scenario mig2man: Effects on Labour Supply, Wages and Productivity Adjustment, % 
Changes 
  
  
Labour demand 
(productivity units) 
Change of 
productivity (af) 
in mig2man_fac 
Labour supply 
(workers) 
mig2man 
Wage 
(workers) 
mig2man 
      _sec _fac _sec _fac _sec _fac 
Sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture -8.22 -7.75 0.00 -8.14 -7.68 -0.94 -1.45 
Manufacturing 22.80 18.41 -3.04 20.26 19.87 3.21 2.50 
Services -5.43 -5.31 -0.03 -4.41 -4.33 0.24 -0.40 
Non-
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture -9.17 -9.00 0.00 -9.09 -8.93 -0.56 -0.88 
Manufacturing 16.90 17.51 -0.41 15.32 16.44 3.76 3.49 
Services -4.72 -5.00 -0.06 -3.88 -4.21 1.08 0.61 
U
n
sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s 
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture -7.81 -7.27 0.00 -7.75 -7.22 -1.26 -1.81 
Manufacturing 23.75 18.23 -3.71 21.15 20.49 2.59 1.81 
Services -4.32 -4.21 -0.03 -3.87 -3.76 -0.05 -0.73 
Non-
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture -8.60 -8.23 0.00 -8.67 -8.29 -1.02 -1.48 
Manufacturing 18.77 16.71 -2.12 16.82 17.40 2.84 2.28 
Services -3.29 -3.46 -0.07 -2.85 -3.00 0.79 0.16 
Foreign 
from 
Palestine 
Agriculture -9.41 -8.91 0.00 -9.41 -8.91 -0.16 -0.72 
Manufacturing 15.58 14.45 -1.64 15.58 16.36 3.93 3.25 
Services -2.57 -2.90 -0.14 -2.58 -2.81 1.96 1.16 
Foreign 
from 
ROW 
Agriculture -5.05 -4.47 0.00 -5.05 -4.47 -3.24 -3.82 
Manufacturing 26.41 11.70 -8.92 26.41 22.64 -2.09 -2.84 
Services 0.49 0.29 -0.18 0.59 0.53 -1.15 -1.95 
 
GDP from
expenditure
Household
income
Government
income
Labour factor
income
Import
demand
Export supply
mig2man_sec 0.49 0.42 -0.59 1.68 17.25 18.75
mig2man_fac -0.12 -0.07 -0.78 1.02 15.27 16.61
Diff. in percentage points -0.62 -0.49 -0.18 -0.66 -1.98 -2.14
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
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When introducing factor specific productivity in mig2man_fac, it is assumed that workers keep their 
level of productivity constant, regardless to the industry they are working in. Each worker who 
migrates changes the labour productivity in the destination sector, and thus the average wage in the 
destination factor type. The change of productivity, depicted in percentage change of the factors’ 
productivity, is shown in the third column in Table III.3. The change in productivity depends on the 
factor type and decreases the wage of a productivity unit by up to -6.7%. The changes in the wage of 
workers, shown in the last two columns of Table III.3, consist of the changes in productivity unit wage 
and the productivity adjustment. Wages are lower and relative wage changes are smaller with this 
productivity adjustment, leading to less migration. There are less workers and productivity units 
available in manufacturing sectors (first and second column in Table III.3), to a smaller extend also in 
services where in-migration from agriculture takes place, and the sectors do not have the capacity to 
increase the production to the extend as before in mig2man_fac. Agricultural production benefits 
from the reduced outflow of workers and shrinks less than before. 
Figure III.3. Scenario mig2man: Effects on Household Income, % Changes 
 
Difference between 
mig2agr_sec and 
~_fac percentage 
points 
-0.40 
-0.45 
-0.52 
-0.55 
-0.52 
-0.28 
-0.29 
-0.33 
-0.35 
-0.35 
 
The productivity of a worker is constant in mig2man_fac, but the revenue per productivity unit can 
change. Total labour factor income increases in both scenario setups, but the increase is 39% lower 
with factor specific productivity (Figure III.2). The changes in household income differ appreciably: 
despite the increase in labour income, total household income is considerably lower and decreases 
(Figure III.2) in mig2man_fac due to decreasing income from capital (returns from capital decrease -
3.7% in mig2man_sec and -4.3% in ~_fac) and land (-15.0% in mig2man_sec and -14.6% in ~fac13). 
When looking at the effects on households in more detail (Figure III.3), differences between the two 
scenarios are obvious: while in mig2man_sec two households experience negative income effects, 
there are four in mig2man_fac. Changes in income are 0.3-0.6 percentage points lower in 
                                                          
13
 Revenues from land decrease due to less agricultural production which decreases demand for land. The 
expanding sector block manufacturing is less capital intensive and returns from capital decrease. 
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mig2man_fac what mostly more than halves the effects. Income effects change direction in the 
Jewish 2nd and 5th quintile. The household groups which are affected negatively have large income 
shares, first in transfers from other households and the government (1st and 2nd Jewish), and second 
in income from capital (5th Jewish and non-Jewish), which both decrease. Transfers are distributed in 
fixed shares and depend on income, which decreases for the government in both simulations and in 
mig2man_fac for rich households, which are the main sources for transfer payments.  
III.4.2.2. Decreasing Total Factor Productivity (Scenarios mig2agr_sec and mig2agr_fac) 
Figure III.4 Scenario mig2agr: Macroeconomic Effects, % Changes and Difference between 
mig2agr_sec and mig2agr_fac (Variables Depicted in Value Terms). 
 
The second scenario simulates an increase of the world market prices for agricultural goods, which 
increases agricultural exports – between 42% for milk and 85% for crops (non-cereals) – and 
stimulates domestic agricultural production (Appendix). At the same time agricultural imports 
become more expensive, which decreases imports – between 10% for cereals and 36% for fruits and 
vegetables –, increases demand for domestically produced agricultural goods and further stimulates 
domestic agricultural production. Labour demand in agricultural sectors increases, which raises the 
relative wage and leads to migration into agriculture. Wages in agriculture are between 30% and up 
to 70% lower than in industry and services (Table III.1) and the relative wage increase in agriculture is 
not high enough to close this gap. As a consequence, factor incomes from labour decrease by -0.33% 
in mig2agr_sec (Figure III.4). The reduced household income, by -0.26%, reduces expenditures and 
GDP declines by -0.19%. The domestic currency appreciates by 0.21% to keep the current account 
balanced, which decreases the competitiveness of exports. While agricultural exports, which account 
for 2.04% of total exports, experience a boost, total exports decrease by -0.78%. Despite the 
appreciation, total imports decline by -0.95% because of the increased import price of agricultural 
goods, decreasing demand of households and decreasing intermediate demand (the decrease in 
imports is mainly triggered by minerals and oil, basic metal and electronic equipment that are mainly 
used as intermediates in the declining production of other goods). 
  
GDP from
expenditure
Household
income
Government
income
Labour factor
income
Import
demand
Export supply
mig2agr_sec -0.19 -0.26 0.05 -0.33 -0.95 -0.78
mig2agr_fac 0.14 -0.03 0.24 -0.08 -0.84 -0.62
Diff. in percentage points 0.34 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.11 0.16
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
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Table III.4. Scenario mig2agr: Effects on Labour Supply, Wages and Productivity Adjustment, % 
Changes 
  
  
Labour demand 
(productivity units) 
Change of 
productivity (af) 
in mig2agr_fac 
Labour supply 
(workers) 
mig2agr 
Wage 
(workers) 
mig2agr 
      _sec _fac _sec _fac _sec _fac 
Sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 19.75 51.30 25.63 19.51 20.09 0.34 0.64 
Manufacturing -2.08 -2.61 0.00 -1.81 -2.23 -0.41 -0.23 
Services -0.29 -0.17 0.04 -0.27 -0.19 0.05 0.37 
Non-
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 19.62 31.29 13.91 19.39 14.95 0.71 0.76 
Manufacturing -1.92 -2.07 0.00 -1.77 -1.86 -0.09 0.00 
Services -0.51 -0.27 0.00 -0.49 -0.24 0.28 0.47 
U
n
sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s 
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 18.91 17.87 6.28 18.74 10.69 0.84 0.61 
Manufacturing -2.44 -2.57 0.00 -2.17 -2.19 -0.15 -0.24 
Services -0.66 -0.14 0.05 -0.67 -0.19 0.30 0.36 
Non-
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 18.62 16.95 5.54 18.85 11.11 1.41 1.03 
Manufacturing -2.47 -2.33 0.00 -2.30 -2.08 0.26 0.13 
Services -1.03 -0.44 0.02 -1.04 -0.46 0.64 0.62 
Foreign 
from 
Palestine 
Agriculture 17.15 19.06 7.83 17.15 10.42 1.74 1.27 
Manufacturing -2.62 -2.36 0.00 -2.62 -2.36 0.41 0.23 
Services -1.22 -0.56 0.01 -1.20 -0.55 0.84 0.77 
Foreign 
from 
ROW 
Agriculture 14.41 11.01 3.63 14.41 7.13 3.36 1.98 
Manufacturing -3.80 -2.89 0.00 -3.80 -2.89 1.23 0.59 
Services -2.52 -1.24 0.00 -2.51 -1.23 1.66 1.14 
When assuming factor-specific productivity in mig2agr_fac, average productivity increases in 
agricultural labour types by 4%-26% (Table III.4, third column). Wages of skilled workers, i.e., skilled 
Jewish Israelis, are far higher in all sector blocks compared to unskilled workers. Furthermore wages 
differences between agriculture and manufacturing are larger for skilled labour types: a skilled 
manufacturing worker earns more than twice as much as a skilled agricultural worker (Table III.1). 
When workers keep their old productivity, in mig2man_fac, skilled Jewish Israeli workers are most 
sought after and the agricultural sector substitutes other labour types with these high productive 
labour types (Table III.4, labour demand and labour supply). This boost in productivity implies, that 
the average worker in agriculture accounts for more productivity units and thus the supply of 
productivity units in agriculture increases, which decreases the return to productivity units. The 
wages of workers, which are combinations of the number of productivity units per worker and the 
wage rates per productivity unit, are higher or decline less in mig2agr_fac for all labour types. 
However, total labour income is negative in mig2agr_fac (-0.08%), as is (total) household income (-
0.03%), but compared to mig2agr_sec the effects are markedly less negative. A relative wage 
increase leads to more migration into agriculture. Agriculture has more productivity units available at 
lower prices compared to mig2agr_sec, and agricultural production therefore increases more 
strongly. Decreasing production costs in agriculture increases competitiveness in the world market, 
agricultural exports increase and agricultural imports decrease. The GDP consists of private 
expenditures, government expenditures, investment, and the trade balance. Since imports decrease 
more than exports and government income increases, due to an increase in income from the capital 
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tax and land prices (returns to capital and land increase and, in Israel, all land is state owned) GDP 
increases in mig2agr_fac whereas in mig2agr_sec it falls.  
Regarding the distributional effects, income decreases in mig2agr_sec for all households (Figure 
III.5). Incomes of Jewish households are more affected than non-Jewish households because their 
wage gap between agriculture and manufacturing, and hence migration, is greater (72% versus 59%). 
When workers are assumed to keep their productivity in mig2agr_fac, income effects are positive in 
all non-Jewish households and less negative in Jewish households. Jews are more heavily employed 
in non-agricultural-sectors, even after migration, and the manufacturing labour types experience 
decreasing wages. An exception is the 5th Jewish quintile that receives a large share of its income 
from returns to enterprises, which increase by 0.6%. 
Figure III.5. Scenario mig2agr: Effects on Household Income, % Changes 
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Figure III.6. Macroeconomic Results with Different Values of the Migration Elasticity 
 
A second set of elasticities which affects the factor market, or more specifically affects the response 
to productivity changes, are the CES-elasticities in the nested production function. A systematic 
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skilled and unskilled workers, when workers keep their old productivity skilled workers are most 
attractive for the expanding agricultural sector. The more substitution is possible, the more skilled 
workers are employed in agriculture and less unskilled workers are needed, making unskilled workers 
finally moving out of agriculture and into services in the setup with strong substitutability. Regarding 
the substitutability between Jewish and Non-Jewish skilled workers, the same behaviour is 
observable: skilled Jewish workers are 2.8 times and skilled non-Jews 2.0 times more productive in 
manufacturing compared to agriculture14. Thus a high elasticity leads to very strong substitution 
effects and the less productive workers are pushed out of the market.  
Table III.5. Sensitivity of Results from mig2agr_fac to Substitution Elasticities σ31 and σ41 
 
Factor supply, % changes Different values for σ31 
(substitution between skilled 
and unskilled workers) 
Different values for σ41 
(substitution between skilled Jews 
and skilled Arabs) 
 
Elasticity value 0.1 1.5 3 0.1 1.5 3 
Sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 12.87 20.09 28.03 18.19 20.09 25.20 
Manufacturing -1.29 -2.23 -2.64 -2.13 -2.23 -2.44 
Services -0.16 -0.19 -0.38 -0.15 -0.19 -0.32 
Non-Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 9.39 14.95 22.06 22.11 14.95 -7.15 
Manufacturing -1.00 -1.86 -2.23 -2.21 -1.86 -0.62 
Services -0.20 -0.24 -0.49 -0.50 -0.24 0.54 
U
n
sk
ill
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s 
Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 21.92 10.69 -11.76 11.06 10.69 9.70 
Manufacturing -2.37 -2.19 -0.62 -2.16 -2.19 -2.19 
Services -0.82 -0.19 0.83 -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 
Non-Jewish 
Israeli 
Agriculture 21.36 11.11 -10.62 11.32 11.11 10.38 
Manufacturing -2.53 -2.08 -0.10 -2.11 -2.08 -2.06 
Services -1.19 -0.46 0.88 -0.47 -0.46 -0.40 
Foreign 
from 
Palestine 
Agriculture 21.88 10.42 -11.35 10.37 10.42 9.57 
Manufacturing -2.98 -2.36 0.10 -2.55 -2.36 -2.30 
Services -1.61 -0.55 1.17 -0.51 -0.55 -0.48 
Foreign 
from ROW 
Agriculture 15.51 7.13 -9.29 7.17 7.13 6.49 
Manufacturing -3.99 -2.89 4.09 -3.03 -2.89 -2.80 
Services -2.70 -1.23 1.60 -1.23 -1.23 -1.12 
III.5. Conclusions 
Labour reallocation, typically from sectors with lower to sectors with higher labour productivity, is an 
important part in the explanation of economic growth. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that 
labour migrating between sectors experience wage losses and that labour types are not 
homogeneous across sectors. Neglecting factor reallocation costs and factor specific productivity in 
CGE-modelling might overestimate the size of potential adjustments in the labour market as a 
response to exogenous shocks and thus affect simulation results. This study estimates the size and 
                                                          
14
 The assumption that wage differences reflect productivity differences is highly questionable when there is 
wage discrimination in the labour market, as it is the case between non-Jewish and Jewish labour types in 
Israel. 
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relevance of productivity effects from factor reallocation. For this purpose, two scenarios of world 
market price changes are run in a model where imperfect factor mobility is introduced using 
migration functions. The first causes labour to move from agriculture to manufacturing and thus 
simulating labour migration to sectors with higher labour productivity, resulting in increasing total 
factor productivity. The second scenario causes migration from manufacturing to agriculture, leading 
to decreases in total factor productivity. Both scenarios are run two times: first, labour assumes the 
destination sector’s productivity and thus average sectoral labour productivity changes, and second, 
labour keeps the productivity from its sector of origin and thus average sectoral labour productivity is 
held constant. 
In the first scenario, which simulates a productivity increasing allocation, the GDP effect is 125% 
smaller when excluding the productivity effect and productivity is held constant. This means, that the 
GDP growth of 0.49% becomes a decline of -0.12% when the productivity effect is excluded. All 
agents of the economy benefit from the increase in productivity if it is modelled as sector specific: 
when the productivity effect falls away households and the government experience clear losses. 
Adjustment effects which lead to a lower total factor productivity, i.e., movement into agriculture, 
are simulated in the second scenario. The losses connected with this factor reallocation are 
quantified by comparing the first run with sector specific labour productivity to the second run, when 
productivity is factor specific and thus held constant for the economy as a whole. GDP is 0.34 
percentage points higher, when total factor productivity does not decrease. All household groups are 
less negatively affected when assuming constant productivity, with the poor being positively 
affected. 
The results show the importance of productivity effects from factor reallocation for model outcomes. 
This is valid in case of imperfect labour mobility and becomes more relevant with higher migration 
elasticities, such as modelled in this paper, as well as with perfect labour mobility, which would result 
in even stronger productivity effects due to the stronger reallocation of labour. The size of the 
productivity effect depends on the extent of labour reallocation as well as on the sectoral differences 
in productivity.  
Both setups, fully sector specific productivity or fully factor specific productivity, are extremes. This 
study uses these extremes to show the relevance of the labour market specification for simulation 
results. For a realistic depiction of the labour market it is likely that the specification should be 
somewhere in between the extremes and would depend, besides others, on who migrates first, 
which part of the productivity is sector specific and/or the time horizon. The productivity setup 
should be more factor specific in the short run, and in the long run, when workers are adapting to 
their new tasks, productivity becomes more sector specific. Regarding the question on who migrates 
first, one might argue that the best workers are the first to migrate because they have the highest 
capacity to adapt to a new labour type (e.g., a higher skill level or sector to work). Then migration 
should decrease productivity in the old sector of work and affect positively productivity in the new 
sector. On the other hand, a firm that decreases employment first might release the least productive 
workers or those workers who choose to change their situation may be less suited to the job. With 
this assumption migration should increase productivity in the old sector of employment and 
negatively influence the destination factor type. Which effect dominates depends on the specific 
situation. When no empirical evidence exists, it is suggested that the model should be based on the 
assumption that migrants move with average and not marginal productivity. 
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III.8. Appendix: Effects on the sectors of the economy, % changes 
Scenario mig2man 
 
 
Production quantity  Supply of composite commodity  Purchaser price  
 
~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points 
Wheat -16.37 -15.16 1.21 4.58 4.87 0.29 -11.23 -10.71 0.52 
Cereals -17.70 -16.06 1.64 4.39 4.71 0.32 -11.60 -11.11 0.48 
Other crops -20.01 -19.07 0.95 -1.53 -1.47 0.06 -1.80 -1.84 -0.03 
Milk 0.21 0.15 -0.05 1.28 1.25 -0.03 -1.82 -1.95 -0.13 
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, and horses -6.79 -6.18 0.61 1.80 1.72 -0.07 -5.22 -5.43 -0.21 
Other animal farming -4.32 -4.09 0.23 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.42 -0.63 -0.21 
Fruits and vegetables -7.70 -7.36 0.34 0.38 0.31 -0.07 1.58 1.31 -0.27 
Fishing -2.41 -1.88 0.53 2.91 3.17 0.25 0.84 0.49 -0.35 
Gardening, mixed and unclassified farming -2.94 -3.32 -0.39 -1.23 -1.73 -0.49 -1.71 -1.72 -0.02 
Coal, oil, and gas 4.02 4.73 0.72 0.66 0.30 -0.36 2.21 2.98 0.77 
Minerals nec 81.11 78.17 -2.94 69.66 60.22 -9.43 2.26 2.92 0.67 
Meat products nec 0.73 0.55 -0.17 0.12 -0.13 -0.25 0.24 0.76 0.52 
Processing of fruit, vegetables and fish 4.91 5.61 0.70 1.14 0.87 -0.27 0.33 0.60 0.27 
Manufacture of edible oils, margarine and 
oil products 5.00 5.11 0.11 2.99 2.93 -0.06 0.46 0.83 0.37 
Dairy Products 1.52 1.28 -0.24 1.01 0.70 -0.30 -0.50 -0.09 0.41 
Manufacture of grain-mill products 5.28 5.50 0.23 -0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -4.36 -3.95 0.41 
Other food products 2.35 2.33 -0.03 0.61 0.31 -0.29 0.24 0.71 0.47 
Beverages and tobacco manufacturing 0.95 1.06 0.10 0.27 0.07 -0.20 0.48 0.63 0.15 
Textiles 9.80 11.14 1.34 4.01 3.82 -0.19 1.07 1.56 0.50 
Wearing apparel 0.73 0.62 -0.11 -0.11 -0.74 -0.63 0.66 0.91 0.26 
Leather products 2.25 3.36 1.11 -0.06 -0.58 -0.52 1.10 1.29 0.19 
Wood products 35.06 30.56 -4.50 32.63 27.98 -4.66 0.68 1.37 0.69 
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Scenario mig2man (contd.) Production quantity  Supply of composite commodity  Purchaser price  
 ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points 
Paper products and publishing 0.36 -0.01 -0.36 -0.56 -0.94 -0.37 0.75 1.54 0.79 
Petroleum and coal products 1.15 0.82 -0.32 0.58 0.07 -0.51 1.71 2.32 0.60 
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products 22.14 22.86 0.71 8.93 8.61 -0.32 0.28 0.93 0.64 
Mineral non-metallic products 3.55 2.55 -1.00 1.78 0.73 -1.05 0.33 1.06 0.73 
Basic metal 19.77 18.20 -1.57 16.31 14.14 -2.16 1.72 2.38 0.66 
Metal products  (excl. machinery, equipm.) 8.43 6.66 -1.76 6.62 5.14 -1.48 0.20 1.18 0.98 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.90 0.95 0.05 -0.54 -1.62 -1.08 1.61 2.17 0.56 
Electronic equipment 33.89 27.50 -6.39 7.78 5.57 -2.22 0.36 1.41 1.04 
Machinery and equipment nec 12.97 10.57 -2.40 4.01 2.67 -1.34 0.57 1.54 0.97 
Manufactures nec 78.53 67.60 -10.93 43.24 36.60 -6.64 0.41 1.33 0.92 
Electricity 0.65 0.22 -0.43 2.14 1.65 -0.49 1.89 1.77 -0.12 
Water -3.94 -4.14 -0.20 -2.74 -2.98 -0.24 1.29 1.25 -0.04 
Construction -1.55 -2.43 -0.88 -1.50 -2.38 -0.88 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 
Trade services 5.77 5.07 -0.70 9.82 8.83 -0.99 0.54 0.16 -0.39 
Transport and business services nec. -13.38 -13.00 0.38 -0.96 -1.39 -0.43 1.82 1.31 -0.51 
Communication -4.13 -4.31 -0.19 -1.60 -1.98 -0.38 -0.20 -0.61 -0.41 
Public Administration, Defense, Education, 
Health -2.33 -2.30 0.03 -0.26 -0.39 -0.13 -0.84 -1.10 -0.26 
Recreational and other services -7.75 -7.74 0.01 -1.40 -1.86 -0.46 -1.54 -1.80 -0.26 
Dwellings 2.01 1.87 -0.13 2.85 2.65 -0.20 -1.79 -2.41 -0.62 
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Scenario mig2agr 
 
 
 
Production quantity  Supply of composite commodity  Purchaser price  
 
~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points 
Wheat 24.38 32.90 8.52 -1.62 -0.66 0.95 14.01 12.73 -1.28 
Cereals 29.42 33.00 3.58 -1.42 -0.52 0.90 14.18 13.99 -0.19 
Other crops 58.34 88.98 30.64 6.58 9.56 2.97 -4.16 -10.84 -6.68 
Milk 0.45 2.49 2.04 -0.20 1.17 1.37 0.63 -4.43 -5.06 
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, and horses 14.56 18.53 3.96 -0.01 1.27 1.28 3.22 1.24 -1.97 
Other animal farming 10.84 15.62 4.79 2.27 3.96 1.69 -1.64 -6.20 -4.56 
Fruits and vegetables 17.76 22.79 5.03 0.76 1.67 0.90 -4.83 -8.30 -3.47 
Fishing 11.31 13.11 1.80 -0.03 0.81 0.84 -3.87 -4.90 -1.03 
Gardening, and mixed, unclassified farming 1.83 3.44 1.61 -0.17 0.53 0.71 0.72 -6.53 -7.25 
Coal, oil, and gas -0.26 -0.03 0.23 0.25 0.66 0.41 -0.19 -0.01 0.18 
Minerals nec -6.57 -8.53 -1.97 -5.46 -7.09 -1.63 -0.19 -0.01 0.18 
Meat products nec 0.03 1.21 1.18 -0.03 0.60 0.63 -0.35 -1.87 -1.52 
Processing of fruit, vegetables and fish -0.11 1.38 1.50 0.00 0.35 0.35 -0.23 -0.72 -0.48 
Manufacture of edible oils, margarine and 
oil products -2.11 -1.21 0.90 -0.73 -0.08 0.65 -0.63 -1.67 -1.04 
Dairy Products -0.31 0.75 1.06 -0.21 0.42 0.63 0.35 -1.77 -2.12 
Manufacture of grain-mill products -2.42 -1.63 0.79 1.90 2.69 0.79 5.68 5.77 0.09 
Other food products -0.76 -0.30 0.45 -0.18 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.01 -0.19 
Beverages and tobacco manufacturing -0.19 -0.08 0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.10 
Textiles -1.39 -1.32 0.07 -0.52 -0.31 0.20 -0.02 0.19 0.20 
Wearing apparel -0.57 -0.44 0.13 -0.33 -0.12 0.21 0.06 0.30 0.23 
Leather products -0.80 -0.69 0.11 -0.33 -0.12 0.21 0.01 0.23 0.22 
Wood products -2.60 -3.22 -0.62 -2.32 -2.87 -0.55 0.04 0.28 0.24 
Paper products and publishing 0.02 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.45 0.29 0.02 0.28 0.26 
Petroleum and coal products -0.35 -0.12 0.23 -0.25 0.01 0.26 -0.11 0.10 0.20 
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Scenario mig2agr (contd.) Production quantity  Supply of composite commodity  Purchaser price  
 ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points ~_fac ~_sec 
difference in 
percentage 
points 
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products -1.59 -1.80 -0.22 0.04 0.35 0.31 0.08 0.35 0.27 
Mineral non-metallic products -0.73 -0.66 0.07 -0.47 -0.30 0.17 0.03 0.30 0.27 
Basic metal -1.84 -2.24 -0.39 -1.44 -1.67 -0.22 -0.13 0.08 0.21 
Metal products  (excl. machinery, equipm.) -0.73 -0.68 0.04 -0.50 -0.35 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.29 
Motor vehicles and parts -0.63 -0.38 0.25 -0.23 0.10 0.34 -0.09 0.11 0.20 
Electronic equipment -3.87 -5.11 -1.24 -1.25 -1.38 -0.13 0.03 0.30 0.27 
Machinery and equipment nec -1.67 -2.05 -0.37 -0.64 -0.57 0.08 0.01 0.27 0.27 
Manufactures nec -6.20 -8.10 -1.90 -3.65 -4.57 -0.92 0.02 0.28 0.26 
Electricity -0.05 0.25 0.30 -0.03 0.28 0.31 0.01 0.26 0.26 
Water 6.12 8.34 2.22 6.15 8.37 2.22 0.03 0.28 0.25 
Construction -0.30 -0.04 0.26 -0.30 -0.04 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.19 
Trade services -0.11 0.17 0.28 -0.03 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.35 0.22 
Transport and business services nec. -0.75 -0.73 0.01 -0.43 -0.26 0.17 0.18 0.54 0.36 
Communication -0.68 -0.51 0.17 -0.63 -0.43 0.20 0.09 0.42 0.34 
Public Administration, Defense, Education, 
Health -0.16 -0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.27 
Recreational and other services -0.61 -0.42 0.18 -0.47 -0.24 0.23 0.08 0.36 0.29 
Dwellings -0.70 -0.58 0.12 -0.67 -0.54 0.14 0.11 0.56 0.45 
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Abstract 
There is a large empirical literature on the existence of high and persistent costs of intersectoral 
labour reallocation, an issue only little considered in equilibrium modelling. Neglecting these 
reallocation costs overestimates the size of labour movements and therefore the possibility of 
adjustment for an economy, as well as the welfare benefits of policy reforms. In the light of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this study addresses the question as to how the existence of labour 
reallocation costs for movement between sectors influences welfare effects that may accrue from a 
calming down of tensions, resulting in increasing employment of Palestinians in Israel. 
Keywords:  
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IV.1. Introduction 
It is a well-known issue that the valuation of welfare effects from trade liberalisation and opening of 
labour markets for foreign workers differs strongly between the economic and public view. This 
discrepancy originates, in part, from differing views on the labour markets: while economists often 
assume perfect labour markets with full employment, the reality of costs of reallocation is most 
apparent to the public (see e.g., Davidson and Matusz, 2000). If costs of reallocation exist, they will 
inhibit labour movement, hence neglecting reallocation costs should result in an overestimation of 
the size of labour movements and suboptimal realised benefits. Several empirical studies show that 
workers who change sectors can experience large and persistent losses in wages. Two effects are 
primarily responsible for these losses: lower incomes during unemployment and lower wages upon 
reemployment. The latter is caused by problems associated with transferring skills and the time costs 
required for skill acquisition and learning processes in the new sector of employment. Thus, the main 
source of costs is not the loss of a job, as many workers quickly find a new job and thus losses in 
income and production are limited But reemployment at lower wage rates, because of incomplete 
skill transfer into the new sector, is a persistent and large problem. 
The Israeli and Palestinian labour markets were integrated. Up to 23% of Palestinian workers crossed 
the border to work in Israel, mainly in unskilled jobs in agriculture and construction. With the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, this situation changed: the border was closed, causing 
severe unemployment in Palestine. Israel substituted the Palestinian workers with other foreign 
workers coming from the rest of the world (ROW). A study conducted by Flaig et al., (2013) found 
positive welfare effects for both economies, Israel and Palestine, when lifting the movement 
restrictions and increasing Palestinian employment in Israel. With the empirical evidence for the 
existence of labour movement costs a question arises: to what extent the Israeli unskilled workers 
can move out of the construction and agricultural sectors and if they are really able to benefit from 
the new situation. This study tracks the wage losses from factor reallocation accruing to workers and 
identifies the impact of these losses on the total economy and welfare. 
This study incorporates the skill losses of intersectoral labour reallocation into the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model STAGE. The data employed are provided by a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for Israel in 2004 (Siddig et al., 2011). In addition to skill levels, labour groups are 
segmented by sector block of employment. Movement of labour between segments is determined 
by changes in relative wages and governed with a migration function. The model allows for the 
choice between sector or factor specific productivity. In this study, the effects of reallocation costs 
found in empirical studies are disentangled from the productivity effects of labour reallocation by 
controlling for labour productivity effects. The results show, that reallocation costs and the mobility 
setup matters for model outcomes. Positive welfare effects are lower with increasing reallocation 
costs/decreasing mobility and the realisation of benefits is suboptimal. 
The next section reviews the empirical and modelling literature on the costs of intersectoral labour 
reallocation, while section 3 describes the model and data. Section 4 defines the scenarios analysed 
and presents and discusses results. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
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IV.2. Adjustment Costs of Intersectoral Labour Migration and Simulation Modelling 
Several empirical studies show, that workers who change sectors can experience large and persistent 
losses in wages. In a study on wage losses of displaced workers, applying 1980s data from 
Pennsylvania with a focus on high tenure workers, Jacobson et al., (1993) find that wage losses of 
workers who change the sector, e.g., leave the manufacturing sector, account for 38% of their pre-
displacement earnings. Workers who find new employment inside the manufacturing sector 
experience losses of 18-20%. This also holds if workers find new jobs inside the same four-digit 
industry. In a more recent study for the US with data between 1990-2005 the average wage loss for 
displaced workers accounts to 15.5%, where workers who switch industries experience an even 
larger loss of 20.8%, while others who remain in their former industries experience a wage loss of 5% 
(Figura and Wascher, 2010). Thus, earning losses are 16-20% higher upon reemployment in other 
sectors compared to reemployment in the old sector (Fallick, 1996). The considerably higher 
numbers found by Jacobson et al., (1993) may have been caused by the focus on high skilled workers. 
High skilled workers are most likely to possess firm-specific and accumulated human capital and are 
therefore more affected when changing firm. Despite some differences in assessing the level of the 
wage losses, there is consent on considerable differences for wage losses between reemployment in 
the old industry and reemployment in a new industry. These earning losses are persistent (Jacobson 
et al., 1993, Fallick, 1996, and Figura and Wascher, 2010). Earnings drop sharply when leaving the job 
and rise rapidly again in the next 1.5 years. After 1.5 years the increase becomes very slow and after 
5 years losses of 25% of pre-displacement earnings have been reported (Jacobson et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, wage losses depend only marginally on age and sex and are not only limited to a few 
sectors. Local labour market conditions are crucial: losses are larger, when workers are displaced in 
regions with depressed rates of employment growth. The difference between strong and weak 
labour markets accounts for one third of the average loss (Jacobson, 1993). Cyclical conditions have 
substantial and long lasting effects, too, but even workers displaced in a strong labour market are 
found to experience large wage losses. 
Using data for 15 industries and 16 countries covering 8 years, Gramm (2005) estimates the level of 
factor specificity of labour and capital in different sectors and for different time periods. The study 
found a significant level of factor specificity and that factors are not perfectly mobile, with capital 
being more specific than labour.  
There are two different reasons why a worker changes her job: first, a worker chooses to reallocate 
among a given number of jobs; and second, the distribution of jobs alters, resulting in the need to 
reallocate. In the first situation, the worker will only change her job if she will be able to or at least 
expects to maintain her level of income. The situation considered in this study applies to the second 
situation, where labour reallocation is induced by the demand side due to macroeconomic changes, 
e.g., in international trade, technology or politics (Gonzales Uribe, 2006, and Fallick, 1996). 
As indicated, the main reason for wage losses is firm- or sector-specific human capital. In addition, 
workers might have been especially suited in skills for their former job, because of particular good 
matches from intensive search, what cannot be realised after reemployment and causes wage losses 
after reemployment (Fallick, 1996 and Jacobson et al., 1993). Other reasons are the loss of wage 
premiums and the loss of seniority, more specifically, lower long term earnings regarding the career 
when starting with a lower wage in expectation of a higher wage in the future. In an empirical study 
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on inter-industry mobility of Jewish immigrants in Israel, Darvish (1990) identified four variables, 
which are relevant for imperfect labour mobility between industries. First, labour market experience 
goes together with greater industry specific skills; age is therefore correlated with lower inter-
industry mobility (Arrow, 1962). Second, according to the human capital theory of Becker (1962), the 
worker’s level of education serves as approximation of the skill-level: the higher the skills level the 
higher is the worker’s value for the employer and the cost of inter-industry mobility. Third, mobility 
depends on the status at work: (former) self-employed are more reluctant to change industries than 
employees because of higher skills, assuming that people deciding for self-employment are particular 
competent. And fourth, in addition to sector specific skills, labour mobility depends on the 
settlement region: settlement in economic active areas is negatively correlated with the inter-
industry mobility rate. This is because of the higher number of economic opportunities as well as 
because of the higher availability of information and therefore more intensive search, which 
increases the probability of finding a job in the old industry. 
The costs of labour reallocation were included in a modelling framework by Garcia-Cebro and Varela-
Santamaria (2011), using a new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model with two sectors: 
one tradable and one non-tradable which is monopolistic competitive. Imperfect mobility is modelled 
by including the cost of reallocation and leisure in the household utility function. Simulating a 
monetary expansion in a small open economy, there are less expansionary effects on (traded) output 
(short term) and less contractionary effects in the long term as well as less welfare in the long run, 
when assuming imperfect labour mobility. The results of the previously mentioned studies are 
supported by Tapp (2011), who estimates the costs of sectoral labour adjustment with an equilibrium 
search and matching model. The study on Canada’s sectoral labour adjustment in 2002-2006, a 
period of increasing commodity prices and exchange rate appreciation, which led to significant 
movements of labour out of the manufacturing into the resource sector, found adjustments costs up 
to 3% of output during the first three years. Non-transferability of skills was the predominant 
contributor to these aggregate costs, which generally remained for up to five years.  
The existence of labour reallocation costs is crucial, when estimating the adjustment of economies to 
globalization and trade liberalization. It appears that public and economic opinions are strongly 
divided on the issue of whether there are welfare gains from trade liberalisation. This difference is 
due to the view on the labour market: while economists assume a fully-employed, perfectly mobile 
labour market, the reality of unemployment is most apparent to the public (Davidson and Matusz, 
2000). The true effects seem to be somewhere in between: economies that have the least to gain are 
those with sluggish labour markets, while economies with either very flexible or very sluggish labour 
markets show clear net benefits from trade liberalisation (Davidson and Matusz, 2000). In a very 
flexible economy, adjustment to trade liberalisation occurs swiftly, while adjustment costs are high in 
an economy with sluggish labour markets but such economies also realise higher benefits from 
liberalisation as the distorting effects from tariffs are large. An economy with moderately sluggish 
labour markets has least to gain, because adjustment occurs relatively slowly and the distortionary 
effects from tariffs are not that large. 
Despite the empirical evidence for their existence, labour reallocation costs are usually not 
accounted for in CGE-models. Typically workers are assumed to move either freely, without costs, 
between sectors or not at all. Chan et al., (2005) consider adjustment costs in labour markets in a 
static CGE-study for Vietnam. Imperfect labour movement is implemented with a constant elasticity 
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of transformation (CET) function, and transaction costs are implemented as 10% relocation costs on 
the value of labour movements, assuming a de facto reduction in factor endowment. The findings of 
Chan et al., (2005) suggest that the amount of labour movement between sectors is typically 
overestimated and that distributional impacts are intensified by transaction costs. The CET approach 
relocates factors according to a productivity frontier and labour quantities are no longer measured in 
‘natural’ units. This makes the labour market clearing conditions vague. To overcome this problem, 
this study choses a migration function approach to differentiate between quantities and wages and 
define relocation costs as reductions in wages. Furthermore, we are able to isolate transaction costs 
effects from productivity effects from the migration of workers between sectors with different 
productivities.  
IV.3. Model and Database 
This study uses an augmented version of the STAGE model (McDonald, 2009)15, which is calibrated 
using an Israeli SAM of the year 2004 (Siddig et al., 2011), that was politically a relatively calm year. 
The SAM has 42 commodity and activity accounts, ten household groups that are classified by 
ethnicity (Jewish, and Arab and Others) and income quintiles, four Israeli labour types defined by skill 
level and ethnicity, and two types of foreign labour - Palestinians and Foreigners, i.e., migrant 
workers from the rest of the world. For each type of labour there are data on the transactions values 
and quantities used by each activity. 
Figure IV.1. Value Added Nesting 
 
                                                          
15 STAGE is a member of the class of CGE models that derive from the USDA/ERS model from the early 90s 
(Robinson et al., 1990). See McDonald (2009) for a technical description of the base model. 
IV. Labour Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment 
52 
The data demonstrate substantial differences in the implied wage rates for each labour type 
according to the employing activity. To represent this heterogeneity, each labour type, e.g., ‘unskilled 
Israeli Arab and Others’, is divided into five segments based on the activity blocks that employ the 
labour: agriculture, food, manufacturing, construction and services. Each labour type is assumed to 
be perfectly mobile within each activity block, but imperfectly mobile between activity blocks. Labour 
mobility between blocks is controlled by (labour) migration functions where the degrees of mobility 
are controlled by (supply) elasticities that govern the responsiveness of migration to changes in 
relative wages.16 This approach allows the modeller to distinguish between the stock of each labour 
type, measured in physical numbers of workers, and the flow of services realised from each worker in 
each activity. Market clearing conditions are defined by reference to the stocks of labour, but the 
reallocation of labour between activities might change the flow of labour services available to an 
economy. In addition, adjustment parameters are included, that allow the realised productivities for 
relocating labour types to be changed; this represents the costs associated with changing 
employment patterns.17 
The model therefore provides the user with three additional instruments to control the operation of 
the labour markets. First, the user can control the stock-flow relationship for each labour type, e.g., 
does a migrating worker keep her productivity from the initial activity or adopt that of the 
destination activity; second, the user controls the flexibility of the labour market by setting the 
migration elasticities between activity blocks18; and third, the setting of the adjustment parameters 
determines the (assumed) costs of relocation. 
IV.4. Simulations and Results 
IV.4.1. Simulations 
Two scenarios are run to estimate the effects of a reduction of movement restrictions for Palestinian 
workers in Israel: 
a. The base scenario replicates the Israeli SAM for 2004 and thus reflects a restrictive Israeli 
border measure against Palestinians, therefore 7% of Palestinian employees from the West 
Bank are employed in Israel. 
b. The policy scenario simulates a liberalised Israeli labour market policy. The share of 
Palestinian workers from the West Bank who work in Israel is increased from 7% to the pre-
Intifada level of 26%. Wages in Israel are 70% higher than those Palestinians receive in 
Palestine (PCBS, 2011). This, in combination with high unemployment, over 18% (PCBS, 
2011), means Palestinian labour supply is assumed elastic and it is assumed that Palestinians 
are willing to work in Israel even when wages decrease. 
                                                          
16
 A detailed description of the migration function and the modelling of factor specific productivity can be 
found in Flaig et al. (2013a). 
17
 In a dynamic formulation the adjustment parameters can change over time, reflecting an assumption that 
they reflect short term adjustment costs. 
18
 If the elasticity is set to zero, the migration function for that factor and activity block pair is switched off. 
IV. Labour Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment 
53 
Labour reallocation has two different effects: first, in standard models the moving worker adopts the 
new sector’s productivity, which influences de facto factor endowment of the economy and thus 
effects simulation results. Second, there are transaction costs of labour reallocation. In order to 
disentangle productivity effects from the transaction costs, migrating workers are assumed to keep 
the level of productivity of their sector of origin, which eliminates the productivity effect. Thus, the 
average sectoral productivity of each labour type will change with migration.  
If labour is homogeneous and perfectly mobile, the data should report similar wage rates in 
industries for a specific labour category, whereas the data reports strongly differing wage rates 
between industries. Wages differ markedly between sector blocks and are less differentiated within a 
sector block. Accordingly, we assume, that wage differences for a specific labour category inside a 
sector block originate from, inter alia, differing capital-labour ratios rather than from differences in 
specific skills. While differences between sector blocks originate from sector block specific skills, 
which render labour imperfectly mobile and cause reallocation costs. Thus, labour is fully mobile 
inside a sector block and imperfectly mobile between sector blocks. 
The objective of this study is to investigate, how Israeli unskilled workers adjust to the increased 
labour supply. For this purpose, the policy scenario (b) is run with two variations in the mobility setup 
and with and without reallocation costs. Labour is assumed to be either highly mobile or virtually 
immobile; if labour is mobile it may or may not incur reallocation costs while if labour is virtually 
immobile reallocation costs are high enough to prevent migration. Thus the three labour market 
setups are: 
1. High mobility: A high migration elasticity (ɛmig=6) allows for strong labour reallocation 
between sector blocks after changes in relative wages; no reallocation costs are assumed.  
2. 20% costs: The second setup reflects a situation when workers who are reallocated between 
sector blocks experience a 20% cut in wages. Productivity is fully factor specific and 
reallocated workers’ wages as well as productivity decline by 20% compared to their former 
earnings/productivity. 
3. No mobility: Finally, the third setup represents a situation where labour is immobile, i.e., the 
labour migration is completely inelastic. As there is no labour reallocation taking place, the 
20% reallocation costs are irrelevant. 
The macroeconomic closures applied are investment driven savings and the foreign account being 
cleared by the exchange rate. Furthermore, the government balances its account with a tax 
replacement instrument: the income tax rate is the equilibrating variable. The CPI serves as 
numéraire. Factors are fully employed with fixed factor supply for each factor type and fully mobile 
with the exception of labour being imperfectly mobile between sector blocks. 
IV.4.2. Results and analysis 
The opening of the Israeli labour market to Palestinians increases domestic production and enhances 
economic growth. When considering distributional effects, private household incomes decrease, but 
declining living costs mitigate this effect and all household groups benefit while the income gap 
widens. 
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Figure IV.2. Macroeconomic Effects 
 
GDP increases in all mobility setups, but to a smaller extend, the higher the transaction costs are 
(Figure IV.2). The same is observable when considering household income, higher transaction costs 
decrease positive effects on household income or increase negative effects (Figure IV.3). Not so clear 
are the effects when examining household welfare, measured by the equivalent variation (EV), which 
combines household income with household expenditures. While the change in EV, depicted in % of 
household income, is lower for all households in the situation with 20% transaction costs compared 
to the situation with high mobility, the effects from the situation with no mobility are ambiguous. To 
explain these ambiguous effects, first income effects and second household expenditures are 
analysed.  
Increased employment of Palestinian workers, which are mainly employed in unskilled jobs in Israel, 
increases unskilled labour supply. Wages of unskilled and skilled non-Jewish labour types decrease, 
while average wages of skilled Jewish labour, capital and land increase (Table IV.1). Foreign workers 
and Palestinian workers represent a large share of employees in agriculture and construction, Israeli 
skilled and unskilled labour types move out of these sector blocks and into services, skilled labour 
types move also into manufacturing. Foreigners from ROW, which are direct substitutes to 
Palestinian workers, show a different movement. Because the increase of Palestinians in construction 
is strongest, with 9% of all employees being Palestinian in the base scenario, the movement of 
foreigners from ROW out of construction outweighs movement from agriculture to other sectors. 
There are more foreigners moving from construction into agriculture than out of agriculture, causing 
a net inflow of foreigners into agriculture. The strong outflow from foreigners in food and industrial 
sectors, about 25%, has to be related to a very small base and is caused by a relatively high number 
of Palestinians in the base scenario compared to ROW-foreigners. Increasing costs of reallocation 
decrease factor reallocation between sectors, displayed as index of factor reallocation in Figure IV.2, 
which shows aggregated reallocation of all factors, including capital and land, in relation to 
aggregated factor demand. 20% transaction costs of labour reallocation decreases overall migration 
and decreases wages for most labour types. In the third setup with no mobility, there is no migration, 
and reallocation is only possible within a sector block. The effects on wages are greater in both 
directions: wages increase, where workers would move in, and decrease, where they cannot move 
out.  
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Figure IV.3. Distributional Effects on Household Groups, Income and EV in % of Income 
 
The effects of the liberalisation of the labour market on household incomes are more positive or less 
negative the richer the household group is. The explanation is, that poor household groups own a 
higher share of unskilled labour, where wages decrease, compared to richer households, which have 
higher shares in the complementary factors - capital, land and skilled labour - for which wages rise or 
decline less. Exceptions are the poorest quintiles whose income consists mainly of transfers, which 
are fixed in real terms for governmental transfers and transfers from abroad. However, inter-
household transfers are flexible and depend on the disposable income, which increases for Jewish 
and rich Arab-Israeli households, thus, inter-household transfer payments increase. All non-Jewish 
households show clearly less positive or more negative income effects compared to the Jewish 
household groups. The reason for this is that non-Jewish households supply a higher share of their 
labour to agriculture and construction, where wages decline strongest. This is valid for skilled as well 
as unskilled workers. 
Household expenditure is another element affecting household welfare. Decreasing wages have two 
contrary effects on welfare: on the one hand, household incomes decrease, and on the other hand, 
production costs potentially decrease affecting consumption prices, which finally results in a falling 
cost of living. The responses to the simulation of the five sector blocks – agriculture, food, 
manufacturing, construction and services – are different.  
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Table IV.1. Factor Change (Migration) and Wage Change in % 
   
Factor Supply Wages 
   
High mobility 20% costs No mobility High mobility 20% costs No mobility 
Sk
ill
ed
 Is
ra
el
i Je
w
is
h
 
Agriculture -2.13 -1.78 0.00 0.02 0.00 -1.37 
Food -0.27 -0.15 0.00 0.07 0.05 -0.47 
Industry 0.68 0.65 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.61 
Construction -3.69 -3.80 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -9.07 
Services 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.47 
N
o
n
-J
e
w
is
h
 Agriculture -0.89 -0.75 0.00 -0.29 -0.37 -1.43 
Food 0.78 0.77 0.00 -0.25 -0.33 -0.47 
Industry 1.29 1.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.25 0.54 
Construction -2.84 -2.80 0.00 -0.32 -0.40 -9.07 
Services 0.69 0.69 0.00 -0.12 -0.20 0.44 
U
n
sk
ill
ed
 Is
ra
el
i Je
w
is
h
 
Agriculture -5.75 -4.05 0.00 -4.08 -4.02 -4.52 
Food -4.92 -5.07 0.00 -4.09 -4.10 -7.48 
Industry -1.90 -1.98 0.00 -3.82 -3.84 -4.96 
Construction -13.83 -14.24 0.00 -4.35 -4.37 -17.62 
Services 1.51 1.44 0.00 -3.24 -3.28 -1.87 
N
o
n
-J
e
w
is
h
 Agriculture -3.19 -1.73 0.00 -4.64 -4.71 -4.60 
Food -2.84 -3.18 0.00 -4.67 -4.79 -7.44 
Industry -0.76 -0.96 0.00 -4.47 -4.60 -5.19 
Construction -12.34 -12.48 0.00 -4.89 -5.01 -17.62 
Services 2.46 2.40 0.00 -3.87 -4.00 -2.09 
Fo
re
ig
n
 
w
o
rk
er
s 
fr
o
m
 
R
O
W
 
Agriculture 8.22 6.97 0.00 -8.36 -8.77 -6.04 
Food -26.60 -24.70 0.00 -9.70 -9.99 -17.62 
Industry -22.51 -21.34 0.00 -9.56 -9.88 -15.71 
Construction -11.94 -11.38 0.00 -9.05 -9.40 -20.71 
Services 5.74 5.72 0.00 -7.96 -8.34 -4.43 
P
al
es
ti
n
ia
n
 Agriculture 270.00 270.00 270.00 -31.68 -30.83 -29.74 
Food 270.00 270.00 270.00 -36.96 -36.81 -38.40 
Industry 270.00 270.00 270.00 -36.10 -36.10 -36.98 
Construction 270.00 270.00 270.00 -33.92 -34.06 -40.71 
Services 270.00 270.00 270.00 -29.77 -29.63 -28.86 
Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.60 0.46 
Land 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.71 0.73 
Agricultural sectors as well as construction can realise strongly declining wages, reflected in the 
prices of value added, which dominate the effects on producer and purchaser prices (Figure IV.4). 
While the price decreases become smaller with increasing transaction costs in the agricultural sector 
block, construction experiences a drop in the price of value added of 2% in high mobility and a strong 
drop of 9% in no mobility. These price developments are determined by the average wage in a sector 
and thus the composition of its factor demand. Workers in construction are most affected by the 
inflow of Palestinian workers and thus the wages in construction are also the most sensitive to labour 
mobility (Table IV.2). While reduced mobility results in decreased outflows of workers out of 
construction, in agriculture this means reduced inflow of workers and thus price effects become 
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smaller. Prices also decrease for food products, although to a smaller extent. The price effects are 
small and positive for most of the manufacturing goods and services activities.  
Table IV.2. Changes in Total Labour Supply per Sector Block, in % 
 
Including Palestinians Excluding Palestinians 
 
High mobility 20% costs No mobility High mobility 20% costs No mobility 
Agriculture 10.56 10.58 10.03 0.55 0.57 0.00 
Construction 4.36 4.43 4.82 -0.46 -0.39 0.00 
Food 5.68 5.65 5.20 0.49 0.46 0.00 
Industry 19.20 19.31 24.94 -6.32 -6.20 0.00 
Services 2.91 2.90 2.32 0.60 0.59 0.00 
Concerning the production quantities, the sector blocks show similar effects, production increases in 
most of the sectors, but with increasing transaction costs the effect is smaller. The strong price 
decline in agriculture and construction is reflected in a rather moderate increase in demand, caused 
by low elasticities of demand for these goods. The production increase in manufacturing is relatively 
strong compared to the small and even positive price developments. These sectors, which typically 
have a high share of production exported (up to 62% in Manufactures nec.), benefit from the 
increased competitiveness on international markets. Exports increase by 1.2-1.4% (Figure IV.2), led 
by a depreciation of the currency of 0.07%. Increased employment of Palestinian workers in Israel 
implies increased outflow of remittances to Palestine, the Israeli currency depreciates to maintain a 
balanced current account. Increased demand for services products, mainly by rich households who 
experience an increase in real income due to higher factor income and decreasing product prices, 
increases production despite increasing prices in the services sector block.  
Thus, the ambiguous effects on the welfare of different household groups in a situation with no 
mobility can be explained by differences in the factor endowments of the household groups. The 
Equivalent Variation (EV) combines income and price effects, households benefit from, on average, 
decreasing prices but experience income losses. These income losses originate especially from 
workers, who would adjust to a shock and are hindered in migration, due to the reallocation costs, 
and hence experience greater wage losses. Thus the decrease in purchaser prices is not strong 
enough to fully mitigate negative income effects in Arab and poor Israeli household groups. 
To conclude, the introduction of 20% reallocation costs implies a loss to the economy for each 
worker who migrates, which negatively affects all agents in the economy, compared to the situation 
without costs. In addition, and what is more evident with no migration (no mobility), households who 
own labour that should react to the shock but cannot migrate, are affected most negatively. This 
implies that increasing inter-sectoral reallocation costs in Israel widens the gap between the poor – 
who own a larger share of unskilled labour which is most negatively affected19 – and the rich. 
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 Palestinians, whose number increase, are employed in Israel mainly in unskilled jobs and thus directly 
compete with Israeli unskilled and other foreign workers for jobs. 
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Figure IV.4. Production, Price of Value Added and Purchaser (Producer) Prices, % Changes. 
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IV.4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The model employs two sets of elasticities, which might influence the results and are thus 
systematically analysed. These are first, the substitution elasticities governing responsiveness in the 
labour nesting and second, the migration elasticities. 
A systematic analysis of each of the substitution elasticities (σ, Figure IV.1) shows, that a variation in 
the substitution elasticities has only small effects on production, the macro economy and private 
household incomes. Figure IV.5 displays results for household income under different substitution 
elasticities in different production nests. A lower substitutability between skilled and unskilled 
workers further increases the income inequality enhancing effect of labour market integration. 
Furthermore, a lower substitutability between unskilled Israelis and non-Israelis improves results for 
all household groups. A lower elasticity between Jewish and non-Jewish Israelis (both skilled and 
unskilled) improves effects for non-Jewish Israeli households and reduces positive effects for Jewish 
Israeli households. 
Figure IV.5. Effects of Substitution Elasticities on Results on Household Income, Different Elasticities 
and Elasticity Values, High Mobility Scenario 
 
The second relevant set of elasticites are the migration elasticities, which govern the response of 
labour migration to relative wage changes. A detailed analysis for values between 0.5 and 12 shows 
that the level of the elasticity is not relevant for the main conclusions drawn from the results; 
namely, any reduction in the degree of labour mobility reduces the potential benefits from 
expanding the pool of labour and there is no evidence, that any degree of reduced mobility of labour 
is beneficial. 
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IV.5. Conclusions 
There is a large empirical literature on the existence of intersectoral labour reallocation costs. 
Workers who change sectors can experience large and persistent losses in wages. The main reason 
for wage losses is firm- or sector-specific human capital. These costs are typically not accounted for 
in CGE modelling, which results in an overestimation of adjustment processes in the economy and 
related sectoral as well as macroeconomic impacts on simulation results.  
In order to quantify the relevance of these transaction costs at an economy wide level, this study 
applies a CGE model to simulate liberalisation of the Israeli labour market policy against Palestinians 
with three different setups of labour mobility: high mobility, migration with 20% costs and with 
prohibitive costs preventing migration. This scenario increases Palestinian employment in Israel by 
370% to a historic level from 2000, when 26% of all Palestinian employees were working in Israel. 
Increased labour supply induces economic growth and increases welfare for all households in Israel, 
though income effects are greater for rich households. 
Results from the different mobility setups show, that labour reallocation costs matter, especially for 
the analysis of distributional effects. Reducing mobility and/or increasing transaction costs decrease 
the positive effects accruing from the liberalisation of the Israeli labour market for Palestinians. This 
is reflected in lower economic growth, affecting nearly all sectors of the economy. The scenario 
employed causes labour reallocation between sector blocks. Reducing mobility and/or increasing 
transaction costs inhibits the ability of workers to adjust to shocks in the labour market, which results 
in increased wage and thus income effects. Those workers who would optimally seek to move out of 
a sector are negatively affected. In this study, these are employees in agriculture and construction, 
sectors were wages are below average. Thus, taking into account factor reallocation costs further 
increases the gap between rich and poor households in the economy and reduces positive growth 
effects to the Israeli economy. 
The authors acknowledge the generous support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for 
this research project on ‘The Economic Integration of Agriculture in Israel and Palestine’. 
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V. Synthesis and Outlook 
V.1. Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Production Factors 
There are various dimensions in the labour market which can be used to differentiate between 
groups of workers; these dimensions are, e.g., skill level, age, region, ethnicity or sector of 
employment. Accordingly, the labour market can be split by specific characteristics of these 
dimensions into factor types, e.g., in the dimension skill level the characteristics might be highly 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers or in the sectoral dimension one might wish to 
differentiate between agricultural, manufacturing and services workers. The depiction of labour 
mobility in CGE models is strongly related to the assumption of homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
factors in specific dimensions. If a factor is assumed homogeneous in a dimension, it is perfectly 
mobile and perfectly substitutable between the characteristics of this dimension. Accordingly, when 
wages increase for one labour type, factor demand will substitute the more expensive labour type 
with another labour type or workers move into the better waged labour type. Thus, adjustment 
processes lead to equal wages among homogeneous factors. If wages differ constantly between 
factor types, these adjustment effects are disrupted: factor demand cannot perfectly substitute 
between labour types, and workers cannot easily move between labour types, hence labour types 
are heterogeneous. 
In CGE models, homogeneous labour is reflected in one labour type while heterogeneity is induced 
by splitting labour into different labour types20. When labour is differentiated into labour types, 
workers cannot move between the labour types, unless there is an additional feature which makes it 
possible to transform workers with one characteristic into another characteristic, e.g., an unskilled 
worker is transformed into a medium skilled worker. This transformation can be implemented with a 
CET-function (e.g., Ivanchovichina and Martin, 2004, and Valenzuela et al., 2008 ) or a migration 
function (e.g., McDonald and Thierfelder, 2009). Inside a labour type, workers are fully mobile and, 
theoretically consistent, should face equal wages. In the production process, factor demand is met by 
variations in the use of specific factor types and substitution between factor types. Factor types are 
often not differentiated sectorally. Thus, if the use of a specific factor type is adjusted, e.g., wheat 
production demands more skilled labour, this skilled labour is sourced from other sectors (or other 
dimensions where labour is assumed homogeneous). Again, in order to stay theoretically consistent, 
if there is perfect substitution and labour is assumed homogeneous, wages should be equal between 
these perfect substitutes. 
Imperfect Substitutability between Labour Types: Empirical Validation of Behavioural Parameters 
versus Representation of Real World Data and Market Structure 
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 Heterogeneity can also be introduced by making factors fully immobile in the model, but that only allows for 
heterogeneity within the dimensions the model spans, i.e., between sectors or regions, which is presented later 
in the section. 
V. Synthesis and Outlook 
63 
When wages of different factor types are not equal, these factor types must be imperfect 
substitutes. Imperfect substitutability between labour types is implemented with constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functions, which combine production factors to form output. The degree of 
substitutability is governed by the related substitution elasticity. Perroni and Rutherford (1995) proof 
the flexibility of a nested CES production process. The CES is non-negative and homogeneous of 
degree zero in prices, furthermore, and in contrast to other flexible functional forms (e.g., the 
Generalized Leontief form of Diewert, 1971), it is globally regular, i.e., non-decreasing and concave in 
prices in the whole price space. The global regularity is important, because the search paths 
algorithms employ to find the equilibrium can involve points which are far from the equilibrium point 
(Perroni and Rutherford, 1995). 
The labour market can be differentiated in multiple dimensions. The different dimensions can all be 
organised in one single nest. Alternatively, factor demand can be set up as system of nested CES 
functions. For the studies included in this thesis, the labour demand of Israel is depicted by a four 
level nested CES functional form, with labour differentiated according to the dimensions skill level 
and ethnicity, which is described in detail in article 1 on ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Labour: Who 
Benefits?’. Palestinian and foreign workers are employed in unskilled jobs in Israel and are not 
represented in the skilled labour market in Israel. Therefore, aggregate skilled labour can only be 
sourced from different ethnically defined Israeli skilled labour types (PCBS, 2005). Aggregate 
unskilled labour can be either Israeli or non-Israeli, which reflects the segmentation in the Israeli 
labour market. As with skilled labour, the Israeli unskilled labour aggregates are made up of Jewish 
and Arab & Other workers resident in Israel. The non-Israeli unskilled labour aggregates are made up 
of Palestinian and foreign unskilled workers, which reflects the fact that Palestinian and foreign 
unskilled labour are in ‘direct’ competition while, for instance, Jewish and Palestinian unskilled 
labour are in less ‘direct’ competition. Segmentation within the categories of Israeli labour, skilled 
and unskilled, is necessary for there is recognition that in Israel ethnicity affects employment. This is 
partly due to service in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) (OECD, 2010a, b); Jewish Israelis (with the 
exemption of the religious Haredim) serve for two to three years in the IDF, while Arabs generally do 
not serve. Those who serve in the IDF are supported with privileges in the labour market (OECD, 
2010c). 
The substitutability in each nest is governed by substitution elasticities, which have been set relative 
to the substitution elasticity for skilled and unskilled labour applied in the GTAP model (Hertel 1997), 
based on expert judgement. This vague setting is caused by the fact that hardly any estimation for 
these labour demand parameters exists, which is a major critic of Boeters and Savard (2013) on the 
use of nested CES functional forms in general. Boeters and Savard (2013) see another problematic 
point arising from the setup of the nesting hierarchy: traditionally, good substitutes are grouped on 
the higher levels and substitutability decreases when going down the nested production tree. This 
traditional convention is not based on empirics and finally the only criterion which counts, is to 
choose a structure, which fits the data and knowledge about market structure best. Thus the base 
problem is the conflicting poles: representation of the data and structure of the economy on the one 
hand and the need for considerably more parameters, which are hardly available, on the other hand. 
In this model, the representation of real world data and structure is the dominant motivation, and 
the nesting developed is believed to give a reasonable picture of the true structure of the Israeli 
labour market. Concerns relating the ad hoc setting of the substitution elasticities are dealt with by 
systematic sensitivity analyses in all three articles. 
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V.2. Transformation and Imperfect Mobility 
While labour types are used to be differentiated by dimensions such as skill, age or gender, a sectoral 
disaggregation is very uncommon, although data shows significant wage differences between the 
sectors of an economy for notionally the same factor type. These differences are typically accounted 
for in CGE-models with sector specific productivity/efficiency factors. These sector specific efficiency 
factors allow the model to fit the data, but they do not explain why these differences exist. The 
reluctance to distinguish labour types by sector accrues from the loss of mobility and the loss of 
adjustment possibilities of the model, which are connected with the disaggregation in the sectoral 
dimension. Usually, heterogeneity is assumed between labour types and homogeneity within a 
labour type. Accordingly, there is typically no or only restricted transformation/mobility between the 
labour types and perfect mobility is assumed inside a labour type. The specific issue with the sectoral 
dimension accrues from the production process itself, which, by nature, distinguishes between 
different sectors. These sectors employ the sector specific labour types. A sector simultaneously 
demands several skill levels (or labour types of other non-sectoral dimensions) and thus has the 
possibility to adjust demand by substitution. At the same time, workers of a skill class are employed 
in several sectors: if factor demand increases in one sector, it is sourced from another sector. If 
labour types are distinguished on the sectoral dimension, there is no possibility to substitute 
between factor types of the sectoral dimensions and factor demand is fixed, unless there is a 
possibility to transform workers from one sector into a worker of another sector21. 
Transformation between labour types, also known as imperfect mobility, is typically included in CGE 
models with a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. In the GTAP-model family 
imperfect mobility of land between agricultural sectors, modelled with a CET function, is a standard 
feature (e.g. Golub et al., 2006, Ahmed et al., 2008 and Li et al., 2012)22. In a study for Israel and Italy, 
Palatnik et al. (2011) estimate CET elasticities, based on simulations with a regional scale PMP land-
use model, and apply these estimates to a CGE model, in which land supply is modelled with nested 
CET functions. Imperfect mobility is introduced in the capital market as standard in GTAP-AGR, based 
on a CET function, and in none of the models imperfect mobility is standard in the labour market. 
Nevertheless, there are some studies including imperfect mobility in the labour market: 
Ivanchovichina and Martin (2004) as well as Zhai and Wang (2002) study possible effects of China’s 
accession to the WTO, taking into account barriers to labour mobility between rural and urban 
regions with a CET function. Both studies conclude that labour market reforms, mainly lifting the 
barrier for rural-urban migration, would significantly improve efficiency and equality. Intersectoral 
labour migration – between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors – is considered in a study of 
Valenzuela et al. (2008), which evaluates the sensitivity of results of global trade liberalisation to 
different assumptions on factor mobility, closures and trade elasticities with the GTAP model. The 
increase in agricultural value added is found twice as high in the specification with perfect labour 
mobility, compared to immobile labour, which highlights the importance of the mobility assumption. 
Given the characteristics of a CET function, this approach implies a reallocation of labour in some 
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 This is valid for the case without unemployment. When there is unemployment, factor demand can source 
additional workers from the unemployed and release workers into unemployment. 
22
 For a more detailed review please see section III.2. 
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form of efficiency unit, which raises the question of determining the units that define the market 
clearing conditions for labour. Ideally, labour should be defined in ‘natural’/physical units, in order to 
be able to track the actual quantity of workers who move between sectors. 
In order to model imperfect inter-sectoral labour reallocation and to be able to track the physical 
units, a migration function is introduced in article 2 on ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’, 
where workers migrate between different sector blocks of production. A migration function is also 
used to depict migration between countries or regions by McDonald and Thierfelder (2009). 
Migration between rural and urban regions can also be comprehended as migration between 
agricultural and other sectors. Article 2 (section III) extends the migration function, by deviating fully 
from the local definition and defining migration bilaterally between different sector blocks of the 
economy. In the migration function of McDonald and Thierfelder (2009), the migration decision is 
based on the relative wage of the own region, relative to the average wage level in all regions, with 
workers migrating to a pool and from that pool. In contrast, the origin of a migrating worker is 
traceable in the version of the migration function developed for this thesis.23 
In a first step, labour types, differentiated amongst others by skill categories and ethnicity in the data 
base, are allocated to segmented sector blocks, which are defined as groups of sectors, e.g., 
‘Agricultural sectors’, within which labour is perfectly mobile. Migration is possible between the 
sector blocks, but only within a specific labour type, e.g. ‘Skilled Arab’. In a second step, migration 
between these labour types is introduced: Migration depends on the change in the relative wage: the 
wage a worker could earn in his old sector, compared to the wage he could earn in another sector he 
could migrate to. Thus, the amount of workers, who migrate from one sector block to another, is 
determined by the change in the relative wage and labour supply in the base situation. The 
responsiveness of migration to wage changes is determined by the migration elasticity: If the 
elasticity is high, labour is mobile between the sector blocks, if it is zero, there is no migration. 
Migration can naturally be set up between characteristics of other dimensions, too. Workers could 
migrate/transform to higher skill levels or transform into higher age classes in a dynamic model. 
V.3. Productivity Effects from Labour Reallocation 
Data reports huge variations between wage rates among different skill classes and sectors. In 
perfectly competitive markets, only heterogeneous productivities can explain the existence of wage 
differences (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013). When labour moves from less to more productive 
sectors in CGE models, it is typically assumed to adapt the productivity in the destination sector and 
an economy experiences a de facto increase in labour endowment. Poirson (2001) estimates the 
impact of labour reallocation on economic growth rates and asks the question, to what extend these 
reallocation effects contribute to faster or slower growth rates, by using panel data for 65 countries 
between the years 1960 to 1990. Her findings confirm the importance of labour reallocation effects 
in determining economic growth rates: countries, which allocate labour relatively more in sectors 
with a higher productivity, over time grow faster. In addition, Poirson shows that missing 
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 For a detailed description of the migration function see section C.2. of the Appendix. 
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reallocation, from agriculture to industry and services, accounts fully for the growth gap of African 
countries relative to other countries. 
This raises the question, in how far it is possible for a worker to move between different sectors and 
adapt the new sector’s productivity. Empirical literature on costs of factor reallocation highlights the 
existence of severe costs of reallocation, mainly caused by non-transferability of skills and losses in 
skills, which hinders mobility between sectors.  
To be able to analyse the productivity effects of labour reallocation, a feature is introduced which 
allows finally for the following setups: 
 Reallocated labour adopts the new sector’s productivity.  
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity. Thus, the average productivity of 
each labour type in each sector block will change. 
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity adjusted for a predetermined 
productivity change. 
 Reallocated labour adopts a productivity somewhere between that of the old and new 
sectors. Again, the average productivity of each labour type in each sector block will change. 
For this purpose, productivity is set partly sector and partly factor specific in model 
calibration.24 
For this purpose, the Israeli labour market is assumed competitive, hence wage differences reflect 
differences in factor productivity25. Productivity varies between labour types as well as inside a 
labour type. Wages are defined per productivity unit and thus are equal. Real factors are 
transformed into productivity units by multiplication with a sector specific efficiency factor. When 
allowing for migration between sectors, workers are usually assumed to gain the new sector’s 
productivity. To allow for a scenario in which workers maintain their old productivity level, or a share 
dependent on it, productivity, which typically is sector specific, is made factor specific. If the 
productivity is factor specific, the average productivity of his new sector adjusts accordingly26. 
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 This option is possible to model with the approach developed, but not applied in the studies forming this 
thesis because of data availability. 
25
 This assumption of competitive markets implies, that also wage differences within others than the sectoral 
dimension reflect productivity differences. This is clearly a problematic assumption as there is clear evidence 
that there are market imperfections existing in the Israeli labour market. As indicated above, e.g., differences 
between Jewish and non-Jewish workers might accrue from service in the Israeli army, and foreign workers 
face different rights and negotiation power compared to domestic workers. However, as migration is only 
possible in the sectoral dimension, wage differences between other dimensions can still be interpreted to 
originate from market imperfections. 
26
 For more detail on the technical implementation of factor specific productivity please see section III.3.2 and 
Appendix C.3 
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Additionally, there is an adjustment parameter which allows for variation in the skill transfer. If the 
adjustment parameter is set to a value less than 1, the worker cannot maintain his former level of 
income. When it equals 1, the worker maintains his old productivity; if it is greater than 1, 
productivity increases. This parameter is used to introduce costs of reallocation, which are analysed 
in article 3 (section IV) on ‘Labour Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment’. 
V.4. Reallocation Costs 
Several empirical studies show, that workers who change sectors can experience large and persistent 
losses in wages (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993, Figura and Wascher, 2010 and Fallick, 1996)27. Despite 
differences in methods of assessing the level of wage losses for workers who switch industries, all 
studies find considerable differences for wage losses between reemployment in the old industry and 
reemployment in a new industry, which differ from 21% (Figura and Wascher, 2010) to 38% 
(Jacobson et al., 1993). These earning losses are persistent: According to Jacobson et al. (1993), after 
5 years, losses still amount to 25% of pre-displacement earnings (see also Fallick, 1996, and Figura 
and Wascher, 2010). Furthermore, wage losses are depending only little on age and gender and are 
not only related to few sectors. Local labour market conditions are crucial: losses are larger, when 
workers are displaced in regions with depressed rates of employment growth. The difference 
between strong and weak labour markets accounts for one third of the average loss (Jacobson, 
1993). Cyclical conditions have substantial and long lasting effects, too, but even workers displaced in 
a strong labour market are found to experience large wage losses.  
The main reason for wage losses is firm- or sector-specific human capital. Fallick (1996) and Jacobson 
et al. (1993) mention in addition wage losses after reemployment originating from especially suited 
skills, because of particular good matches from intensive search. Other reasons are the loss of wage 
premiums and the loss of seniority, more specifically lower long term earnings regarding the career, 
when starting with a lower wage in expectation of a higher wage in the future. In an empirical study 
on inter-industry mobility of Jewish immigrants in Israel, Darvish (1990) identifies four variables, 
which are relevant for imperfect labour mobility between industries. First, age is correlated with 
lower inter-industry mobility. Second, according to the human capital theory of Becker (1962), the 
worker’s level of education serves as approximation of the skill-level: the higher industry specific 
skills are, the higher is the worker’s value for the employer and the cost of inter-industry mobility. 
Third, the mobility depends on the status at work: (former) self-employed are more reluctant to 
change industries than employees, because of higher skills, assuming that people deciding for self-
employment are particular competent. Fourth, in addition to sector specific skills, labour mobility 
depends on the settlement region: settlement in economic active areas is negatively correlated with 
the inter-industry mobility rate. This is because of the higher number of economic opportunities as 
well as because of the higher availability of information and therefore more intensive search, which 
increases the probability of finding a job in the old industry. 
A study of Garcia-Cebro and Varela-Santamaria (2011) on imperfect intersectoral labour mobility and 
monetary shocks in a small open economy includes the costs of labour reallocation in a new open 
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economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model framework. The study includes the cost of reallocation 
and leisure in the household utility function. Simulating a monetary expansion in a small open 
economy, Garcia-Cebro and Varela-Santamaria find in the short term less expansionary effects on 
traded output and less contractionary effects in the long term as well as lower welfare gains or larger 
welfare losses in the long run, when reallocation costs are included. Tapp (2011) estimates the costs 
of sectoral labour adjustment for Canada in 2002-2006 with an equilibrium search and matching 
model and finds adjustments costs up to 3% of output during the first three years. Non-
transferability of skills was the predominant contributor to these aggregate costs, which generally 
remained up to five years. The existence of labour reallocation costs is crucial, when estimating the 
adjustment of economies to globalization and trade liberalization. Davidson and Matusz (2000) ask, 
why public and economic opinions are so strongly divided on the issue of whether there are welfare 
gains from trade liberalisation. The authors reason, that this difference can be explained by deviant 
views on the labour market: while economists assume a fully-employed and perfectly mobile labour 
market, the reality of unemployment and other adjustment costs is most apparent to the public.  
Despite the empirical evidence for their existence, labour reallocation costs are rarely studied in CGE-
models. Chan et al. (2005) consider adjustment costs in labour markets in a standard, static CGE-
study for Vietnam. They differentiate four different possibilities of treating adjustment cost: firstly, 
labour moves fully mobile across all sectors; secondly, two blocks are differentiated, agriculture and 
manufacturing, where there is no mobility between these blocks, but workers are mobile inside a 
block; thirdly, the same as before, but there are transaction costs when moving within sector blocks; 
and lastly, mobility between the blocks is possible only with transaction costs. Imperfect labour 
movement is implemented with a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, and 
transaction costs are implemented as 10% relocation cost on the value of labour movement, 
assuming a de facto reduction in factor endowment. Findings of Chan et al. (2005) suggest, that the 
amount of labour movement between sectors is typically overestimated and that distributional 
impacts are mostly intensified by transaction costs. Article 3 on ‘Labour Market Flexibility and Costs 
of Adjustment’ analyses, how the existence of labour reallocation costs for movement between 
sectors is influencing model outcomes. 
V.5. General Conclusions 
V.5.1. Study Results 
The first article on ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Palestinian Labour: Who Benefits?’, presented in 
this thesis in section II, examines the potential effects of a partial liberalization of labour market 
policy in Israel with respect to cross-border workers from the West Bank. The study simulates an 
increase in the number of Palestinians working in Israel from 50 thousand to the pre-Intifada level of 
more than 100 thousand. The study is based on a detailed depiction of the labour market and factor 
demand is set up with a series of nested CES-functions.  
An opening of the Israeli labour market to more Palestinian workers would increase domestic 
production, and potentially enhance economic growth in Israel. Opening the labour market would 
widen the income gap between poor and rich households in Israel by increasing the factor income of 
rich household groups more than those of some poorer household groups. However, the negative 
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distributional effects of changes in factor incomes will be partially offset by greater reductions in the 
cost of living for poorer households. Overall there are welfare gains for all household groups in Israel. 
These results are robust across a wide range of substitution elasticities. Two elasticities are 
influencing the results especially strong: the substitution elasticities between Israeli and non-Israeli 
unskilled workers, and between Palestinian and foreign workers. These are the elasticities of the 
nested tree, which are closest to the shock (the increase of Palestinian workers). When increasing 
the substitution elasticity between Palestinian and foreign workers, the effects on the labour market 
are stronger. Mainly the closest substitutes to Palestinians, the foreign workers, are more negatively 
affected: Palestinians wages fall less, while foreigners experience a greater decline in wages, the 
wage rate for aggregate labour decreases slightly. Differences in the effects on Israeli households are 
not large, while the effects on the macroeconomic level are very small, but positive, as the elasticity 
is increased. Increasing the substitution elasticity between Israeli and non-Israeli unskilled workers 
increases the negative impacts on poor Israelis: factor income decreases for unskilled workers. 
Households in the West Bank would benefit from sharply increased remittances from Palestinians 
working in Israel. Such additional inflows to the West Bank from employment abroad, in combination 
with the outflow of workers, could, however, negatively impact on the West Bank’s economy. While 
previous studies have found a positive effect from the transfer of high labour income from 
Palestinian cross-border workers to the West Bank, the interactions effects are not well articulated. 
There is therefore a case for multi region CGE model for the West Bank and Israel that endogenises 
the Palestinian labour supply decisions and the consequent indirect effects upon the West Bank.  
The third article on ‘Intersectoral Factor Movements: Do Adjustment Costs Matter for Welfare?’ in 
section IV quantifies the relevance of transaction costs from labour reallocation at an economy wide 
level. The study applies a variation of the labour market scenario from the first article to three 
different setups of labour mobility: migration without cost, with 20% costs and with almost 
prohibitive costs.  
Labour reallocation has two different effects: first, the moving worker typically adopts the new 
sector’s productivity, which influences de facto factor endowment of the economy and thus affects 
simulation results. Second, there are transaction costs of labour reallocation. In order to disentangle 
productivity effects from the transaction costs, migrating workers are assumed to keep the level of 
productivity of their sector of origin, which eliminates the productivity effect28. Thus, the average 
sectoral productivity of each labour type will change in case of sectoral in-migration. The three 
labour market setups are: First with ‘No costs’, a high migration elasticity allows for strong labour 
reallocation after changes in relative wages. Second with ‘20% costs’ reallocated workers experience 
a 20% cut in productivity. Productivity is fully factor specific and reallocated workers’ wages as well 
as productivity decline by 20% compared to their former earnings/productivity. Third, with ‘High 
costs’, reallocation costs are high enough to fully prevent labour reallocation. Hence, labour 
migration is completely inelastic. 
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The scenario applied is similar to the one in article 1 but with a stronger shock: Palestinian 
employment increases in Israel by 370% to a historic level from 2000, when 26% of all Palestinian 
employees were working in Israel. Similar to article 1, increased labour supply induces economic 
growth and increases welfare for all households in Israel, though income effects are stronger for rich 
households. 
Results from the different mobility setups show that labour reallocation costs matter, especially for 
the analysis of distributional effects. Increasing transaction costs decrease positive effects accruing 
from the liberalisation of the Israeli labour market for Palestinians. This is reflected in lower 
economic growth, affecting nearly all sectors of the economy. The scenario employed causes labour 
reallocation between sector blocks. Increasing reallocation costs lowers the ability of workers to 
adjust to shocks in the labour market, which results in increased wage effects and thus income 
effects. Especially workers, which otherwise would move out of a sector, are negatively affected. In 
this study, these are employees in agriculture and construction, sectors were wages are below 
average. Thus, taking into account factor reallocation costs further increases the gap between rich 
and poor households in the economy and reduces positive growth effects to the Israeli economy. 
Neglecting factor reallocation costs and factor specific productivity in CGE-modelling might 
overestimate the size of potential adjustments in the labour market as a response to exogenous 
shocks and thus affect simulation results. Article 2 on ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’, 
presented in section III of this thesis, aims to estimate size and relevance of productivity effects from 
factor reallocation. For this purpose, two scenarios of world market price changes are run: the first 
causing labour moving from agriculture to manufacturing and thus simulating labour migration to 
sectors with higher labour productivity, resulting in increasing total factor productivity. The second 
scenario causes migration from manufacturing to agriculture, leading thus to decreasing total factor 
productivity. Both scenarios are run two times: first, labour adopts the destination sector’s 
productivity and thus average sectoral labour productivity changes. Second, labour keeps the 
productivity from its sector of origin and thus average sectoral labour productivity is not directly 
affected by migration. 
In the first scenario, which simulates a productivity increasing allocation, the GDP effect is 138% 
smaller, when excluding the productivity effect and productivity is held constant. This means that the 
GDP growth of 0.43% becomes a decline of -0.17%, when the productivity effect is excluded. All 
agents of the economy benefit from the increase in productivity if productivity is modelled sector 
specific. When the productivity effect falls away, households and the government experience clear 
losses. Adjustment effects, which lead to a lower total factor productivity, i.e., movement into 
agriculture, are simulated in the second scenario. The losses connected with this factor reallocation 
are quantified by comparing the first run, with sector specific labour productivity, to the second run, 
when productivity is factor specific and thus held constant for the economy as a whole. GDP is 0.33 
percentage points higher, when labour productivity is assumed sector specific. All household groups 
are less negatively affected, when assuming factor specific productivity, the poor are even positively 
affected. 
The results show the importance of productivity effects from factor reallocation for model outcomes. 
This is valid in case of imperfect labour mobility and becomes more relevant with higher migration 
elasticities, such as modelled in this paper, as well as with perfect labour mobility, which would result 
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in even stronger productivity effects due to the stronger reallocation of labour. The size of the 
productivity effect depends on the extent and the direction of labour reallocation, as well as on the 
sectoral differences in productivity. 
Both setups, fully sector specific productivity and fully factor specific productivity, are extremes. The 
study uses these extremes to show the relevance of the labour market specification for simulation 
results. For a realistic depiction of the labour market, it is likely that the specification should be 
somewhere in between the extremes and would depend, besides others, on who migrates first, 
which part of the productivity is sector specific and the time horizon. The productivity setup should 
be more factor specific in the short run and in the long run, when workers are adapting to their new 
tasks, productivity becomes more sector specific. Regarding the question on who migrates first, one 
might argue that the best workers are the first to migrate, because they have the highest capacity to 
adapt to a new labour type (e.g. a higher skill level or sector to work). Then migration should 
decrease productivity in the old sector of work and affect positively the destination labour type. On 
the other hand, a firm which decreases employment first might release the least productive workers 
or those workers choose to change their situation, which are least appropriate for the job. With this 
assumption, migration should increase productivity in the old sector of employment and negatively 
influence the destination factor type. Which effect dominates depends on the specific situation. As 
long as no empirical evidence exists, the model is based on the assumption that migrants move with 
average and not marginal productivity. 
V.5.2. Final Comments and Outlook 
This thesis develops a comprehensive framework to model imperfect labour mobility in CGE models. 
First, the article on ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on Labour: Who Benefits?’ introduces a single 
country CGE model for Israel with a detailed labour market and a nested CES production process. 
Based on this model, the second article on ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’ introduces 
imperfect mobility between sectors with a migration function. It furthermore develops the possibility 
to change between sector and factor specific productivity, which is used to estimate productivity 
effects from factor reallocation. This theoretical approach is applied in the third article on ‘Labour 
Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment’, to analyse the macroeconomic costs of intersectoral 
labour reallocation found in several empirical studies. 
A nested factor demand is found useful to depict heterogeneity of factors. A main critic with this 
approach is the non-availability of required additional parameters, thus, substitution elasticities are 
mostly rather guessed instead of empirically estimated. However, careful sensitivity analyses show 
robust results for a wide range of elasticity values. The value of a substitution elasticity is affecting 
the results strongly only for extreme values or in combination with factor specific productivity, when 
productivity differences are huge, but this is more a matter of the productivity setup. Stronger than 
the actual value of the elasticity, the actual nesting structure and nesting hierarchy seem to matter 
for model outcomes. In this field, too, modelling conventions are not based on empirical studies. In 
summary, while the nested CES structure for factor demand helps to depict the labour market 
structure of a country, additional research is needed in the estimation of substitution elasticities and 
how and according to which factors the nesting structure should be determined. 
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Productivity effects from labour reallocation are an important driver for model outcomes. The 
productivity effects are larger, the stronger the change in relative wages, the higher the mobility of 
labour, and the stronger the differences in sectoral productivities. The relevance of productivity 
effects for model outcomes indicate that the assumption of full mobility might overestimate positive 
macroeconomic effects accruing, e.g., from trade liberalisation. The aim of the study is to show the 
relevance of productivity effects, not to depict a realistic situation. In order to be able to set up a 
realistic scenario, there is need for empirically based data on migration parameters between sectors. 
Furthermore there is need for additional research on which part of the productivity is factor and 
which part sector specific. 
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A. The Database: A Social Accounting Matrix for Israel29 
 Introduction A.1
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Israel and the year 2004, which is developed by the Agricultural 
and Food Policy Group at the University of Hohenheim, serves as database for the studies forming 
this dissertation report. A SAM provides a comprehensive description of the economy and, similar to 
the Input-Output framework and National Accounts transactions, data is displayed in matrix format 
for a particular year with multiple accounts30. Revenue is presented on rows, expenditures in 
columns and for each account total revenue must equal total expenditures. While the main purpose 
of Input-Output Tables is to depict the structure of the economy, mainly the relation between 
industries through transactions and intermediate inputs, the emphasis of a SAM is on distributive 
aspects. For this purpose, institutional accounts are disaggregated, where the focus and strength of 
the SAM is less on the disaggregation itself, but on the relation of different institutional units to the 
production structure and on transfers between these institutional units. 
The SAM is developed in a top-down approach: first, a balanced macro SAM with 13 accounts is 
compiled, based on official Israeli data sources (National Account data and Supply and Use Tables, 
both from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, ICBS, 2009a and 2009b, respectively). This macro 
SAM serves as base for a detailed micro SAM with multiple accounts, Table A.3 shows a detailed list 
of the Micro SAM accounts. The SAM is conducted for 2004, a year with a comparatively stable 
political situation between Palestine and Israel as well as other neighbouring countries and which can 
be considered a relatively ‘normal year’ in terms of its ability to represent an equilibrium state. 
Besides the use of the SAM as data base for the studies conducted in the framework of the DFG-
project on ‘the economic integration of agriculture in Israel and Palestine’, the SAM is also 
contributed to the GTAP-database and for this purpose transformed to the GTAP Input-Output-Table 
format. 
The following parts of the chapter describe the Micro SAM in detail, with emphasis on the factor and 
household accounts, which are most relevant for the studies in the main part of this report. The work 
on this SAM for Israel was a joint work, where my focus of work was on the household account. 
 The SAM for Israel A.2
A.2.1  Activities and Commodities, Trade Margins 
The Israeli SAM distinguishes 47 activity and commodity accounts: 10 agricultural accounts, 25 
industrial accounts, and 12 service accounts (Table A.3). Major sources of industry-related data are 
the Supply and Use Tables (SUT) of 2004 (ICBS, 2009b).The differentiation between activities and 
commodities allows for the valuation of output at producer prices and consumption at market prices 
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(including indirect commodity taxes and transactions costs). In addition, the separation allows for 
multi-product activities and for the commodity to be produced by more than one activity.  
The transition from basic prices to purchaser prices includes expenses for marketing the product and 
transporting it to the purchaser. These expenses are defined in the supply table as ‘trade and 
transport margins’ which includes taxes on and subsidies for products. The trade margins appear in 
the SAM as payments from the commodity account to the margin account. These payments are then 
channelled through the trade margins account to the commodity account ‘trade services’, while 
transport margins are payments from transport margins to the commodity account ‘transport and 
business services’. 
A.2.2 Production Factors 
Israeli Labour 
Two ICBS publications are used as data sources for the domestic labour account: the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) of 2004 (ICBS, 2005a) and the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2006 (ICBS, 2006a) which 
contains data from the Business Survey (BS) of 2004. Data on physical labour force are taken from 
the LFS, and the BS is used to obtain data on employees’ compensation. 
The total number of employed persons is 2.4 million in 2004, including wage employees, family 
members, persons staying in institutions who work at least 15 hours per week and kibbutzim 
workers31; persons temporary absent from work are also included (ICBS, 2005a). In a first step, total 
domestic workforce is split according to ethnic groups into Jewish, about 2.1 million employed 
persons, and Arab, about 274,000 employed persons, representing the two major ethnic groups in 
Israeli society. For data availability reasons the Arab Israeli group is merged with all other ethnic 
minorities, which are 71,000 persons. The second step separates the ethnic labour groups into 
female and male, to be able to account for lower average gross income from work of female workers, 
which is found to be 37% lower than the income of their male counterparts. Reasons are lower wage-
rates for females and less weekly working hours (ICBS, 2006a, Table 12.41). In addition, the number 
of working women in the Arabs and others group is about 60% smaller than the number of working 
males, whereas the numbers of female and male employed persons in the Jewish population are 
found almost equal. Thirdly, the domestic workforce is disaggregated into 8 professions with 
different skill levels: academic professionals, associate professionals and technicians, managers, 
clerical workers, agents and sales- and service workers, skilled agricultural workers, other skilled 
workers, and unskilled workers (ICBS, 2005a)32. 
Average wages are used to calculate the total annual compensation of employed persons for each 
labour account and each sector. Wages are derived from a Business Survey (BS) based on employers’ 
reports to the National Insurance Institute (ICBS, 2006a, Table 12.38). Different definitions and 
coverage, sources, methods of data collection, and estimation procedures cause several difficulties in 
matching the wage data of the BS to the labour force data of the LFS33. The BS reports average wages 
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differentiated by economic sector of employment. In addition data on wages are available according 
to gender and profession in Table 12.41 of the BS (ICBS, 2006a); there is no information on wages 
according to ethnic group. In order to link the available data, a multiplicative factor, differentiated by 
profession and gender, is used to adjust monthly average wages of each sector according to 
profession and gender. Finally it is assumed that wages do not differ between Jews and ‘Arabs and 
others’ when working in the same sector with the same profession and gender, as no more detailed 
data is available. 
Table A.1. Distribution of Employed Persons and Monthly Wage Rates 
 Number of Workers 
(Thsd.) 
Percentage 
Distribution 
Monthly Wage 
(ILS) 
Jewish Female 922 35% 9,258 
Jewish Male 1,131 43% 13,713 
Arab & Others Female 86 3% 7,596 
Arab & Others Male 261 10% 9,609 
Palestinians 50 2% 2,277 
Foreigners ROW 189 7% 3,916 
Total 2,640 100% - 
Source: based on Siddig et al. (2011) 
Total monthly compensation is calculated with the average monthly wages and the number of 
employed persons in each sector received from the LFS, and scaled to the original compensation 
values, which are calculated without disaggregation according to profession. The annual labour 
compensation is calculated and balanced to the National Accounts data. 
Foreign Workers 
In addition to the Israeli workforce the SAM distinguishes two groups of non-Israeli workers: 
Palestinians, who typically commute to Israel on a daily basis from the West Bank and Gaza34, and 
other foreign workers from the rest of the world, mostly coming from Asia to work in Israel. Many 
foreign workers in Israel work without legal documents, often overstaying tourist visa or illegally 
crossing the border (ICBS, 2005b). Estimates on the number of illegal foreign workers in Israel vary 
widely, but even conservative assessments suggest that the number of illegal foreign workers is as 
high as the number of legal foreign workers (e.g., ICBS, 2005b). Because illegal workers represent a 
considerable part of the total workforce in several sectors, particularly agriculture and construction, 
the current SAM reserves two separate accounts: illegal workers from Palestine and illegal workers 
from the rest of the world. 
Data on foreign workers is obtained from the Wages and Employment Monthly Statistics of June, 
2005 by the ICBS (2005c), however, information on foreign labour is not published as detailed as for 
the domestic labour force. Most detailed data on Palestinian workers in Israel is available from the 
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Palestinians from Gaza working in Israel dropped by more than 90% and since 2006 the border is fully closed, 
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Palestinian LFS (PCBS, 2005). This information is also considered to be more accurate than the data 
published by the ICBS, as the latter includes workers who receive their wages through the payment 
department of the Employment Service only, whereas the Palestinian LFS relies on household 
surveys. 8.7% of the total Palestinian labour force, 578 000 persons, are working in Israel (PCBS, 
2005, Table 16f), disaggregated by 6 sectors which are included in the Palestinian LFS. To further 
disaggregate over the 47 activities of the SAM the distribution inside these 6 sectors is assumed 
equal to that of the Israeli labour force. 
Daily wages and the average number of monthly working days of Palestinian workers in Israel, 
disaggregated to 6 sectors, (PCBS, 2005, Table 41) are used to calculate average monthly wages. As 
no more detailed information on wages is available, it is assumed that average wages in all 
subsectors equal the corresponding wage rate of the 6 main sectors. The number of illegal 
Palestinian workers in Israel is estimated to be 35,000 in 2004 by the Worker Advice Center (2004). 
Illegal Palestinian workers are deducted from the total number of Palestinian workers in Israel, 50 
286, obtained from the Palestinian LFS, assuming the LFS reports also illegal workers. Thus, about 
70% of all Palestinian workers in Israel are undocumented and 30% are legal. The derived number of 
legal Palestinian workers, 15 286, almost doubles the number published by the ICBS, which considers 
workers who receive their wages through the payment department of the Employment Service only 
(ICBS, 2006a, Table 12.34). The total annual labour compensation in the different sectors is split 
according to the shares of legal and illegal Palestinian workers, making the rough assumption that 
legal and illegal workers earn the same wage rate. 
The most detailed data on foreign workers from the rest of the world (from here on, ‘foreign 
workers’) in Israel in 2004 is obtained from the Central Bank of Israel (CBI) annual report 2005 (CBI, 
2006). The CBI data is based on the national accounts data of the ICBS and includes reported and 
unreported foreign workers. As data for 2004 are not available (the annual report of the CBI for 2004 
does not contain a labour market report), 2004 values are calculated using the values of 2005 and 
the rates of change over the previous year. Additionally, the number of foreign workers in 10 distinct 
sectors is obtained by the number of working permits issued in that sector in 2005 and the rate of 
change over 2004, published both by the CBI (2006: 24). Further disaggregation to the 47 activities of 
the SAM follows the process chosen for Palestinian workers. 
Wages of foreign workers are obtained from ICBS (2005c, Table 1.22), which reports the monthly 
average wages for workers from abroad in 7 distinct sectors and one wage rate for all ‘other 
industries’. Housekeepers and homecare workers insured by their employer are excluded from this 
survey. The following assumptions are made: First, all foreign workers in Israel work for wages and 
thus are employees. Second, average wages of illegal foreign workers are similar to those of legal 
foreign workers35. Third, housekeepers and homecare workers insured by the employer receive the 
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A. The Database: A Social Accounting Matrix for Israel 
79 
Figure A.1. Disaggregation of Factor Accounts in the SAM  
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same average monthly wages as foreign workers employed in healthcare services (compare ICBS, 
2005c, Table 1.22). Fourth, average wage rates of subsectors are equal within the main sectors and 
fifth, the average monthly wage rate in all main sectors for which no specific average wage rate is 
published equals the wage rate in ‘other industries’. The total number of foreign workers is 
estimated to be 188 000 in 2004 (ICBS, 2005b) which is quite close to 188 500, published by the CBI 
for the same year (CBI, 2006). The ICBS (2005b) also provides data on the number of foreign workers 
staying in Israel with and without working visas, thus 48.7% are legal and 51.3% are illegal workers, 
and are assumed equal in all sectors. Finally, the total compensation of non-domestic workers is 
scaled to the value of compensation of employees paid abroad from the national accounts data 
(ICBS, 2009a, Table 32), which implies a reduction by 18.3%36. 
Balancing the value of compensation for foreign employees to value of the compensation of 
employees paid abroad from the national accounts assumes, that workers send their full income 
abroad and do not consume in Israel; Palestinians, too, are assumed not to consume in Israel. This 
assumption is surely questionable. Nevertheless, Palestinians from the West Bank use to work in 
Israel on a daily basis, returning to Palestine for food and lodging, what might support the 
assumption. 
Land 
As other economic activities mostly require a very small land area, land is considered a production 
factor for agricultural activities only. More than 90% of the land is owned by the Israeli state and 
farmers can lease land on long term contracts, lasting 24 to 99 years, through the Israeli Land 
Administration (Egoz, 1996). Leasing rates depend on several factors, including the type of usage, 
area and irrigation facilities. There is no free land market in Israel. The value of land in the specific 
agricultural activities is derived from the area allocated to agricultural activities and the annual 
leasing rates. Data on agricultural area are taken from the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010 (ICBS, 
2010) and FAO (FAOSTAT, 2011); the Israeli Ministry of Justice (IMJ, 2010) publishes leasing rates of 
land in Israel. 
Capital 
To estimate capital compensation of each activity, a land-capital composite is calculated as residual 
between labour compensation and net domestic product at basic prices. The total value of net 
domestic product as well as its distribution over 13 sectors for 2004 is obtained from ICBS (2009a, 
Table 16), however, the values for different sectors do not sum up to the total due to ‘errors and 
omissions’. The value of errors and omissions is dispersed over the 13 sectors, assuming that the 
errors and omissions occurred equally in all sectors. Labour compensation is aggregated to the 13 
sector aggregation and subtracted from the net domestic product in each sector. The residual value 
in each of the 13 sectors is assumed to account for land and capital compensation. Finally the land-
capital composite is reallocated to the 47 activities of the SAM and the value of land is deducted in 
agricultural activities. The share of land and capital compensation in the total value added is rather 
                                                          
36
 Given the weak wage data, a scaling of this size might be reasonable. Palestine is officially not regarded as 
foreign country by Israel, compensation of Palestinian employees is therefore not included in the 
compensation of employees paid abroad. 
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low in comparison to other OECD member countries. Also, for the sector ‘Imputed value of bank 
services’ the NA state a negative value added. Because labour compensation in this sector is zero, 
according to the 1995 IOT (ICBS, 2002, Table 3), capital compensation is negative.  
A.2.3 Households 
Classification 
Household data are obtained from the publications of the ICBS: the National Accounts 1995-2007 
(ICBS, 2009a), the Expenditure and Income Survey of 2004 (ICBS, 2006b; ICBS 2006c), the SUT 2004 
(ICBS, 2009b), the General Government Accounts 2000-2005 (ICBS, 2007), and the Social Survey 2004 
(ICBS, 2011). A detailed household account in the SAM is the basis to analyse the livelihoods of 
people and distributional effects, and gives the opportunity to simulate various discriminatory 
policies. Households can be classified according to a huge variety of dimensions, e.g., according to 
income level, ethnic background, head of household, or spatially by state or locality. In the SAM for 
Israel, the Israeli population is disaggregated into income quintiles in order to differentiate according 
to living standards. The use of income as only criterion for classifying households according to living 
standard is controversial because it does not reflect the whole range of aspects which comprise the 
living standard (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). Nevertheless, income is used here as a proxy for the 
living standard, because of good data availability from the Income and Expenditure Surveys of the 
year 2004 (ICBS 2006b, 2006c), which provide detailed information on households classified 
according to income. 
Households are classified to income quintiles by net income per standard person, in order to take 
into account different household sizes and scale economies, which arise, e.g., from sharing living 
accommodations and cooking. In addition to income, households are differentiated by ethnicity into 
Jewish (83.6% of population) and non-Jewish (Arab and others) in Israel, to capture social, 
behavioural and cultural differences between these groups. The non-Jewish group, which is 
dominated by the Arab-Israeli population (12.7% of population), includes also immigrants from the 
former Russian federation who are non-Jewish or people who do not have a Jewish mother and 
therefore are not considered to be Jewish. The share of non-Jewish non-Arabs is about 3.7% of the 
total Israeli population. Table A.2 provides an overview of the distribution of Israeli households by 
income quintiles and population group. The income quintiles are ranged from one, which represents 
the household group with the lowest average income, to five, which is the quintile with the highest 
income, for both Jews and ‘Arabs and others’. Thus, the SAM includes 10 household groups: total 
households are first classified according to income and second, each quintile is divided into ethnic 
groups. As a result, household groups differ substantially in size, with Arabs in the highest income 
quintile establishing the smallest group (13,000 households) and Jews in the highest income quintile 
establishing the largest group (377,000 households). The Income Survey (ICBS, 2006b) provides data 
on deciles according to net income per standard person and data by ethnical group. Data are 
aggregated to quintiles and allocated according to ethnicity. As there is no information on average 
income within the published deciles according to ethnic background, it is assumed, that the income 
levels of different ethnic groups within a similar income quintile are similar. 
  
A. The Database: A Social Accounting Matrix for Israel 
82 
Table A.2. Israeli Households Classified by Ethnic Groups and Income 
 
            Jews             Arabs and Others 
Income Quintiles  Number of Households Percentage Number of Households Percentage 
 
 [Thousand] Share [Thousand] Share 
Quintile 1 257.0 65.7% 134.0 34.3% 
Quintile 2 299.0 76.6% 91.0 23.4% 
Quintile 3 336.0 86.3% 53.0 13.7% 
Quintile 4 362.0 92.8% 28.0 7.3% 
Quintile 5 377.0 96.6% 13.0 3.4% 
Total 1630.0 83.6% 320.0 16.4% 
Source: ICBS (2006c) 
Income 
The SAM provides a comprehensive description of transaction flows in which households are 
involved (Figure A.2). The household earns income from work or other factors of production and 
receives transfer payments from the government, foreign countries, or other households. Income is 
spent on final consumption goods and services, taxes, and transfers to other households (domestic 
and abroad). Savings are balancing total income and total expenditures. 
Figure A.2. Monetary Flows to and from Households 
 
Source: Siddig et al. (2011) 
Labour compensation is the major component in household income and includes, for consistency 
with the labour account, income from wages and self-employment (employees), as well as 
imputations of wages for employed persons who are not employees. First, Jewish labour groups are 
allocated to Jewish household groups and Arab and other labour groups are allocated to their 
corresponding households. The Social Survey 2004 (ICBS, 2011) provides data on the distribution of 
different occupations according to the level of total family income, but not according to income 
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quintiles and it does not differentiate between Arabs and Jews. To estimate the number of earners 
each household group of the SAM holds in each occupation, the income data from the Social Survey 
are mapped to the household groups, taking into account the number of earners in each household 
group (ICBS, 2006c, Table 2.2.). Afterwards, the shares each household group holds in the different 
labour accounts are calculated. These shares are applied to distribute the compensation of labour of 
each labour group among the different household groups. 
There are significant differences in the level of income and its distribution among households when 
comparing the results of the approach described above, where income from the production side is 
allocated, with data from the Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, Table 2.1.). In total, the compensation 
of labour published in the National Accounts (see the section production factors) is 46% higher than 
the household income from labour published in the Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, Table 2.1.). The 
reason might be imputations for employed persons (see above) which are not accounted for in the 
Expenditure Survey, but which are included in the compensation of labour. In addition, after 
allocating the labour income to the household groups, the share of income from labour the higher 
quintiles receive is lower and the share of income from labour the lowest quintiles receive is higher 
compared to the shares published in the Expenditure Survey. This bias may be caused by the 
imputations for employed persons, which are assumed to exist primarily in the lower income 
quintiles. 
Household income from capital is obtained from the 2004 Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 
2006c, Table 2.1). It provides information on monthly capital income for income deciles. The monthly 
values of property income per income decile are converted in yearly values for the final household 
groups. Households also receive income from entrepreneurial activities. Every enterprise is finally 
owned by households or the government; hence, owners receive the profits of their enterprises. 
Data on transfers from enterprises to households is not available, thus, transfers from enterprises 
are obtained after deducting transfers to the government, tax payments, as well as enterprise saving 
from total enterprises income. Transfer payments from enterprises are distributed among the 
household groups to create a balance between income and expenditure for each household group. 
The second source of income to households is transfers from other households in Israel, from the 
ROW and transfers from the government. On the expenditure side, domestic households also remit 
abroad, transfer money to other domestic households, and make compulsory payments to the 
government. Data on inter-households transfers are from the Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 
2006c, Table 2.1 and Table1.1). The total amount of household transfers as well as the shares of 
household transfers to the ROW, 60% of total household transfers, is reported by ICBS (2009a, Table 
28). Domestic inter-households transfers, the remaining 40%, are distributed among the household 
groups according to the distribution of total transfers. Data on transfers from the government to 
households is obtained from the General Government Accounts (ICBS, 2007), while information 
about its distribution among different household groups is based on the Household Expenditure 
Survey (ICBS, 2006c). Government transfers to households include social insurance benefits, 
pensions, and other allowances and assistance. Income from social benefits reported in the 
Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, Table 2.1) is found to be lower than that reported in the 
Government Account (ICBS, 2007, Table 5.4). Therefore, the former is scaled to the level of the latter 
as household income is generally assumed undervalued in household surveys. Data on transfers to 
households from the ROW is obtained from the National Accounts (ICBS, 2009a, Table 28) and 
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distributed among household groups according to household income from allowances and assistance 
excluding Israeli institutions, which is obtained from the Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, 
Table 2.1)37. The value of transfer payments of Israeli households to households abroad is distributed 
among household groups according to the distribution of total transfer spending (ICBS, 2009a, Table 
28). 
Expenditure 
The Household Expenditure Survey of the year 2004 provides detailed information on household 
monthly consumption expenditures by income quintiles (net income per standard person; ICBS, 
2006c, Table 1.1). Based on the ISIC (Revision 3) commodity classification, the detailed expenditure 
data of the survey is allocated to the 47 commodity classification of the SAM. The yearly 
consumption expenditures of the whole population according to the Household Expenditure Survey 
adds up to ILS 234,408 million, while the value published in the National Accounts is 34.7% higher or 
ILS 315,860 million (ICBS, 2009a, Table 7). Accordingly, the Household Expenditure Survey data is 
scaled-up to the value of the National Accounts. The scaling-up follows the approach of source 
unification and increases consistency. 
Due to missing data, it is assumed that that the consumption patterns of the different ethnic groups 
in a specific quintile are equal. In addition to consumption expenditures, households spend money 
for compulsory payments to the government, including direct income taxes, social insurance 
payments, and health insurance payments, as well as transfers abroad. Data on these components 
are provided in the Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, Table 2.1) and the National Accounts 
(ICBS, 2009a, Table 30). Data from the Household Expenditure Survey are used and scaled-up to the 
National Accounts level. 
The Household Expenditure Survey (ICBS, 2006c, Table 1.1) provides also information on selected 
savings items. Based on this information, the share of each quintile in total savings is calculated and 
scaled-up to meet net private savings published in the National Accounts (ICBS, 2009a, Table 29). 
Savings in the third quintile groups obtained by this approach are found too low, resulting in negative 
transfers from enterprises. Therefore, savings of household groups of the third quintile are adjusted, 
reducing slightly the savings of other household groups by an equal rate to keep total household 
savings constant. 
  
                                                          
37
 The value of the current transfers from abroad excluding transfers to the Israeli government obtained from 
the Household Expenditure Survey is lower than that from the National Accounts, as the latter includes transfer 
payments to Israeli non-profit institutions as well as transfers from immigrants. Accordingly, the Household 
Expenditure Survey value is scaled-up to the National Accounts level. 
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A.2.4 Taxes 
The SAM identifies four types of major taxes: taxes on domestic production, taxes on imported 
products, direct taxes including health and social insurances, and taxes on production factors (Table 
A.3). Major sources of data on taxes and subsidies are the National Accounts 1995-2007 (ICBS, 2009a, 
Table 30), and the General Government Accounts (ICBS, 2007). The SUT of the year 2004 (ICBS, 
2009b) provides data on net taxes and subsidies on products only. Therefore, it could not be used as 
data source for the different tax accounts included in the SAM. The distribution of the total value for 
each tax type over the corresponding accounts is based on unpublished data by ICBS and personal 
communication with ICBS staff. Taxes on production and products include indirect taxes on 
production, production subsidies, export subsidies, value added taxes on domestic products, fuel tax, 
excises on tobacco and cement, other taxes on domestic products, and sales subsidies on domestic 
goods. Taxes on imported products are represented by four accounts: value added taxes on imports; 
customs; purchases and other taxes on imports; and taxes on defence imports.  
Direct taxes and insurances are represented by five different accounts. The allocation of income tax 
to the enterprises account is straightforward as enterprises are represented by one single account in 
the SAM. For households, income taxes payments are allocated according to data in the Household 
Expenditure Survey. Social insurance payments are reported in two separate categories: social 
insurance payments by employers and social insurance payments by employees. Social insurance 
payments by employers are levied on production activities based on the value of labour 
compensations by each activity. The payments are merged into the activities payments to labour. 
Therefore, labour compensations received by production factors from activities include social 
insurance payments by employers. On the other hand, social insurance payments by employees are 
levied on income of production factors prior to allocations to households. At this point, production 
factors pay total social insurance payments by employers, which are already received from activities, 
as well as the social insurance payments by employees to the corresponding tax account. Again, the 
distribution of the entire payments is based on labour income. Health care in Israel is both universal 
and compulsory and is administered by a small number of organisations which are government 
funded. All Israeli citizens are entitled to the same uniform benefits package, regardless of which 
organisation they are a member of, and treatment under this package is funded for all citizens 
regardless of their financial means (IMFA, 2010). In the current SAM, the total health insurance 
payments reported in the National Accounts (ICBS, 2009a, Table 30) is distributed among the ten 
household accounts based on the Household and Expenditure Survey. 
The remaining tax accounts are taxes on factors of production including land, capital and labour. 
Taxes on capital and land are merged together under the name ‘taxes on capital including land and 
fixed assets’, which is payable by activities based on shares of capital and land use. The labour tax 
account is disaggregated into 36 labour categories and total wage bill and payroll taxes are 
distributed over the activity accounts based on the values they pay for the compensation of labour. 
A.2.5 Enterprises 
Data on enterprises income and expenditure is obtained from the ICBS including the Statistical 
Abstract 2005 (ICBS, 2005d, Table 14.12) and the National Accounts (ICBS, 2009a). Returns to capital 
are allocated to enterprises and are ultimately distributed among the enterprises expenditure 
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destinations such as government, households, and the ROW. These returns to capital are calculated 
as residuals of net domestic product at basic prices after a deduction of the compensation of labour 
and land. In addition to income from capital, the Israeli government provides enterprises with non-
recurrent grants to investors amounting to ILS 8.1 billion in 2004 (ICBS, 2005d, Table 14.12). 
Enterprise income is spent on paying direct income taxes, transfers to the government in terms of 
returns to state owned enterprises, transfers to households, transfers to the ROW, and savings. 
 Balancing A.3
The SAM is constructed with the top-down approach: first, an aggregated macro SAM with 13x13 
accounts is built based on official Israeli sources of data. The macro SAM is balanced based on the T-
accounts of the major economic actors in Israel including the government, non-governmental 
institutions, saving-investment and the ROW. Tax accounts are automatically balanced within the T-
account of the government. Small imbalances in the activity and commodity accounts are balanced 
based on the cells that are sourced from the SUT. These are intermediate consumption, which is 
reduced by 0.65% and domestic output, which is increased by 0.65%.  
The aggregated accounts of the micro SAM are governed by the control totals of the macro SAM and 
thus are balanced, too. Activities and commodities show various imbalances at the individual 
accounts level with the summation of the imbalances of all commodities and all activities equalizing 
zero. Where possible, imbalances were solved manually for obvious incorrect data entries, e.g., 
intermediate consumption of sugar while there is no domestic sugar production. These errors mainly 
occur from the mapping and reallocation process between different data sets. Significant 
improvements are obtained from balancing based on changing what is called the ‘weakest link’, 
which corresponds in this context to those SAM cells in which data sources are least trustworthy or 
data are calculated as residuals. 
For final balancing, the cross entropy-method is applied. Although the final automated balancing 
causes about 40% of the entries to change by more than 10%, these changes occur mainly in small 
accounts. Less than 5% of the entries with an absolute value higher than 100 million NIS change by 
more than 10% and only 58 entries (1%) change by more than 25%. 
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Table A.3. List of SAM Accounts 
No. Commodities and Activities (c, a) No. Factors (f) – contd. 
1 Wheat 11 Jewish male agricultural skilled workers 
2 Cereals 12 Jewish male sales and service workers 
3 Other crops 13 Jewish male clerical workers 
4 Milk 14 Jewish male managers 
5 Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, and horses 15 Jewish male associate professionals and technicians 
6 Other animal farming 16 Jewish male academic professionals 
7 Fruits and vegetables 17 Arab & others female unskilled workers 
8 Fishing 18 Arab & others female industrial skilled workers 
9 Forestry 19 Arab & others female agricultural skilled workers 
10 Gardening, mixed and unclassified farming 20 Arab & others female sales and service workers 
11 Coal, oil, and gas 21 Arab & others female clerical workers 
12 Minerals nec 22 Arab & others female managers 
13 Meat products nec 23 Arab & others female associate professionals and technicians 
14 Processing of fruit, vegetables and fish 24 Arab & others female academic professionals 
15 Manufacture of edible oils, margarine a. oil products 25 Arab & others male unskilled workers 
16 Dairy Products 26 Arab & others male industrial skilled workers 
17 Manufacture of grain-mill products 27 Arab & others male agricultural skilled workers 
18 Other food products 28 Arab & others male sales and service workers 
19 Sugar manufacturing 29 Arab & others male clerical workers 
20 Beverages and tobacco manufacturing 30 Arab & others male managers 
21 Textiles 31 Arab & others male associate professionals and technicians 
22 Wearing apparel 32 Arab & others male academic professionals 
23 Leather products 33 Foreign workers from Palestine - legal  
24 Wood products 34 Foreign workers from Palestine - illegal  
25 Paper products and publishing 35 Foreign workers from the Rest of the World – legal 
26 Petroleum and coal products 36 Foreign workers from the Rest of the World – illegal 
27 Chemical, rubber, and plastic products 37 Capital including land, and fixed assets  
28 Mineral non-metallic products 38 Land 
29 Basic metal   
30 Metal products  (excl. machinery and equipment) No. Taxes (gt) 
31 Motor vehicles and parts 1 Taxes on Jewish female unskilled workers 
32 Transport equipment nec 2 Taxes on Jewish female industrial skilled workers 
33 Electronic equipment 3 Taxes on Jewish female agricultural skilled workers 
34 Machinery and equipment nec 4 Taxes on Jewish female sales and service workers 
35 Manufactures nec 5 Taxes on Jewish female clerical workers 
36 Electricity 6 Taxes on Jewish female managers 
37 Water 7 Taxes on Jewish female associate professionals, technicians 
38 Construction 8 Taxes on Jewish female academic professionals 
39 Trade services 9 Taxes on Jewish male unskilled workers 
40 Transport and business services nec. 10 Taxes on Jewish male industrial skilled workers 
41 Water transport 11 Taxes on Jewish male agricultural skilled workers 
42 Air transport 12 Taxes on Jewish male sales and service workers 
43 Communication 13 Taxes on Jewish male clerical workers 
44 Financial serv. and insurance incl. imputed bank serv. 14 Taxes on Jewish male managers 
45 Public Administration, Defence, Education, Health 15 Taxes on Jewish male associate professionals and technicians 
46 Recreational and other services 16 Taxes on Jewish male academic professionals 
47 Dwellings 17 Taxes on Arab & others female unskilled workers 
  18 Taxes on Arab & others female industrial skilled workers 
No. Factors (f) 19 Taxes on Arab & others female agricultural skilled workers 
1 Jewish female unskilled workers 20 Taxes on  Arab & others female sales and service workers 
2 Jewish female industrial skilled workers 21 Taxes on Arab & others female clerical workers 
3 Jewish female agricultural skilled workers 22 Taxes on Arab & others female managers 
4 Jewish female sales and service workers 23 Taxes on Arab & others female assoc. professionals, techn. 
5 Jewish female clerical workers 24 Taxes on Arab & others female academic professionals 
6 Jewish female managers 25 Taxes on Arab & others male unskilled workers 
7 Jewish female associate professionals and technicians 26 Taxes on Arab & others male industrial skilled workers 
8 Jewish female academic professionals 27 Taxes on Arab & others male agricultural skilled workers 
9 Jewish male unskilled workers 28 Taxes on Arab & others male sales and service workers 
10 Jewish male industrial skilled workers 29 Taxes on Arab & others male clerical workers 
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No. Taxes (gt) – contd. No. Taxes (gt) – contd. 
30 Taxes on Arab & others male managers 49 Social insurance payments by employers 
31 Taxes on Arab & others male associate profes.,technic 50 Health Insurance Payments 
32 Taxes on Arab & others male academic professionals   
33 Taxes on Foreign workers from Palestine - Legal No. Households (h) 
34 Taxes on Foreign workers from Palestine - illegal 1 Jewish households in first income quintile 
35 Taxes on Foreign workers from Rest of World - Legal 2 Arab and other households in first income quintile 
36 Taxes on Foreign workers from Rest of World - illegal 3 Jewish households in second income quintile 
37 Taxes on capital 4 Arab and other households in second income quintile 
38 Production taxes 5 Jewish households in third income quintile 
39 Production subsidies 6 Arab and other households in third income quintile 
40 Exports subsidies 7 Jewish households in fourth income quintile 
41 Value added taxes on domestic products 8 Arab and other households in fourth income quintile 
42 Fuel tax 9 Jewish households in fifth income quintile 
43 Excises on tobacco and cement 10 Arab and other households in fifth income quintile 
44 Other purchase, excise duties, consumption taxes on 
domestic products 
  
41 Sales subsidies to domestic goods No. Other Accounts 
42 Value added taxes on imports 1 Trade margins 
43 Import customs 2 Transport margins 
44 Purchase and other taxes on imports 3 Government  
45 Defence imports tax 4 Enterprises (e) 
46 Direct income taxes on Households 5 Savings – investments 
47 Direct income taxes on Enterprises 6 Stock Changes 
48 Social insurance payments by employees 7 Rest of World 
 
 Aggregation for Model Use A.4
For modelling reasons, the accounts of the SAM used in the model work have been slightly adjusted: 
Activities and Commodities: 
 ‘Forestry’, ‘Transport equipment nec’ and ‘Financial services and insurance including imputed 
bank services and general expenses’ show negative capital use in production. The sectors are 
merged with related sectors. 
 ‘Sugar’: There is no domestic sugar production; sugar is added to ‘other food’. 
Taxes are mapped to the tax accounts used in the model as displayed in Table A.4. Factor use taxes 
are indexed over factors (TF(ff,a)), therefore each factor use tax account of the SAM, which is specific 
to a single factor (ff), has one corresponding tax rate in the model. Other tax rates are aggregates of 
tax accounts in the SAM. 
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Table A.4. Mapping between Tax Accounts in the Model and Tax Accounts in the SAM 
Tax Accounts in the Model Tax Accounts in the SAM 
TM(c) Tariff rate on commodity c Import customs 
  Defence imports tax 
TE(c) Export subsidy rate Exports subsidies 
TS(c) Sales tax rates Value added taxes on domestic products 
  Fuel tax 
  Other purchase, excise duties, consumption taxes on dom. Products 
  Sales subsidies to domestic goods 
  Purchase and other taxes on imports 
  Value added taxes on imports 
TEX(c) Excise tax rates Excises on tobacco and cement 
TX(a) Indirect tax rate on activity a Production taxes 
  Production subsidies 
TF(ff,a) Factor use tax rate by factor ff  Taxes on Jewish female unskilled workers 
 and activity a Taxes on Jewish female industrial skilled workers 
  Taxes on Jewish female agricultural skilled workers 
  Taxes on Jewish female sales and service workers 
  Taxes on Jewish female clerical workers 
  Taxes on Jewish female managers 
  Taxes on Jewish female associate professionals and technicians 
  Taxes on Jewish female academic professionals 
  Taxes on Jewish male unskilled workers 
  Taxes on Jewish male industrial skilled workers 
  Taxes on Jewish male agricultural skilled workers 
  Taxes on Jewish male sales and service workers 
  Taxes on Jewish male clerical workers 
  Taxes on Jewish male managers 
  Taxes on Jewish male associate professionals and technicians 
  Taxes on Jewish male academic professionals 
  Taxes on Arab & others female unskilled workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others female industrial skilled workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others female agricultural skilled workers 
  Taxes on  Arab & others female sales and service workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others female clerical workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others female managers 
  Taxes on Arab & others female associate professionals, technicians 
  Taxes on Arab & others female academic professionals 
  Taxes on Arab & others male unskilled workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male industrial skilled workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male agricultural skilled workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male sales and service workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male clerical workers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male managers 
  Taxes on Arab & others male associate professionals, technicians 
  Taxes on Arab & others male academic professionals 
  Taxes on Foreign workers from Palestine – Legal 
  Taxes on Foreign workers from Palestine – illegal 
  Taxes on Foreign workers from the Rest of the World – Legal 
  Taxes on Foreign workers from the Rest of the World – illegal 
  Taxes on capital 
TYF(f) Factor Income tax rate Social insurance payments by employees 
  Social insurance payments by employers 
TYH(h) Direct tax rate on household h Direct income taxes on Households 
  Health Insurance Payments 
TYE(e) Direct tax rate on enterprises Direct income taxes on Enterprises 
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B. Base Model Description38 
 Introduction: General Features of STAGE-LAB B.1
This chapter describes the base model, STAGE-LAB (Version 1), used for the studies in the main part 
of the thesis. The aim of the chapter is not to describe every single equation but to explain 
incorporated relationships and the model structure. For a detailed documentation of model 
equations refer to the model documentations of McDonald and Thierfelder (2009) and McDonald 
(2007). STAGE-LAB of McDonald and Thierfelder (2009) is developed from STAGE of McDonald (2007) 
with more details in the factor markets: STAGE-LAB includes a generalised system of nested Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions in the production process, unemployment and allows for 
migration between different factor types. STAGE is a single country computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model, using the GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) software, and is a direct 
descendant and development of models from the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly those 
models reported by Robinson et al. (1990) and Kilkenny (1991). 
The model is based on a SAM, which identifies the agents available to the model and serves as 
database to which the model is calibrated to. For modelling purpose, the data of the SAM is slightly 
adjusted when the data is read into the model: transactions between an account and itself are set to 
zero; transfers of domestic institutions with foreign institutions and vice versa are treated as net 
transfers; transactions between domestic institutions and the government are treated as net 
transfers. These adjustments change account totals which are finally recalculated. Two additional 
series of data complete the database: first, quantities of primary inputs used by activity serve to 
identify real factor quantities and factor prices. Second, a series of elasticities are employed, 
including substitution elasticities governing the relation between imports or exports and domestic 
commodities, the CES-substitution elasticities of the production functions, income elasticities of 
demand and the Frisch (marginal utility of income) parameter for each household. 
While agents and transactions are identified by the SAM, the model is defined by behavioural 
relationships, where a mix of linear and non-linear relationships determines the response to 
exogenous shocks in simulations. Households are assumed to maximise utility using a Stone-Geary 
utility function which allows for subsistence consumption expenditures and reduces to a Cobb-
Douglas given an appropriate specification of parameters. The households consume sets of 
composite commodities, which are formed as CES aggregates of imported and domestically produced 
goods, assuming imperfect substitutability. The optimal composition is determined by relative prices, 
following the so called Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) of product differentiation by 
assuming imperfect substitution. This Armington assumption avoids extreme specialisation and price 
fluctuations which are observable with other trade assumptions, but bears the shortcoming that 
small numbers stay small and big numbers remain big, what limits the possibility to model structural 
changes in trade. 
Domestic production is depicted by a nested production process. In the first nest, intermediate 
demand and value added form output with either Leontief or CES technology possible to apply, while 
                                                          
38
 This chapter is mainly based on McDonald and Thierfelder (2009) and McDonald (2007). 
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CES is set as standard technology. In the second nest, aggregate intermediate demand is formed by 
intermediates in fixed proportions, using the Leontief technology. Aggregated value added and 
aggregates of the following nests of the branch are formed using the CES technology, where the 
optimal input ratio is determined by relative factor prices. The model allows for multi-product 
activities, assuming a constant proportionate combination of commodity output by each activity. 
Thus, for any vector of commodities demanded, which is given, there is a unique vector of outputs 
that must be produced by activities. The vector of commodities demanded consists of domestic 
demand for domestic products and export demand, assuming imperfect transformability (CET) 
between domestic and export demand, the optimal distribution is determined by relative prices. 
Other relationships in the model are generally linear. 
The next part of the chapter describes price and quantity transaction relations, with special focus on 
the labour market, while section B.3 proceeds with the treatment of institutions in the model. 
Section B.4 describes market clearing conditions and macro-economic closures. A full list of variables, 
parameters and sets is provided in section B.5. Section B.6 describes the adaption of the model to 
Israel, especially elasticity values with which the model is set up. 
 Price and Quantity Relationships B.2
Trade 
An overview over the relations between prices and details on interrelationships of quantities gives 
Figure B.1. The model contains the assumption of the law of one price, since it is SAM based, thus 
prices are equal across rows of the SAM. An exception from this rule is made for exports, because the 
commodity (c) specific export price (PEc) does not need to equal the purchaser price (PQDc). 
However, exports get a separate set in the model and are thus implicitly separate from domestically 
consumed goods. The differentiation between goods produced for the export market (QEc) and 
goods produced for the domestic market (QDc) is possible because of the Armington assumption of 
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign commodities. Accordingly, an output 
transformation function (CET) and its connected first order condition are applied, to find the optimal 
allocation of the domestic output (QXCc) between the domestic (QDc) and foreign (QEc) markets in 
relation to the optimal export-domestic price ratio (Equation EX2-EX3). The model allows for traded 
and non-traded commodities, as well as domestically produced and non-produced or consumed and 
non-consumed commodities. If a good is not exported, the quantity produced equals the quantity 
supplied to the domestic market (Eq. EX5). The export price (PEc), shown on the left of Figure B.1, is 
determined by the world-market price (PWEc) and the exchange rate (ER); ad valorem export duties 
(TEc) account for the price difference between these two prices (Eq. EX1). The country is assumed a 
small country; world market prices (PWEc and PWMc) are fixed. This assumption can be dropped: for 
this purpose the world market prices are formulated as variables and can become flexible and the 
model incorporates a downward sloping export demand curve with a constant elasticity export 
demand function, which is not active, when the world market prices are fixed (Eq. EX4). 
Imports, on the right branches of Figure B.1, are valued cost insurance and freight (cif) and the 
import price (PMc) is determined by the world market price for imports (PWEc), which typically is 
fixed, the exchange rate and ad valorem import duties (Eq. IM1). Domestic supply (QQc) equations 
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are using CES functions and the related first order conditions to determine the optimal allocation of 
imports (QMc) and supply from domestic production (QDc) (Eq. IM2-IM3). 
Figure B.1. Price and Quantity Relationships for the STAGE Model 
 
    
         
         
   
          
              
 
   
         
        
 
         
          
            
      
               
         
 
               
        
     
  
        
    
     
     
              
 
      
          
        
    
      
                            
           
      
Source: McDonald and Thierfelder (2009)  
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Prices 
The supply price of the composite commodity (PQSc) is the weighted average of the value of 
domestic supplies and imports (Eq. P2). The conditions are derived from the first order condition for 
the CES-domestic supply equation. Similarly, the price of domestically produced commodities (PXCc) 
is calculated as weighted average of the value of goods produced for the export market and goods 
supplied domestically (Eq. P3). Domestic agents consume composite commodities (QQc); the 
purchaser price is determined by the supply price of the composite commodity and ad valorem sales 
taxes (TSc) and excise taxes (TEXc) (Eq. P1). 
Two price indices can be used for price normalisation, which is needed since the model is 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices and thus only defines relative prices. The first is the consumer 
price index (CPI) which is defined as weighted sum of purchaser prices (PQDc) in the current period 
(Eq. N1). Weights are the shares of each commodity in total demand in the base period. Second, the 
domestic producer price index (PPI) can be chosen as numéraire. The PPI is defined as weighted sum 
of supply prices for domestically supplied commodities, where the weights are shares of the value of 
domestic supply (Eq. N2). 
B. Base Model Description 
94 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Commodity Price Block   
(P1)                        c      
(P2)      
               
   
            
c      
(P3)      
                     
    
      
cx      
 Numéraire Block   
(N1)     ∑                 
 
 1 CPI 
(N2)     ∑                
 
 1 PPI 
Production 
The model allows for multiple product activities, thus a commodity can be produced by multiple 
activities. Domestic production of a commodity (QXCc) is a CES-aggregate of the commodity 
produced by several activities (QXACa,c) (Eq. X1). It is assumed, that activities produce different 
commodities in fixed shares, i.e., the output of QXACa,c is produced in fixed shares as Leontief 
aggregate of the output of each activity (QXa) (Eq. X5). 
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Output of each activity (a) is formed by a series of nested CES-production functions (Figure B.2), 
which is mathematically very flexible in form and number of nests. Constraints to the structure are 
rather economic meaningfulness and data availability, i.e., estimations on substitution elasticities for 
substitution between and within sub-groups of factors. The base model used incorporates a five level 
production nest, as displayed schematically in Figure B.2. Activity output is a CES-aggregate of 
aggregate intermediate inputs (QINTa) and aggregate value added (QVAa), both in quantity terms (Eq. 
X10). The optimal ratio of aggregated QINTa and QVAa is defined by the first order condition for profit 
maximisation (Eq. X11) which is determined by the respective relative prices of aggregated 
intermediate input (PINTa) and aggregated value added (PVAa). The aggregate price of intermediates 
(PINTa; Eq. X8) is determined by intermediate input-output coefficients (Figure B.2), where output is 
the aggregate intermediate input (QINTa). 
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Variables 
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(X12)                                 with Leontief 
technology at the top level 
(X13)                                   with Leontief 
technology at the top level 
On the second level, aggregated intermediate input demand (QINTDc; Eq. X16) is a Leontief 
aggregate. It is a product from fixed input coefficients of intermediate demand of an activity for a 
commodity. On the second level, too, aggregate value added is formed as multi factor CES aggregate, 
where primary inputs can be natural factors (FDf,a) or aggregate factors (FDfag,a), which can itself be 
formed from natural factors or aggregate factors (Eq. X14, X17)39. Every factor at the end of a branch 
of the nesting structure must finally be a natural factor (f), the set (fag) incorporates aggregated 
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 More detail on the nested factor demand equations are provided in section C of the Appendix. 
B. Base Model Description 
96 
factor types and set (ff) includes natural and aggregate factor types. The first order condition for 
profit maximisation associated to the CES functions determines the wage rate of factors (WFff,a) in 
each nest (Eq. X15, X18). The wage rate, which is factor but not activity specific in the model because 
of the law of one price, includes a sector and factor specific weighting factor (WFDISTff,a) to allow for 
differing wages between activities. 
Figure B.2. Production Relationships for the STAGE-LAB Model: Quantities and Prices 
 
 
              
                    
         
     
                   
                  
     
                         
       
           
       
                      
                                          
Source: McDonald and Thierfelder (2009) 
Factors, which are at the same level of a specific nest, are equally substitutable. Thus the nesting 
structure has the advantage that it allows to differentiate between the substitutability of different 
factors. In Figure B.2, e.g., different types of labour are assumed to be not equally substitutable. 
Capital, land and aggregated labour are considered equally substitutable in the production process, 
where the substitution elasticity (σ22) governs the degree of substitution. Let’s assume that labour is 
differentiated by skill level in 4 labour types, as displayed in Figure C.1 up to the fourth level, thus on 
the third level skilled labour is formed by two different types of skilled labour and unskilled labour is 
an aggregate of two types of unskilled labour types. Aggregated skilled and unskilled are equally 
substitutable, but a specific skilled labour type is not directly substitutable with an unskilled labour 
type. 
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Factors 
STAGE-LAB includes a series of migration functions that allow factors (‘natural’ factors, f) to migrate 
between labour types and thus between sub-nests of the production structure. Net migration is 
implemented with a constant elasticity supply function for each labour type. A factor migrates 
between factor types in response to relative wage changes (WFMIGf,mig) (Eq. MG2), which are defined 
as changes in factor prices relative to the weighted average factor prices (AVGWFmig) (Eq. MG1). Each 
factor type that is allowed to migrate is assigned to a group (mig), which serves as pool where labour 
migrates in and is distributed from to the destination labour types, factors do not migrate bilateral. 
The degree of mobility is controlled by the supply elasticities (etamigf), which can vary for factors. In 
order to keep the total supply of factors constant, a market clearing condition (Eq. MG3) concludes 
the migration setup. 
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Unemployment is introduced as mixed complementarity problem (MCP; Eq. U1). The total supply of a 
natural factor consists of current total demand and a stock of the factor that is currently unemployed 
(Eq. C1). When there is unemployment, the real wage of that factor is fixed until all unemployed 
factors are absorbed by demand in the labour market. When the stock of unemployed factors is 
empty, the real wage rate of this factor is flexible. Thus two segments of labour supply functions are 
generated: horizontal until full employment and then vertical. More complex structures of a 
segmented labour supply function are possible, but not implemented in the model. As the wage rates 
are fixed when there is unemployment, unemployment has implications for labour migration which 
depends on changes in relative wage rates. There can only be migration when at least one of the 
factors within a migration pool is fully employed, since only then relative wages change. 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Unemployment   
(U1)           f        
                                
These extensions, migration and unemployment, increase the degree of realism achieved in the 
modelling of labour markets. An implication of this increased realism is that the response of factor 
markets to changes in prices is decreased: the nested structure reduces the extent of substitution 
possibilities and the migration functions further reduce substitution possibilities. 
Factors have two sources of income: first factors receive income (YFf; Eq. F1) from their employment 
in activities; second factors receive income from employment abroad, which is assumed fixed in 
terms of the foreign currency. The factor income which is finally distributed to institutions which own 
these factors (YFDISPf; Eq. F2) includes allowances for depreciation rates and factor taxes. 
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 Institutions B.3
Households 
Households (h) receive income (YHh; Eq. H1) from several sources. Income from factors is distributed 
among households in fixed proportions, according to the distribution of ownership of factors. In 
addition, households are recipients of inter-household transfers and recipients of governmental 
transfers, receive income from incorporated enterprises and transfers from the rest of the world. 
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Household income is used for consumption expenditures, where households are assumed to 
maximise utility using Stone-Geary utility functions (Eq. H4). In this function, household consumption 
consists of two components: ‘subsistence’ demand, which is satisfied directly, and ‘discretionary’ 
demand. This ‘discretionary’ demand is spent out of uncommitted income, i.e., household 
consumption expenditure (HEXPh) after deducting total expenditure on subsistence demand. 
Additionally to consumption expenditures, household expenses include transfer payments to other 
households (HOHOh.hp; Eq. H2), which are defined in fixed proportions of household income after tax, 
and income tax payments. Household savings balance total income and total expenditures. 
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Enterprises 
Enterprises consume commodities in fixed volumes (QEDc,e, Eq. E2), which can be varied via an 
adjuster (QEDADJ). If this adjuster is made flexible, enterprise commodity consumption varies in fixed 
proportions. After paying income taxes and after saving, enterprises distribute profits or dividends to 
households (HOENTh,e, Eq. E4) and to the government (GOVENTh,e, Eq. E5) in fixed shares of income. 
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Government 
The numerous tax rates in the model are variable and various possibilities to vary the tax rates are 
already implemented in the model. The model differentiates import taxes, export taxes, sales taxes, 
excise taxes, indirect taxes on production, taxes on factor use, factor income taxes and income taxes 
of households and enterprises (Eq. T1-T9). These tax rates generate revenues for the government 
(Eq. T10-T17) and thus government income consists of the eight tax instruments. In addition, the 
government can receive income from factor ownership, income from enterprises and transfers from 
abroad (Eq. G1-G4). The government consumes commodities in fixed proportions, which can be 
adjusted with a scaling factor. Other features in the government account, which allow for different 
macro-economic assumptions, are discussed in section B.4. 
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Savings and Investment 
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Savings are representing income to the capital account. Total savings (Eq. I3) in the economy include 
savings of households (Eq. I1) and savings of enterprises (Eq. I2), both modelled with sophisticated 
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possibilities for variation and derived as shares of after tax income. In addition, total savings 
incorporate allowances for depreciation of factor income, the government budget deficit or surplus 
and the current account balance. Similar to government and enterprise consumption, the volumes of 
investment demand for commodities are determined by the volumes in the base period (Eq. I5). 
Foreign Institutions 
The economy employs factors which are owned by the rest of the world. The compensation of these 
foreign factors is in fixed proportions of factor income available for distribution (after allowing for 
depreciation and factor taxes) (Eq. R1). 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Foreign Institutions Block   
(R1)                         f        
 Market Clearing and Macro Closures B.4
Market Clearing 
The model contains six markets: factor markets, commodity markets, and enterprise, government, 
capital and rest of the world accounts. To make sure that supply equals demand or income equals 
expenditure, the model contains several market clearing equations. Activities are transformed to 
commodities and thus market clearing of domestic produced goods is achieved in equation (Eq. X16). 
In the factor markets, factor supply of a specific type needs to equal aggregated factor demand of 
this factor type plus the stock of unemployed (Eq. C1). This stock of unemployed factors is positive or 
zero. In the commodity market, the supply of the composite commodity is equal to total domestic 
demand of that commodity, including intermediate, household, enterprise, government and 
investment demand and stock changes (Eq. C2). Government savings (KAPGOV) clear the government 
account, which is the residual of government income and government expenditure (Eq. C3). Similarly, 
the rest of world account clears with the balance of the capital account (CAPWOR) being the residual 
of expenditures on imports (commodity and factor services from abroad) and income from abroad 
(containing export and factor revenues and transfers from abroad to domestic institutions) (Eq. C4). 
A slack variable (WALRAS) is included in the market clearing equation for the capital market. Total 
savings (TOTSAV) must equal total value of investments (INVEST), with the slack variable being zero, 
when all markets are fully cleared and the model is fully closed (Eq. C5). 
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There are several possibilities to specify factor markets. Factors can be full employed and mobile or 
full employed and immobile across activities, factors can be unemployed or there are restrictions 
originating from factor demand. These specifications are determined by the interplay of factor supply 
(FSf), factor prices (WFf), sectoral proportions of factor prices (WFDISTf,a) and factor demand (FDf,a). 
Typically, for long term projections, factors are assumed mobile and full employed: then the factor 
price is flexible and factor supply fixed. For short term projections factors might become immobile 
across activities, i.e., capital, accordingly, factor demand is fixed. For this specification the sectoral 
factor price proportions need to adjust to clear the factor market. With fixed factor demand, the 
factor supply is also fixed, thus, the condition that fixes factor supply is now redundant and needs to 
be relaxed. To maintain the balance of equations and variables, at least one other condition must be 
imposed: this can be achieved by fixing the sectoral proportions for factor prices for a specific activity 
(activ) (WFDISTf,activ), thus, activity specific returns will be defined relative to the return in activ. 
Unemployment can be introduced more sophisticated in the equation system with related variables 
and equations (Eq. U1) or simply via a specification of the factor market clearing. For this purpose, 
factor supply is set perfectly elastic and factor prices are fixed. In case factor supply might increase 
unrealistically in simulations, it is possible to include an upper bound on factor supply. Then the 
variable is not free anymore and the factor price of that factor needs to be unfixed. In another 
possible specification factor use by an activity might be restricted, for this purpose, factor demand of 
that activity is fixed (FDf,activ) and the sectoral proportion of factor prices relating to this activity are 
unfixed (WFDISTf,activ). 
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 Factor Market Clearing   
 Factors full employed and mobile        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
         
      40 
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
or Factors full employed and immobile  
(implement for a single factor or all 
factors) 
       
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
       
             
                           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
or Unemployment with perfectly elastic 
supply (implement for a single factor 
or all factors) 
       
         
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
or Unemployment with restricted supply 
(implement for a single factor or all 
factors) 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
         
       
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
or Activity inspired restrictions on factor 
market closures (implement for single 
activities but not all factors) 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
         
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
       
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
                 
Macro Closures 
The specification of macro-economic closures is important for the operating of the economic system 
and clearly affects adjustment processes in simulations. STAGE-LAB embodies various closure rules, 
allowing, e.g., for the choice between a Keynesian view on the economy, where the economy is 
driven by demand and investment, or a neo-classical view, where the economy is savings driven. 
In order to allow for a ‘balanced macroeconomic closure’, with which it is possible to guard 
expenditure shares of the agents of the economy, STAGE-LAB contains a series of equations which 
define absorption as well as non-household agents’ expenditure shares (Eq. A1-A4), which can be 
useful in setting up macro-economic closures. Absorption is the total value of final domestic demand 
including household, enterprise and government demand, intermediate demand and stock changes. 
Additionally, the model contains a useful equation for calculation of GDP from value added. 
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 In GAMS the solver PATH, which is applied to solve the model, demands variables to be defined as free 
variables with a range between plus and minus infinity. However, the model specifications ensure that 
variables stay inside the economically meaningful range. 
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                  ) 
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The current account can be defined either with a fixed exchange rate and a flexible current account 
balance, assuming an inflexible currency system, or the current account balance is fixed and the 
exchange rate floating, which is appropriate for countries, which, e.g., follow structural account 
programmes. Assuming a small country as typical setup, world market prices are fixed. As world 
market prices (PWE and PWM) are defined as variables, the small country assumption may be 
dropped for the country or for specific commodities: then world market prices become flexible, with 
an export demand function determining the export price (Eq. EX4).  
 Current Account Closure:   
 Fix exchange rate regime      ̅̅ ̅̅            
or Fix current account balance                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 Small country assumption          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
or Large export country for good c          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
        
Activates eq. (EX4) 
For the capital account closure, savings can either be investment driven or investment is savings 
driven. When investment is savings driven, hence, savings are to be fixed (neo-classical approach), all 
saving rates adjusters – additive and multiplicative – are fixed (Eq. I1-I2) and investment free to 
adjust. Investment driven savings (Keynesian approach) can be achieved in several ways. On the 
investment side, either the value of investment (INVEST), the investment scaling factor (IADJ) or the 
share of investment in total final demand can be fixed. If investment is fixed, the model needs to 
adjust by changes in the savings rate, hence, one of the saving rates adjusters are made flexible. 
There the choice is between multiplicative and additive adjusters. Furthermore, for both types of 
saving rates adjusters, the saving rate can become flexible only for households (SHADJ/DSHH) or 
enterprises (SEADJ/DSEN) or savings rates of households change equiproportionate (SADJ/DS). 
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 Capital Account Closure:   
 Savings driven investment Multiplicative Adjusters: 
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
          
            
            
  Additive Adjusters: 
     ̅̅̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
or Investment driven savings One savings rate adjuster 
(multiplicative or additive) 
becomes flexible, all others stay 
fixed. 
One is fixed, two stay variable:  
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
The enterprise account can be closed by fixing the quantity of commodities demanded (QEADJ), 
which allows the value of enterprise consumption expenditure to vary according to price changes. 
Alternatively the value of consumption expenditures by enterprises (VED) or the share of enterprise 
expenditure in the total value of final demand (VEDSH) can be fixed. 
 Enterprise Account Closure  
 Fix one of the variables                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
 Government Account Closure   
 Flexible internal balance            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
One is fixed, two stay variable: 
                 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 
 
 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
          
or Fix internal balance               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
  Unfix either one of the 
tax rate adjusters 
or one of the fixed government 
expenditure parameters. 
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In the base specification for the government account, all tax rates are fixed, assuming government 
income to be ‘fixed’ and government savings variable. Base tax rates are defined as parameters, 
which can be adjusted with multiplicative and additive tax rate scaling factors, defined as variables 
(Eq. T1-T16). Thus, technically these scaling factors are fixed. The two other sources of government 
income, income from factor ownership and transfers from abroad, are governed by parameters. 
Government expenditure is controlled by fixing the quantity of commodities demanded (QGDADJ) 
(Eq. G2-G3), the value of government consumption expenditure (VGD) or the share of government 
expenditure in the total value of domestic final demand (VGDSH). The scaling factor on transfers to 
households (HGADJ) and enterprises (EGADJ) need to be fixed. With this specification, all parameters, 
which the government can control, are fixed and the internal balance (government savings) is free to 
adjust. If the government is assumed to maintain the internal balance, one of the tax rate adjusters 
needs to become flexible. 
Finally, one of the two price normalisation equations, consumer price index or producer price index 
(Eq. N1-N2), needs to be chosen to serve as numéraire. 
 Numéraire Closure   
 Producer price as numéraire        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        
or Consumer price as numéraire               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
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 Parameter, Variables and Sets Listing B.5
Table B.1. Alphabetical List of Parameters 
Parameter Name Parameter Description   Parameter Name Parameter Description   
ac(c) Shift parameter for Armington CES function    gamma(c)    Share parameter for Armington CET function   
actcomactsh(a,c) Share of commodity c in output by activity a    goventsh(e)    Share of entp' income after tax save and consump to govt   
actcomcomsh(a,c) Share of activity a in output of commodity c    govvash(f)    Share of income from factor f to government   
adva(a) Shift parameter for CES production functions for QVA    govwor    Transfers to government from world (constant in foreign currency)   
adx(a) Shift parameter for CES production functions for QX    hexps(h)    Subsistence consumption expenditure   
adxc(c) Shift parameter for commodity output CES aggregation    hoentconst(h,e)    Transfers to hhold h from enterprise e (nominal)   
alphah(c,h) Expenditure share by commodity c for household h    hoentsh(h,e)    Share of entp' income after tax save and consump to h'hold   
at(c) Shift parameter for Armington CET function    hogovconst(h)    Transfers to hhold h from government (nominal but scalable)   
beta(c,h) Marginal budget shares    hohoconst(h,hp)    Interhousehold transfers   
caphosh(h) Shares of household income saved (after taxes)    hohosh(h,hp)    Share of h'hold h after tax and saving income transferred to hp   
comactactco(c,a) Intermediate input output coefficients    hovash(h,f)    Share of income from factor f to household h   
comactco(c,a) Use matrix coefficients    howor(h)    Transfers to household from world (constant in foreign currency)   
comentconst(c,e) Enterprise demand volume    invconst(c)   Investment demand volume   
comgovconst(c) Government demand volume    ioqintqx(a)    Agg intermed quantity per unit QX for Level 1 Leontief agg   
comhoav(c,h) Household consumption shares    ioqvaqx(a)    Agg value added quant per unit QX for Level 1 Leontief agg   
comtotsh(c) Share of commodity c in total commodity demand    kapentsh(e)    Average savings rate for enterprise e out of after tax income   
dabte(c) Change in base export taxes on comm'y imported from region w    predeltax(a)    Dummy used to estimated deltax   
dabtex(c) Change in base excise tax rate    pwse(c)    World price of export substitutes   
dabtfue(c) Change in base fuel tax rate    qcdconst(c,h)    Volume of subsistence consumption   
dabtm(c) Change in base tariff rates on comm'y imported from region w    rhoc(c)    Elasticity parameter for Armington CES function   
dabts(c) Change in base sales tax rate    rhocva(a)    Elasticity parameter for CES production function for QVA   
dabtx(a) Change in base indirect tax rate    rhocx(a)    Elasticity parameter for CES production function for QX   
dabtye(e) Change in base direct tax rate on enterprises    rhocxc(c)    Elasticity parameter for commodity output CES aggregation   
dabtyf(f) Change in base direct tax rate on factors    rhot(c)    Elasticity parameter for Output Armington CET function   
dabtyh(h) Change in base direct tax rate on households    sumelast(h)    Weighted sum of income elasticities   
delta(c) Share parameter for Armington CES function    te01(c)    0-1 par for potential flexing of export taxes on comm'ies   
deltava(f,a) Share parameters for CES production functions for QVA    tex01(c)    0-1 par for potential flexing of excise tax rates   
deltax(a) Share parameter for CES production functions for QX    tfue01(c)    0-1 par for potential flexing of fuel tax rates   
deltaxc(a,c) Share parameters for commodity output CES aggregation    tm01(c)    0-1 par for potential flexing of Tariff rates on comm'ies   
deprec(f) Depreciation rate by factor f    ts01(c)    0-1 par for potential flexing of sales tax rates   
dstocconst(c) Stock change demand volume    tx01(a)    0-1 par for potential flexing of indirect tax rates   
econ(c) Constant for export demand equations    tye01(e)    0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on e'rises   
entgovconst(e) Government transfers to enterprise e    tyf01(f)    0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on factors   
entvash(e,f) Share of income from factor f to enterprise e    tyh01(h)    0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on h'holds   
entwor(e) Transfers to enterprise e from world (constant in foreign currency)  use(c,a)    Use matrix transactions   
etamig(f) Migrant supply elasticity  vddtotsh(c)    Share of value of domestic output for the domestic market   
eta(c) Export demand elasticity    worvash(f)    Share of income from factor f to RoW   
factwor(f) Factor payments from RoW (constant in foreign currency)    yhelast(c,h)    (Normalised) household income elasticities   
frisch(h) Elasticity of the marginal utility of income     
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Table B.2. Alphabetical List of Variables 
Variable Name  Variable Description   Variable Name  Variable Description   Variable Name Variable Description   
AVGWF(mig)  Avg wage in mig - wage that clears mig equilibrium PD(c)    Consumer price for domestic supply of commodity c   TEADJ    Export subsidy Scaling Factor   
CAPGOV    Government Savings   PE(c)    Domestic price of exports by activity a   TEX(c)    Excise tax rate   
CAPWOR    Current account balance   PINT(a)    Price of aggregate intermediate input   TEXADJ    Excise tax rate scaling factor   
CPI    Consumer price index   PM(c)    Domestic price of competitive imports of commodity c   TFUE(c)    Fuel tax rate   
DTAX    Direct Income tax revenue   PPI    Producer (domestic) price index   TFUEADJ    Fuel tax rate scaling factor   
DTE    Partial Export tax rate scaling factor   PQD(c)    Purchaser price of composite commodity c   TM(c)    Tariff rates on imported comm'y c   
DTEX    Partial Excise tax rate scaling factor   PQS(c)    Supply price of composite commodity c   TMADJ    Tarrif rate Scaling Factor   
DTFUE    Partial Fuel tax rate scaling factor   PVA(a)    Value added price for activity a   TOTSAV    Total savings   
DTM    Partial Tariff rate scaling factor   PWE(c)    World price of exports in dollars   TS(c)    Sales tax rate   
DTS    Partial Sales tax rate scaling factor   PWM(c)    World price of imports in dollars   TSADJ    Sales tax rate scaling factor   
DTX    Partial Indirect tax rate scaling factor   PX(a)    Composite price of output by activity a   TX(a)    Indirect tax rate   
DTYE    Partial direct tax on enterprise rate scaling factor   PXAC(a,c)    Activity commodity prices   TXADJ    Indirect Tax Scaling Factor   
DTYF    Partial direct tax on factor rate scaling factor   PXC(c)    Producer price of composite domestic output   TYE(e)    Direct tax rate on enterprises   
DTYH    Partial direct tax on household rate scaling factor   QCD(c,h)    Household consumption by commodity c   TYEADJ    Enterprise income tax Scaling Factor   
EG   Expenditure by government   QD(c)    Domestic demand for commodity c   TYF(f)    Direct tax rate on factor income   
EGADJ    Transfers to enterprises by government Scaling Factor QE(c)    Domestic output exported by commodity c   TYFADJ    Factor Tax Scaling Factor   
ER    Exchange rate (domestic per world unit)   QENTD(c,e)  Enterprise consumption by commodity c   TYH(h)    Direct tax rate on households   
ETAX   Export tax revenue   QENTDADJ  Enterprise demand volume Scaling Factor   TYHADJ    Household Income Tax Scaling Factor   
EXTAX    Excise tax revenue   QGD(c)    Government consumption demand by commodity c   UNEMP(f)  Unemployed factor 
FD(f,a)    Demand for factor f by activity a   QGDADJ    Government consumption demand scaling factor   VENTD(e)    Value of enterprise e consumption expenditure   
FS(f)    Supply of factor f   QINT(a)    Aggregate quantity of intermediates used by activity a   VENTDSH(e)    Value share of Ent consumption in total final demand   
FUETAX    Fuel tax revenue   QINTD(c)    Demand for intermediate inputs by commodity   VFDOMD    Value of final domestic demand   
FYTAX    Factor Income tax revenue   QINVD(c)    Investment demand by commodity c   VGD    Value of Government consumption expenditure   
GOVENT(e)    Government income from enterprise e   QM(c)    Imports of commodity c   VGDSH    Value share of Govt consumption in total final demand   
HEADJ    Scaling factor for enterprise transfers to households   QQ(c)    Supply of composite commodity c   WALRAS    Slack variable for Walras's Law   
HEXP(h)    Household consumption expenditure   QVA(a)    Quantity of aggregate value added for level 1 production   WF(f)    Price of factor f   
HGADJ    Scaling factor for government transfers to households   QX(a)    Domestic production by activity a   WFMIG(f,mig)  Wage comparison used to make migration decision 
HOENT(h,e)    Household Income from enterprise e   QXAC(a,c)    Domestic commodity output by each activity   WFDIST(f,a)    Sectoral proportion for factor prices   
HOHO(h,hp)    Inter household transfer   QXC(c)    Domestic production by commodity c   YE(e)    Enterprise incomes   
IADJ   Investment scaling factor   SADJ    Savings rate scaling factor for households and enterprises   YF(f)    Income to factor f   
INVEST    Total investment expenditure   SEADJ    Savings rate scaling factor for enterprises   YFDISP(f)   Factor income for distribution after depreciation   
INVESTSH    Value share of investment in final domestic demand   SHADJ    Savings rate scaling factor for households   YFWOR(f)    Foreign factor income   
ITAX    Indirect tax revenue   STAX    Sales tax revenue   YG   Government income   
MTAX   Tariff revenue   TE(c)    Export taxes on exported comm'y c   YH(h)    Income to household h   
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Table B.3. List of Sets and Subsets 
Set Name Set Description   Set Name Set Description   Set Name Set Description   
sac         SAM accounts    ff(sac)     Factors     h(sac)      Households 
   c(sac)      Commodities           f(ff)       Natural Factors     g(sac)      Government 
          cagr(c)     Agricultural Commodities                l(f)        Labour Factors     gt(sac)     Government tax accounts 
          cnat(c)     Natural Resource Commodities                     ls(l)       Skilled Labour Factors     tff(sac)   Factor tax account used in GDX program 
          cfd(c)      Food Commodities                     lm(l)       Skilled or Unskilled Labour Factors     e(sac)      Enterprises 
          cind(c)     Industrial Commodities                     lu(l)       Unskilled Labour Factors     i(sac)      Investment 
          cuti(c)     Utility Commodities                uef(f)  Factors with unemployment     w(sac)      Rest of the world 
          ccon(c)     Construction Commodities           fag(ff)     Aggregate factors     sacn(sac)   SAM accounts excluding TOTAL 
          cser(c)     Service Commodities           f2(ff)      Factor inputs to QVA at level 1  ss          ASAM categories 
          cagg        Aggregate commodity groups           f2ag(ff)    Aggregate factors at level 2     ssn(ss)     ASAM excluding totals 
          ce(c)       Export commodities           f3(ff)      Factor inputs to aggregate factors at level 2  fcons     Set for parameters controlling program flow 
          cen(c)      Non-export commodities           f3ag(ff)    Aggregate factors at level 3  mcons      Set for parameters controlling model content 
          ced(c)     Export commodities with export demand functions           f4(ff)      Factor inputs to aggregate factors at level 3  sigc        Set for commodity elasticities 
          cedn(c)    Export commodities without export demand functions           f4ag(ff)    Aggregate factors at level 4  siga       Set for activity elasticities 
          cm(c)      Imported commodities           f5(ff)      Factor inputs to aggregate factors at level 4     sigfd(siga) Set for aggregate factor elasticities 
          cmn(c)     Non-imported commodities           k(ff)       Capital Factors  ppn         Population 
          cx(c)      Commodities produced domestically           n(ff)       Land factors 
           cxn(c)     Commodities NOT produced domestically AND imported           map_f_tff(f,tff)  Factor taxes to factors 
           cxac(c)    Commodities that are differentiated by activity           map_tff_f(tff,f)  Factor taxes to factors reverse 
          cxacn(c)   Commodities that are NOT differentiated by activity           map_aagg_a(aagg,a)  Mapping from act. to aggregate act. 
          cd(c)     Commodities produced and demanded domestically           map_cagg_c(cagg,c)  Mapping from com. to aggregate com. 
          cdn(c)      Commodities NOT produced and demanded domestically           map_f4ag_f5(f4ag,f5)     Mapping to F4ag from f5 
    m(sac)      Margins           map_f3ag_f4(f3ag,f4)     Mapping to F3ag from f4 
    a(sac)      Activities           map_f2ag_f3(f2ag,f3)     Mapping to F2ag from f3 
           aagr(a)     Agricultural Activities           map_fag_f(ff,f)         Mapping to fag from f 
           anat(a)     Natural Resource Activities           map_fag_fa(ff,ff)        Mapping to aggregates 
           afd(a)      Food Activities          mig               Migration flows 
           aind(a)     Industrial Activities          map_mig_f(mig,f)  Migration mapping 
           auti(a)     Utility Activities 
 
 
          acon(a)     Construction Activities 
             aser(a)     Service Activities 
             aagg        Aggregate activity groups 
            anch(a)     Anchor activity for fixing 1 WFDIST in various factor closures 
          anchN(a)    Anchor activity for fixing 1 WFDIST in land factor closures 
          aleon(a)    Activities with Leontief prodn function at Level 1 
           aqx(a)     Activities with CES aggregation function at Level 1 of nest 
          aqxn(a)    Activities with Leontief aggregation function at Level 1 of nest 
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 Adaption to Israel: Elasticities B.6
The accounts used in the model for Israel are identified by the Israeli SAM, which is described in 
section A of the Appendix, i.e., see section A.3 for a full list of accounts and specifications of the 
database for model purposes. In addition to the data reported by the SAM, which reports transaction 
payments and thus values, the model employs two additional datasets. First, in order to be able to 
distinguish between factor prices and quantities on factor type as well as activity level, a factor use 
matrix completes the SAM. This factor use matrix reports real quantities for a factor by activity 
matrix. 
Second, a series of elasticities govern the strength of responses to model simulations. Elasticities and 
its values in the different publications are displayed in Table B.4 and Table B.5. Elasticity values are 
derived from literature where possible, mainly following the GTAP model (compare Hertel, 1997) 
(EL1-EL4, EL6 and EL8-EL9), or are based on educated guesses. Table B.4 reports commodity 
elasticities, which are generally set uniform for all commodities with one exemption: The sector 
‘other crops’ is characterised by large import shares and simultaneously large export shares of over 
30%. The simulation of increasing world market prices for ‘other crops’ with the Armington 
elasticities (EL1 and EL2) set equal to 2 results in exploding exports of this sector. The Armington 
elasticities are therefore set to a more inelastic level in the productivity paper, where world market 
price changes are simulated.  
The series of CES-elasticities in the nested production functions (7a-7k) refers to the five level nest 
adopted for the model for Israel displayed in Figure C.1 (section C.1) of the Appendix. Estimations on 
substitution elasticities of labour demand are not available, except for the substitution between 
skilled and unskilled workers (Boeters and Savard, 2013). For article 1 ‘Relaxing Israeli Restrictions on 
Labour: Who Benefits?’ values are thus based on educated guesses about relative relationships. 
Skilled and unskilled labour (where the elasticity value is based on empirics) are least substitutable 
and better substitutability is assumed in the sub-nests. With Jewish and Non-Jewish Israeli being less 
good substitutes than male and female as well as foreigners from ROW and from Palestine41. In 
article 3 on ‘Labour Market Flexibility and Costs of Adjustment’ the relative relationships persist, but 
with a lower level because the migration extension has problems to handle a very strong 
substitutability. The reason for this sensitivity against the substitution elasticity can be found in the 
data, which indicates strong wage differences inside a migration group (see Table III.1. in section 
III.3.1). Here, in-migration causes a sudden change in the relative wage rate, if the factor demand 
reacts too elastic it develops a circular. When wage differences inside a migration group are smaller, 
substitution elasticities can be increased. In article 2 on ‘Factor Mobility and Heterogeneous Labour’, 
these effects are very strong, because simulations are set to induce strong factor movements. 
Therefore all substitution elasticities are set 1.5 (following skilled and unskilled). Due to aggregation 
of labour groups, some elasticities become irrelevant in paper 2 and 3. 
  
                                                          
41
 For more detail in considerations about nesting and substitutability please see section II.3.2. 
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Table B.4. Commodity and Activity Elasticities 
 
 
for 
Labour 
integration 
productivity 
paper 
reallocation 
costs 
(EL1) Armington CES elasticities c 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 
 
‘Other crops’ 2.0 0.9 2.0 
(EL2) Armington CET elasticities c 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 
 
‘Other crops’ 2.0 0.9 2.0 
(EL3) Export demand c 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(EL4) Commodity output c 4.0 4.0 4.0 
(EL5) σ1: CES-elasticities for QX a 0.5 0.5 0.5 
(EL6) 
σ22:CES-elasticities for 
QVA 
a 0.8 0.8 0.8 
(EL7) 
CES-elasticities in nested 
production functions:  
   
(EL7a) σ31: Labor a 1.5 1.5 1.5 
(EL7b) σ41: Skilled a 4.0 1.5 3.0 
(EL7c) σ42: Unskilled a 4.0 1.5 3.0 
(EL7d) σ51: Skilled Israeli Jews a 6.0 n.r n.r 
(EL7e) σ52: Skilled Israeli Arabs a 6.0 n.r n.r 
(EL7f) σ53: Unskilled Israelis a 4.0 1.5 3.0 
(EL7g) σ54: Unskilled non-Israelis a 6.0 1.5 4.5 
(EL7h) σ61: Unskilled Israeli Jews a 6.0 n.r n.r 
(EL7i) σ62: Unskilled Israeli Arabs a 6.0 n.r n.r 
(EL7j) σ63: Foreigners from ROW  a 8.0 n.r n.r 
(EL7k) σ64: Palestinians a 8.0 n.r n.r 
 
  
B. Base Model Description 
114 
Table B.5. Frisch and Income Elasticities42 
 
Jewish households, 
income quintiles 
Arab and Other households, 
income quintiles 
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
(EL8) Frisch elasticities -1.6 -1.3 -1.05 -1.05 -1.05 -1.6 -1.3 -1.05 -1.05 -1.05 
(EL9) Income elasticities: 
         Wheat 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 
Cereals 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 
Other crops 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 
Milk 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, and horses 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Other animal farming 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Fruits and vegetables 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Fishing 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Gardening, and mixed and unclassified farming 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Coal, oil, and gas 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Minerals nec 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Meat products nec 0.8 0.65 0.5 0.35 0.2 0.8 0.65 0.5 0.35 0.2 
Processing of fruit, vegetables and fish 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 
Manufacture edible oils, margarine, oil products 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 
Dairy Products 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 
Manufacture of grain-mill products 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05 
Other food products 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 
Beverages and tobacco manufacturing 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.8 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.25 
Textiles 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Wearing apparel 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Leather products 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Wood products 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Paper products and publishing 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Petroleum and coal products 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Chemical, rubber, and plastic products 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Mineral non-metallic products 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Basic metal 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Metal products (excl. machine. and equipment) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Motor vehicles and parts 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Electronic equipment 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Machinery and equipment nec 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Manufactures nec 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Electricity 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Water 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Construction 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Trade services 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Transport and business services nec. 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Water transport 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Air transport 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Communication 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Public Administration, Defense, Educ., Health 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Recreational and other services 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Dwellings 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
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 Same for all publications. 
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C. Model Changes 
The base model presented in section B of the Appendix is adjusted and extended for the studies 
which build the main part of the dissertation report. These changes in the model and the 
implementation of new features into the model framework are presented in this section in more 
technical detail than possible in a journal article. Section C.1 describes the labour market nesting, 
adapted to the Israeli labour market, which is first and in detail discussed in article 1 in section II and 
represents the base for all studies of this thesis. Based on the labour nesting, section C.2 provides 
technical details on the migration function, implemented in article 2 and article 3 in sections III and 
IV. Finally the implementation of factor specific productivity is set on top of the migration function, 
which is presented in section C.3. 
 Setup of the Nesting Structure C.1
Nested CES Production Function 
In STAGE-LAB, output is formed by a series of nested CES-functions, which is very flexible in form 
(Perroni and Rutherford, 1995). In the base version of the STAGE-LAB, production is depicted by a 
five level CES production nest (Section B.2, Eq. X10 and Eq. X14-X20). The form is flexible with natural 
factors (f) at the lowest level of each branch of the nested structure. These natural factors form an 
aggregated factor (fag) on the next level, which itself, together with natural or aggregate factors, can 
form an aggregate on the next upper level (Figure C.1). 
The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function has the following basic form, with two input 
factors (K and L) forming output (q) (e.g., Nicholoson and Snyder, 2008): 
         [           ]
 
                               
Variations of   allow the introduction of returns-to-scale:     indicate increasing returns-to-scale, 
    indicates decreasing returns-to-scale and when     returns-to-scale are assumed constant. 
Distributional weights, which indicate the relative significance of inputs, are introduced by  . The 
substitution elasticity   can be directly derived from   with 
  
 
   
. 
Starting with the second level, the aggregate value added is formed by factors of the second level, 
which can be either natural factors or aggregate factors themselves. Where      
  are the 
distributional weights and      
   is the elasticity parameter (not the elasticity) for the CES production 
function of     . The sum is over all f2 of one sub-nest which form together aggregate value added. 
   
   is a shift parameter, which allows simulations of technical progress. 
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The optimal factor use (    ), is determined by the relative prices of inputs. Activities are assumed 
to maximise profit, which is defined as difference between turnover and total costs: 
                  ∑ (                (        ))  . 
The optimal input combination can be derived with the Lagrange approach for optimisation: 
             ∑(                (        ))
  
  [   
   [ ∑ (     
         
   
  
)
       
  
]
  
  
  ⁄
     ] 
(1) 
  
     
                   (        )   (
  
  
  )   
  [∑      
          
  
      
   
  
]
  
  
  ⁄   
     
         
         
   
    
 
(2) 
  
     
              
         
  
     
  
     
  
                 (        )
    
  
 (
  
  
  )   
  [∑      
         
   
  
       
  ]
  
  
  ⁄   
     
         
        
   
    
      
 
Thus the related first order derivative for profit maximisation is 
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Model Adjustments 
The value added nesting in the model for Israel is set up as displayed in Figure C.1 and the economic 
background behind the nesting structure is explained in section II.3.2. Value added, in the first level, 
is an aggregation of the set f2 (factors on the 2nd level), which consists of the natural factors land and 
capital as well as aggregated labour. Aggregated labour (f2ag: aggregated factors on the 2nd level) is 
formed of skilled and unskilled labour (f3). Following the skilled branch of the nesting, skilled labour 
(f3ag) directly substitutes Jewish and Arab Israeli workers (f4,f4ag), which are themselves aggregates 
of labour types of different occupations and gender (f5) distinguished by ethnicity (Jewish or Arab-
Israeli). In the unskilled branch, unskilled labour (f3ag) is formed by Israeli and non-Israeli labour (f4). 
The Israeli unskilled labour branch is similar to skilled labour, displaced by one level. At the unskilled 
non-Israeli nest (f4ag) foreigners from Rest of the World (ROW) and Palestinians (f5, f5ag) are direct 
substitutes, and both are themselves aggregates of legal and illegal workers (f6). This structure of the 
value added nesting is used in all the studies of mine, but only the first article (section II) applies the 
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exact setup as displayed in Figure C.143. In the other articles (Section III and IV), the 6th level is 
modified for the purposes of these studies (Figure III.1 in section III.3.1 and Figure IV.1 in section 
IV.3). 
The nesting is implemented into the model by adjusting sets and set mappings accordingly. In 
addition, the base model incorporated 5 levels of nested CES production functions, hence a 6th level 
is introduced including the related implementation and calibration, where necessary, of sets, 
parameters, variables and equations (Eq. X19-X20). 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Production Block, 6th Level   
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 Because of presentational limitations, the last level is not reported in the first article, however elasticities are 
set very elastic to approximate an aggregated group. 
C. Model Changes 
118 
Figure C.1 Value Added Nesting of Original Israeli SAM-Labour Accounts (Section II) 
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 Migration Function C.2
A migration function is developed and applied in article 2 and article 3 (section III and IV). The 
purpose of this migration is to model movement between factor types and simultaneously be able to 
track origin and destination of these migration flows. These bilateral migration flows are used to 
relate factor movements to different assumptions on productivity, which is implemented on top of 
the migration block and described in section C.3. 
Existing Approaches to Model Migration 
As described in section B.2, the base version of STAGE-LAB contains already a block of equation for 
migration (M1-M3). In STAGE-LAB the migration decision is based of a change in the wage rate 
relative to the average wage change (        ) in the migration group (mig). Thus the workers 
migrate to a pool and are distributed out of that pool and assigned to their new factor types. In order 
to model bilateral migration flows, it would be possible to have only one pair per pool. For the 
validity of the migration clearing equation (Eq. M3), each factor must be assigned only to one 
migration group. Therefore, only one pool per factor is possible and bilateral migration is only 
possible between two specific labour types. In addition, technically possible but not nicely modelled, 
the average wage (        ) is not calculated by an equation and is mapped to (Eq. M3) to 
maintain the balance between variables and equations. 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Migration Block in STAGE-LAB Base Version: Pool Solution   
(M1)          
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 mig          
A Bilateral Migration Approach 
Thus, a new approach is developed in order to be able to track bilateral migration. This approach is 
formally depicted in article 2 in section III and explained in more detail in this section. First, labour 
types which can migrate and groups within which migration is possible need to be defined. In the 
following example and in the studies, migration occurs within labour types between sector blocks, 
but the migration framework can easily be applied in other dimensions, e.g., migration between 
regions or skill-levels. 
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The 32 factor types of the SAM are in a first step aggregated to 6 factor types:  
 Skilled Jewish, 
 Skilled Arab and others, 
 Unskilled Jewish, 
 Unskilled Arab and others, 
 Foreigners from ROW and 
 Palestinians. 
In a second step each of these 6 factor types is separated into different sector blocks. The number of 
sector blocks can be chosen freely, article 2 (section III) distinguishes 3 sector blocks: 
 Agriculture, 
 Manufacturing and 
 Services. 
Article 3 (section IV) distinguishes 5 sector blocks, including additional sector blocks for food 
products and construction. In the following explanations I will stick to three sector blocks: thus, there 
are (6*3) sector block specific factor types in the model. Sector block specific factor types which can 
migrate, are defined by subset fmig(f) (and its alias fmigp) of factors, these factors can migrate within 
a migration group, which is specified in a separate mapping set. More specifically, as displayed in 
Table C.1, the mapping set defines pairs of factors, between which migration is possible, and defines 
it in both directions, e.g., skilled Jewish agricultural workers migrating to skilled Jewish 
manufacturing labour and vice versa. 
Table C.1. Migration Pairs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Skilled Jewish Skilled Arab 
and Others 
Unskilled 
Jewish 
Unskilled Arab 
and Others 
Foreigners  
from ROW 
Palestinians 
(I) 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
↕ 
Manufacturing 
(II) 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
Manufacturing 
↕ 
Services 
(III) 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
Services 
↕ 
Agriculture 
The migration decision is based on relative wage changes (Eq. M4). An increasing wage of factor 
fmigp relative to factor fmig initiates factors to migrate from factor fmig to factor fmigp (FSMfmig,fmigp) 
inside a specified migration group. The response to migration is governed by the factor specific 
migration elasticity (etamigfmig), which can take values between zero, not including the boundary for 
technical reasons, and infinity. With a low elasticity, near zero, factors respond only little to relative 
wage changes, a high elasticity makes factors react sensitive to changes in relative wages. All 
workers, who belong to a factor, have the possibility to migrate, thus migration is based on factor 
supply in the base (FS0fmig). In the base situation, the relative wage equals the relative wage in the 
C. Model Changes 
121 
base and there is no migration. It is worth to notice, that workers which stay in their old sector, are 
depicted as workers from fmig remaining in fmig (FSMfmig,fmig) and the migration function (Eq. M4) is 
only valid for migration pairs, alas, workers migrating from fmig to fmigp. Furthermore, pairwise 
migration flows are possible only in one direction, e.g., from skilled Jewish agricultural labour to 
skilled Jewish manufacturing labour, and must be positive, accordingly, FSMfmig,fmigp is per definition a 
positive variable. Hence, in the example with 3 sector blocks and 6 factor types which serve as 
migration groups, the number of equations and variables for the migration function is (6*3), which is 
the number of pairs between which migration is possible (Table C.1). Wages might differ for the 
activities a factor is employed in (WFAf,a=WFDISTf,a*WFf), thus, relative wages are defined by 
weighted average wage rates of the factor. 
 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Bilateral Migration Block   
(M4)                         
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Number of 
migration 
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Translated to a matrix of origin and destination factor groups, there are only diagonal entries in the 
base situation. Table C.2 exemplarily displays migration for one factor type (e.g., skilled Jewish 
labour): in the base the amount of workers in a factor type equals the base factor supply 
(FSMagr,agr=FS.lagr=FS0agr). When relative wages change in a simulation, bilateral factor migration 
occurs, this is induced by equation M4. Table C.2 shows this exemplarily, assuming increasing wages 
in manufacturing and services. The amount of workers who migrate from a factor and those who 
remain in the factor, the sum over columns, must equal the base supply of the factor (FS0fmig) (Eq. 
M5) This condition specifies the number of workers who do not migrate (FSMfmig,fmig). Finally, the sum 
over rows gives the new amount of workers in a factor group (FS.lfmig). 
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Table C.2. Bilateral Migration System 
Base Agriculture Manufacturing Services ∑ 
Agriculture FSMagr,agr   FS0agr 
Manufacturing  FSMman,man  FS0man 
Services   FSMser,ser FS0ser 
∑ FS.Lagr FS.Lman FS.Lser  
Simulation Agriculture Manufacturing Services ∑ 
Agriculture FSMagr,agr FSMagr,man FSMagr,ser FS0agr  constant 
Manufacturing  FSMman,man  FS0man constant 
Services  FSMser,man FSMser,ser FS0ser   constant 
∑ FS.Lagr FS.Lman FS.Lser  
 Productivity Adjustment C.3
Factors are assumed homogeneous inside a factor type and heterogeneous between factor types. 
Based on bilateral migration, the model is modified to allow for a variety of assumptions on factor 
productivity. For this purpose, in a first step, wages are defined per productivity unit and a sector 
specific efficiency factor for labour types (        ) is implemented to identify productivity 
differences. In the second step, a variable (         ) is defined which allows for productivity 
adjustments for migrating workers, i.e., when assuming factor specific productivity. 
A Sector Specific Efficiency Factor for Labour Types (        ) 
Assuming, that wage differences reflect differences in factor productivity, wages are defined per 
productivity unit and thus are equalized. Productivity differences are fully incorporated in the newly 
introduced efficiency factor for factor types (        ), thus, variables are defined the following: 
                                                                  
                                                                     
                                        
                                  
                                                 
                                                      
And 
                
     
              
 
[Wage of  
productivity unit] 
  
[Transaction value  
per productivity unit] 
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Following the new definition of variables, the calibration of parameters is adjusted, which are used 
for the initialisation of these variables. It is possible to calibrate wage rate and efficiency factors in 
two ways: 
 Version I: sector specific productivity 
o      ∑ (      )     ⁄  
o               
o            
(          ⁄ )
    
 
 Version II: factor specific productivity 
o                        ⁄  
o      ∑ (      ) ∑ (                ) ⁄  
o                
                 and                          44 
At this stage, it does not matter for results whether Version I or Version II is employed, unless there 
is no adjustment of the productivity taking place. Choosing ADFDFf,a as the productivity variable is 
thus a matter of interpretation: the sectoral proportion for factor prices, WFDISTf,a, connects 
productivity differences to activities, while ADFDFf,a connects productivity to factors. If ADFDFf,a is 
calibrated as in version II, the adjustment of the productivity takes place on the real factors’ level, 
and the upper/aggregated level adjusts accordingly. On the aggregated level it is not relevant 
whether WFDISTfag,a or ADFDFfag,a adjusts and ADFDFfag,a are fixed to its base levels. 
Because wages are defined per productivity unit, factor demand needs to be transferred into factor 
demand per productivity unit (FDf,a*ADFDFf,a) throughout the model. Accordingly, the efficiency 
factor is also implemented in the production functions: Value added (QVAa) is the result of employing 
productivity units, when one worker is double as productive as a second worker the output he 
produces is double as much. Equation X14a shows the new production function and equation X15a 
the corresponding first order condition for profit maximization, the new element is indicated by bold 
letters. Production functions on other levels of the nesting structure are adjusted similarly. 
In article 2 and article 3, labour types are aggregated and there is no differentiation between gender 
and occupation, the six remaining labour types are split by sector block. Thus the base structure of 
the production nest remains the same, but since each activity only employs the related sector block 
specific factor types there is no possibility to substitute between the sector blocks (Figure C.3). 
Accordingly substitution elasticities of the last nest of each branch in the nesting structure are 
without effect. 
  
                                                          
44
 On the aggregated level, productivity differences are caught by WFDISTfag,a again (and only by it), which is 
flexible. WFfag is fixed, too. 
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Figure C.2: Value Added Nest with Sector Block Specific Labour Types 
Agricultural block: e.g., Wheat production Manufacturing block: e.g., Textile production 
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 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Production Block, Second Level, Productivity Unit Calibration, 
(3rd, 4th and 5th level are analogue) 
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Implementation of a Productivity Adjustment for Migrating Workers 
When a factor moves between sectors or factor types, the factor is typically assumed to gain the 
productivity of the destination sector or factor type, thus, productivity is assumed sector specific45. In 
order to make productivity factor specific, which means that a factor keeps its old productivity in the 
destination, a productivity adjuster is implemented. With this adjuster, productivity adjusts 
endogenously in combination with the migration function. 
The base idea is, that a migrating factor (       ) maintains its old productivity and the average 
productivity of the new sector block (    ) adjusts accordingly. 
Migration is recorded factor group specific, we know the factor origin of each migrating factor, but 
not the exact activity (factors are homogeneous inside a factor group). The adjustment factor is 
therefore not activity specific, but sector block specific – unless a factor group represents only one 
activity. It is not possible to track the exact origin of the migrants of an activity, therefore workers are 
assumed to migrate in fixed shares to each activity which demands new labour. 
In case there is one factor type for each single activity, with factor specific productivity, the 
productivity of a factor type where in-migration occurs is determined as follows 
            
                                                             
       
 
or generalised 
                                                          
45
 The wording can cause some confusion: a factor moves from one factor type to another factor type which 
has its own productivity. The factor type has its productivity from employment in specific sectors and is 
therefore sector specific. Hence, when a factor migrates to another factor type and takes on the productivity of 
the destination factor type, it gets the productivity from employment in a new sector (even though it is also 
related to a specific factor type). 
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                     ∑                                  
       
  
When there are several activities per factor group, there are three points to deal with, exemplarily 
depicted in Figure C.4: 
1. Factors can move between factor types (f2 to f1) and also inside a factor between two 
activities (f1 from a1 to a2). It is possible to track movement between factor groups, but not 
between the actual activities inside a factor type. The change in FD includes both: movement 
inside a factor group and between factor groups. 
2. We do not know where the worker from a3 and the worker from a4 are going to, a1, a2 or 
a5. We therefore move workers with the ‘average productivity’ of their factor group. 
3. We only know the total amount of f2 migrating to f1 and f3, not which activity absorbs them 
actually, first, because workers can move inside a factor, from a1 to a2. Second, if a factor 
absorbs migrants from more than one factor, we do not know which activity absorbs which 
factor. Each sector is therefore assumed to receive the same share of ‘migrants’. The 
Productivity is adjusted in all activities of a factor group with the same adjustment factor. 
Figure C.3 Schematic Depiction of Migration Flows with Three Factor Types and Six Activities 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 
f1 X X     
f2   X X   
f3     X X 
Average factor specific productivity of a factor type (     ) is calculated as weighted average from 
activity specific efficiency factors: 
        
∑                  
∑        
    
The level of the productivity of factor type f1 is determined by the amount of workers remaining in 
factor type 1 and the amount of workers migrating to factor type 1, which keep their former factor 
type’s productivity: 
                                                            
Thus, translated to the activity specific efficiency factor (ADFDFf,a), the actual productivity is 
determined by the old productivity (ADFDF0f,a) and a factor type specific productivity adjustment 
factor (ADFDFADIf). 
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 Equation Number of 
Equations and 
Variables 
Variable 
 Productivity Block   
(PA1)                               (f*a) ADFDFf,a 
 where   
(PA2) 
          
∑                          
         
 
f ADFDFADJf 
 When there is only one activity per factor, then   
                     
With this setup, productivity can be set factor specific or alternatively sector specific for each factor 
type separately. When ADFDFADJf is fixed to its base value, ADFDFf,a does not change (Eq. PA1), a 
migrating factor takes on the productivity in the destination factor type and productivity is sector 
specific. When AFDFADJf,a is flexible and thus equation (Eq. PA2) is active, productivity is factor 
specific and a migrating worker adjusts the productivity in its destination factor type. An additional 
adjustment parameter, adfadjfp, is implemented to allow for variation in the skill transfer. If the 
adjustment parameter, adfadjfp, is set to a value less than 1, the worker cannot maintain his former 
level of income. When it equals 1, the worker maintains his old productivity; if it is greater than 1, 
productivity increases. 
Productivity adjustments occur only on the destination factor type. This is based on the assumption, 
that migrants are factors with average and not marginal productivity. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to argue, that the best workers are the first to migrate because they have also the best 
opportunities to adapt to a new labour type (e.g., a higher skill level or sector to work). Then 
migration should decrease productivity in the old sector of work and effect positively the destination 
labour type accordingly. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to argue, that a firm which 
decreases employment first gets rid of the least productive workers or workers choose to change 
their situation which are least appropriate for the job. Most apparent is this argument with regard to 
capital, where an investor would definitely start to reallocate first the least productive capital. With 
this assumption, migration should increase productivity in the old sector of employment and 
negatively influence the destination factor type. Both arguments are reasonable and there is a lack of 
empirical evidence which could give the preference to one argument. When the factor is assumed to 
migrate with the average productivity, it is therefore assumed that both types of factors migrate, the 
highest and the least productive workers, which in sum statute an average factor. 
This section describes extreme assumptions: productivity is either fully factor specific or fully sector 
specific. However, it is possible to choose a less extreme setup, where a part of the productivity is 
sector and another part is factor specific. For this purpose, WFDISTf,a and ADFDFf,a are calibrated to 
contain both a part of the productivity. WFDISTf,a then displays the sector specific productivity while 
ADFDFf,a accounts for the factor specific part. 
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Thus, there are four possibilities to depict productivity or skill transfer of inter-industry labour 
reallocation:  
 Reallocated labour adopts the new sector’s productivity. (ADFDFf is fixed) 
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity. Thus, the average productivity of 
each labour type in each sector block will change. (ADFDFf is flexible) 
 Reallocated labour retains the old sector’s productivity adjusted for a predetermined 
productivity change (adfadjfp,not equal to 1). 
 Reallocated labour adopts a productivity somewhere between that of the old and new 
sectors. Again, the average productivity of each labour type in each sector block will change. 
For this purpose, productivity is set partly sector and partly factor specific in model 
calibration. 
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